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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing”  
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics) 










This thesis aims to answer some questions with regard to how infants learn to perceive and 
perform goal-directed action. To address these two interrelated aspects of goal-directed action, the thesis 
employs a range of behavioral, occulomotor and pupillary measures designed to tap into developmental 
changes and the cognitive mechanisms that underlie these abilities. The first section of chapter 1 will 
introduce the general topic. The second section will focus on how infants perceive third-person goal 
directed action. A third section will focus on how infants learn about goals by experience. The fourth 
section will give a short overview of the remaining chapters. Readers should expect a certain amount of 
overlap between chapter 1 and chapters 2 to 8 since they are submitted/ accepted/ published as stand-
alone articles. 
General Background 
Let us consider why our question “how do infants learn to perceive, and perform goal-directed 
action?” is of serious importance. The world today is (as it has always been)  an ever changing hostile and 
complex place in which humans aspire to live comfortable and fulfilling lives. Fortunately humans are 
endowed with the ability to act on their environment, since sitting back and letting it all flow by is not an 
option. In order to act effectively upon our environment we need to be able to set goals. “How are we able 
to set such goals?” thus can be considered a life and death question.  
To start answering this question, we will reflect on what it is that constitutes a goal and a goal-
directed action. A goal is a desired, future state of affairs toward which effort is directed to attain it. A 
goal-directed action is an action directed toward attaining a goal. These definitions imply volition (or 
intentionality) and a cost, since (limited) physical and/or mental effort needs to be exerted to perform the 
action to achieve the desired state. The definition also implies prospective memory or planning since the 
effort exerted needs to be directed towards changing the future environment in a meaningful way so that 




Some authors have suggested that the rudimentary capability to have first-person goals (Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004; Rochat, 2001) and perceive third-person goals (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) is with us 
from birth on—or even earlier; while others stress that the capacity is learned (e.g., Piaget, 1962). 
However, given the complexity and flexibility of human behavior and the dramatic changes the mind and 
body undergo during development, it is rather unlikely that such innate goals remain stable across the 
lifespan (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Since our survival and life fulfillment critically depend on having 
complex goals, it seems necessary to assume that we learn new goals or modify existing goals during our 
lifetime. 
A new question thus arises; if goals are not (all) innate, how do we acquire them?  In principle the 
(folk-psychological) answer to that question seems quite simple, namely through experience and 
observing others.  However, under closer, more scientific scrutiny these answers are not so 
straightforward. These answers lead to new questions that result in more complicated answers: “How 
does one acquire new goals through observation?” and “How does one acquire new goals through 
experience?”. These more philosophical questions inevitably result in more elaborate and complicated 
answers. Along these lines many authors have focused on observation of third-person action as an 
important source for acquiring new goals, while other theorists have focused more on acquiring new goals 
through active exploration. Although these questions and approaches are to some extent separated 
throughout the dissertation for presentational purposes, one should keep in mind that theoretically and 
empirically these approaches are heavily interrelated. The crosstalk between the observation of third-
person action and action experience is most prominently displayed in chapter 4 wherein action experience 
actually alters and aids third-person action perception.  
Under the assumption that new goals are acquired during the lifetime, a logical step in studying 




of new goals is led by the profound developmental changes in mind and body that take place during this 
period in life. Indeed, the concept of goal itself might develop from a primitive to a more complex 
concept during this period as indicated by the emergence of more complex goal-directed behaviors with 
progressing age. Such developmental conceptual changes in goals may be mediated by advances in short- 
and long-term memory (for a review, see Rovee-Collier, 1999), knowledge of the physical world (such as 
object permanence (Piaget, 1936), and developmental changes in the cognitive system that mediate goal 
representation itself. Unraveling the answer to the question mentioned above “How do we learn about 
goals” is an ongoing effort in cognitive science.  
The current thesis will focus on developmental research on goal perception and representation.  
The thesis will firstly focus on how infants learn about goals by observation and then focus on the 
interplay of action experience and action perception. Thereafter focus will shift toward how infants 





Learning about goals by perceiving third-person actions 
The human race is essentially social. It relies on meaningful communication for sharing 
knowledge on successful survival strategies gathered throughout the generations. Meaningful 
communication is impossible without goal perception, the ability to perceive goals in others’ behavior. 
This ability can thus be placed at the very core of humanity. Furthermore, inferences about others’ goals, 
enables the prediction of behavior and thus greatly enhances our ability to react correctly and timely to 
others. This is of great advantage in any social situation.  
Indeed our everyday experiences are heavily influenced by the ability for goal perception. Goal 
perception is pervasive and immediately effects our perception, memory and reasoning about any third-
person actions (e.g., Woodward, Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson & Buresh, 2009). To illustrate, the 
propensity readily makes us interpret impoverished events, like the movement of two dimensional 
geometrical figures, as goal directed (e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944; Osaka, Ikeda & Osaka, 2012). Thus it 
seems that our cognitive systems actively try to make sense of the world by interpreting any perceived 
movements in terms of intentions and goals. As a result of this propensity we do not experience life as a 
succession of physical movements but rather parse events in terms of more meaningful terms such as 
goals. Indeed, the propensity to perceive goals, also help us to control our environment by enabling us to 
predict and explain behavior of others. 
In psychology, the ability to perceive goals and predict actions of others is often captured under 
the term Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM as a whole consists of three cognitive abilities that are assumed to 
be closely related, and sometimes even as being produced by a single underlying cognitive mechanism 
(Ravenscroft, 1997). These abilities are: the ability to predict human behavior in a wide range of 
circumstances, to attribute mental states to humans, and the ability to explain the behavior of humans in 




underpin such processing (Ravenscroft, 1997). Although the definition mentioned above only mentions 
“humans”, there is ample evidence that humans also use mindreading for machines and animals. However 
these actors are not incorporated in the definition since insisting that mental state attributions to animals 
are not metaphorical is compatible with such attributions being “systematically false”. Therefore, the 
precise extension of the ToM remains under debate. Some theorists would even contend that the same 
processes involved in ToM also apply to first person mindreading by assuming simulational processes.  
ToM, through communication, enables typical human phenomena such as language and culture. 
Since these phenomena are human prerogatives, some researchers postulate intention reading ability to be 
restricted to the human race (for a review see: Lurz, 2011). Nonetheless, some evidence indicating 
intention reading in animals such as chimpanzees does exist (e.g. Premack & Woodruff, 1978; for a 
review see Call & Tomasello, 2008). Many of the (philosophical) arguments against interpreting these 
studies as evidence for animal mindreading abilities, such as posing consciousness and language ability 
(e.g. Davidson, 1985) or “mentalese”  (a hypothetical language in which concepts and propositions are 
represented in the mind without words) (Fodor, 1975) as prerequisites (for a review see: Lurz, 2009), may 
also apply to infants. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the intention reading ability evolved 
to a greater extent in the human race. Thus, since full blown ToM becomes apparent later in human 
development, behavior that infants show, when consistent with goal attribution, may be interpreted as 
evidence for an emerging ability to read intentions. Nevertheless theorists are divided with regard to how 
ToM develops, some see infants as actively exploring the environment to accumulate and falsify 
hypothesis regarding the ToM (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997), while others see it as an ability that is to a large 
extent innate and matures during childhood (Scholl & Leslie 1999). 
However, infants’ initial state of goal perception or intention reading (like that in animals) may be 




great interest, whether infants actually ascribe mental states, such as beliefs and desires, to others. 
Alternatively, they may rely on contingencies between the observable cues in the environment and target 
behaviors, trigger stereotypical motor patterns that are innate, or rely on mental simulation that doesn't 
require having mental state concepts (Andrews, 2012). Indeed, theorists have proposed that intention 
reading need not be mentalistic in content (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995). They propose that 
intention attribution in the mentalistic sense evolves from teleological interpretations. To illustrate: the 
teleological answer to the question “Why did the chicken cross the road?” would be: “To get to the other 
side” whereas the mentalistic answer would be “Because it wanted to go to the other side”. Notice that 
both answers explain the observed behavior, but only the mentalistic answer refers to the mind of the 
chicken. An even deeper philosophical divide concerns the subjectively perceived causal structure of 
mental states. On the one hand, theorists such as Fodor (1987) maintain that intentional states are in fact 
causal in producing behavior, while other theorists such as Dennett (1987) propose that concepts of 
intentional states, such as belief, desire, and perceiving, are theoretical concepts that exist by virtue of, 
and are determined by, a common-sense psychology or folk-psychology (ToM).  According to Dennet, 
for another to have intentional states, is for its behaviors to be well predicted and explained by the 
principles of folk psychology (ToM) (Lurz, 2009). The ascribed intentional states do not necessarily refer 
to real structural or functional states in the brain or body. He thus proposes that ToM is epiphenomenal to 
behavior predictive strategies. 
These philosophical considerations aside, theorists like Sodian (2011) propose, analogues to the 
teleological view (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995), that early infants’ goal attribution relies on a “lean level of 
analysis” working solely on the assumption that an agent’s (intentional) action is goal oriented. Only the 
later representational ToM analysis of goal attribution requires the observer to represent the agents’ 
viewpoint, who can have desires and (false) beliefs about a certain state of the world mentally. 




analysis” thus suggesting a developmental pathway. She bases this assumption on a number of studies 
that show that individual differences in goal attribution in habituation tasks at the ages of 6–14 months, 
predicted the performance on a ToM test at preschool age in several independent studies (Aschersleben, 
Hofer, & Jovanovic, 2008; Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008; Wellman, Phillips, 
Dunphy-Lelii, & Lalonde, 2004). Whatever the exact ontogeny and content of goal attributions, let us 
now turn to methods for investigating the development of goal attribution in infancy. 
Methods of assessing goal perception 
Alas intention reading (just as intention proper) cannot be directly observed. This makes it 
imperative for developmental cognitive research on goal attribution to rely on indirect measures.  Until 
recently most research found such a measure in imitation. The logic of these studies is that in order to 
successfully imitate the goal of a perceived third-person action, the participants must perceive it as goal 
directed. This logic is temptingly simple. Nonetheless, it becomes rather complicated when one takes into 
account the concept of emulation (Tomasello, Davis-Dasilva, Camak, & Bard, 1987). This idea holds that 
one can copy behavior, outcomes of behavior or learn affordances without actually attributing a goal to 
the observed model. Thus the exact definition of imitation adhered to is of great importance for research 
on goal perception. Some have suggested definitions that require imitation to refer to the learning of novel 
actions (Byrne & Russon, 1998). Others suggested that the term should involve intention understanding 
(Tomassello, 1999) or a conscious intention to imitate (Tissaw, 2007). Still others see these strict 
definitions as too controversial (Paulus, 2011) and adhere to a definition that only requires the actions of 
the imitator to be sufficiently similar to the model in terms of behavior and outcome (for a review see 
Paulus, 2011). However, imitational studies, adhering to different levels of strictness on the definition, 




by observation, even though relatively few experiments are devoted to understanding the phenomenon of 
imitation itself (Jones, 2009).  
One of the aims of Piaget’s elaborate genetic epistemological stage theory (1962) was to account 
for the emergence of imitation. Others have suggested an innate apprehension of equivalences between 
acts of the self and those of others that enables imitation (Melzoff, 2007). Meltzoff & Moore (e.g., 1977) 
and others  have presented evidence suggesting that a rudimentary innate ability to imitate (very simple) 
gestures such as protruding ones tongue or mouth opening is present in neonates (see Anisfeld, 1991 for a 
review). These findings are under heavy debate (Jones, 2009) and even if one does accept the behavior in 
these studies as imitation or emulation of a goal-directed action, the goal itself is not new in the sense that 
the infants never protruded their tongues before. Thus although imitation is seen as one of the most 
important steps in the development of the human brain (Hayek, 1952), its onset and the exact cognitive 
mechanisms that enable the translation of third-person goal-directed behavior into first person behavior 
remain open for discussion (Jones, 2009).  
Imitational research has provided a wealth of concepts regarding action perception (e.g., 
Meltzoff, 2007), nonetheless one could conclude that methods that use imitation as a derived measure of 
goal attribution might not be ideally suited to the task. There are several reasons for this conclusion. 
Firstly, the concept of imitation itself is ill defined. Furthermore (partly due to its troublesome definition) 
its developmental onset is vague at best. Differences in the onset of goal perception versus imitation could 
thus produce results that under- or overestimate the capacity of goal perception. Additionally, there is a 
large motivational component in imitational studies, meaning that infants might simply not “want” to 
imitate a certain action while being perfectly able to do so. Lastly, infants might “want” to imitate a 
certain action without having proper motor control to do so. Thus infants may be more, or less able to 




A method that may be more suitable for measuring goal perception in third-person action is the 
preferential looking time method as developed by Fantz (1958). In (simple) preferential looking time 
studies infants are habituated to (or familiarized with) a certain stimulus until attention decreases by a 
predefined amount. Thereafter they are confronted with a second stimulus that is different on some 
dimension. Attention recovery or looking longer at the second stimulus is taken as evidence that the 
infants noticed the change along that dimension and thus perceived the dimension, which resulted in more 
elaborate processing.  If applied meticulously and with the right control conditions, this technique could 
in principle asses if and how infants perceive an action as goal-directed if one changes the stimuli in the 
right way. Although, just like in imitation, the cognitive mechanisms subservient to the phenomenon of 
habituation are under discussion (Colombo & Mitchell, 2009), preferential looking time has an important 
advantages over imitational measures; since the phenomenon is robustly present at birth (e.g., Friedman, 
Nagy & Carpenter, 1970) the measure does not run the risk of failing to detecting goal perception due to 
onset issues. The vast majority of recent studies on goal perception utilize this method. Recent advances 
in the suitability for infant research of eye tracking, EEG and near infrared spectroscopy have brought 
these methods within the grasp of developmental cognitive research. 
Some seminal findings using looking time measures 
A seminal way of assessing goal attribution in infants, that uses looking time as a measure was 
developed by Woodward (1998). Woodward devised a (dis-) habituation paradigm to contrast the surface 
features of a goal-directed action to its more conceptual aspect that is the goal of the action, the Violation 
of Expectation (VoE) paradigm. Using a live puppet-show she habituated 5- and 9-month-old infants to 
an arm coming in from the side of a stage repeatedly grasping one of two different toys presented at 
horizontally distinct locations (a familiar action since infants start to reliably reach for interesting thing 




Before the test trials infants were shown that the location of the two toys were swapped. Woodward then 
measured the dishabituation to two different test events; in one  of the events the same toy was grasped at 
the new location and in the other test events the new toy was grasped at the old location. In this study 9-
month-olds dishabituated more to the new toy same location presentation than to the old toy different 
location presentation. The infants now expected the actor to continue to grasp the same toy even though it 
was in a different location. With appropriate controls, this study was taken as evidence for goal attribution 
for familiar human actions in 9-month-old infants. Goal attribution is now widely accepted to emerge in 
infants around 6 months (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007; Woodward, 1998; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, 
& Hiraki, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 1. Woodwards 1998 paradigm. Infants were habituated to a hand grasping a toy at one of two locations. From 
habituation to test the toys change sides. Infants dishabituate more to a change of goal (Test event 1) than to a change of location 
(Test event 2) indicating the infants expects the actor to have the same goal as during habituation. This figure is partly adapted 
from Woodward (1998). 
  
Habituation event





Another seminal line of research into goal attribution using similar methodology, aimed at 
assessing how infants rely on the selection of action means for goal attribution, was started by Gergely et 
al. (1995). In their experiment twelve-month-old infants were habituated to an animated circle that 
approached another circle either in an efficient or inefficient manner. In the “efficient approach” 
condition, the circle jumped over an obstacle in order to get to the other circle, while in the “inefficient 
approach” condition the circle jumped although the obstacle was not located between the two circles. In 
the test phase the obstacle was removed. Both groups saw the old (now inefficient) jumping action and a 
new straight pathway approach in which the animated circle moved towards the other circle in an efficient 
straight path. Gergely and colleagues (1995) found that only the infants habituated to the efficient goal 
approach dishabituated significantly to the inefficient, more familiar jumping action even though the 
efficient straight line approach was new to them. They concluded that only the infants who had seen an 
efficient action during habituation had seen the action as goal directed and thus had the expectation in the 
test phase that the circle would approach the other circle in an efficient goal-directed manner (a straight 






Figure 2. Gergely et al. (1995) paradigm. Infants were habituated to either the efficient or the inefficient goal approach 
wherein a small circle approaches a big circle (in the inefficient condition the obstacle was not in between the two circles yet the 
circle still jumped). During test they were shown either the old or the new action now without any obstacles. Only infants in the 
efficient goal approach condition dishabituate more to a the old action than to the new action. This indicates the infants expected 
the small ball to efficiently approach the big ball given the changed situational constraints. This figure is partly adapted from 
Gergely et al. (1995). 
Theoretical approaches to third-person action perception 
By now there is a large body of evidence that demonstrates an emerging understanding of third-
person action in infancy during the second part of the first year (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007; Woodward, 
1998; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005). Yet, the cognitive mechanisms that subserve 
such an understanding and their developmental origins are still under heavy theoretical debate. Proposed 
theories differ along a number of dimensions, mostly motivated by the scientific traditions from which 
they evolved, and thus deliver partially contrasting explanations (Paulus, 2011). However, the 
mechanisms suggested are often not mutually exclusive but rather should be seen as complementary, 









temporal order in development). Theoretical confusion and debate is for a large part due to inaccurate 
definitions within the field, and the often difficult to prove claims of nativism versus constructivism or 
maturation versus experience.  
The nativist- versus constructivist- divide in third-person goal perception, closely mimics the 
historic divide in language-acquisition theory; while Chomsky (1965) suggests innate modules 
specifically evolved for language acquisition, Vygotsky (1985) stresses experience as the main drive 
behind language acquisition. Similarly some propose hardwired full-fledged action understanding (Fodor, 
1987) or “core principles” to guide emerging intention reading (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994), while others 
stress constructivist sensori-motor processes whereby action understanding emerges through experience 
(e.g., Piaget, 1962). Another dimension that differentiates theories is whether individual (e.g. Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003) or social processes are highlighted (Király, Csibra & Gergely, 2013). 
To illustrate, several, sometimes interrelated processes have been suggested as fundamental for a 
full-fledged percept of a third-person goal-directed action. For one, the observant has to be able to parse 
the continuous stream of events in a way that enables him to select a certain sequences of events that is 
likely to contain a goal-directed action. Several different processes might play a role in such a parsing 
ability. A process hypothesized to be important for the selection of events that could contain goal-directed 
action, is that of actor detection. The logic behind this hypothesis is that the mere presence of a moving 
actor is in itself is a good predictor of goal-directed action occurring. Some theorize that the process of 
actor detection develops as a result of infants’ experiences with human agents (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995; 
Woodward, Sommerville & Guajardo, 2001) suggesting that the detection of actors first applies to 
humans and then generalizes to other classes of actors. Others theorize that the detection of actors relies 
on more abstract cues such as biological motion, non-rigid transformation and self-propulsion (e.g., 




Another process, hypothesized to be important for parsing events, is the detection of significant 
changes in the physical world, in other words, the detection of action effects. Such effects are 
hypothesized to aid the interpretation of an end state as a goal state. Again, several mechanisms have been 
suggested for this interpretational process. Some stress the detection of surface features of the end state 
such as its’ saliency (for a review, see: Elsner 2007) or spatiotemporal properties (e.g., Gergely et al., 
1995), while others stress more elaborate cognitive processes such as the internal emulation of the action 
to assess the end state as a goal (Meltzoff, 2007). Another major point of divergence for theories on the 
perception of goal-directed action is the perception of novel, versus familiar actions. Some experience-
oriented theorists, working in the grounded or embodied cognition tradition, such as Woodward (1998) 
stress that in order to interpret an action as goal-directed the action has to be within the infants action 
repertoire. Others stress mechanisms that do not rely on action repertoire but utilize more abstract 
interpretational principles (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995). 
As outlined above theoretical standpoints clearly diverge on a number of dimensions.  For clarity 
three of the main theories regarding third-person action understanding will now be highlighted: motor 
resonance, teleological reasoning and action-effect theory. 
Motor resonance 
A theoretical approach that has lately enjoyed major interest in the field of goal-directed action 
perception is the motor resonance approach. Although a privileged link between action and perception has 
been suggested as early as the late nineteenth century (James, 1890), approaches that emphasize such a 
link, the grounded- and embodied-cognition approaches (e.g., Barsalou, 2008), have recently gained 
renewed prominence due to the discovery of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, 




grounded- cognition theories state that cognition (and thus action understanding) is grounded in bodily 
experiences.  
Di Pellegrino and colleagues (1992) were the first to document neurons in the premotor cortex of 
macaque monkeys that fire when executing a grasping movement, and when a similar action is observed. 
This result was only obtained for goal-directed (object-directed) actions; mimicry of such actions did not 
produce the effect. Such findings gave rise to the idea that monkeys use the same brain regions 
responsible for planning actions to interpret third-person actions. Theorists suggested that by feeding 
information about the observed action into their own motor system, the monkeys were able to interpret 
the observed action in terms of a goal by simulating the action as if they were performing it themselves.  
Later findings suggesting a homologous MNS in humans (e.g., Gazzola & Keysers, 2009), extended this 
theory of action understanding through inverse planning to humans. A number of researchers went on to 
proposed the MNS and its’ ability to “share” motor representations, to be the foundational cornerstone for 
higher order social processes, such as motor learning, imitation, perspective taking, understanding facial 
emotions and empathy (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). Although the theory has many 
proponents, there are also some theorists that fear that over-interpretation of the available data gave rise to 
the MNH (e.g., Hickok, 2009). They propose that mirror neurons play only secondary roles in action 
understanding. 
The most comprehensive developmental theory regarding third person action perception based on 
the MNH was developed by Meltzoff (2007).  In his “Like me framework” he poses that infants use the 
(supramodal) codes generated by the MNS for interpreting third person action. Infants ascribe internal 
states such as goals by applying the simple strategy of attributing the same mental states that went along 
with the action when they perform it themselves. Although he acknowledges the capacity to emulate 




experience. He states that a primitive, developing capacity to represent “supramodal” codes generated by 
the MNS is present at birth. He derives this assumption from his imitation research on neonates (Meltzoff 
& Moore, e.g. 1977).  Others see the MNS as an emergent property of hebbian- (Hanuschkin, Ganguli & 
Hahnloser, 2013; Del Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 2009) or associative- (Heyes, 2010) learning 
mechanisms and thus experience. Again these views are hard to disentangle experimentally. However, the 
main prediction of the MNH and the “Like me framework” is that the ability to perceive goal-directed 
action develops as a function of action experience and that it is restricted to human (or human like) 
agents. 
The application of motor resonance theory gained large scale support in developmental science 
due to the seminal VoE work of Woodward (1998) (for an explanation of the methodology see above and 
Figure 1).  Woodward found evidence for goal attribution in 9-month-old infants, but only when the 
puppet show was performed by a human arm, not when the actor was a rod, or when the actor performed 
an unfamiliar back-of-the-hand-dropping action (Woodward, 1999). This was taken as evidence that 
infants have to be familiar with the action presented in order to interpret it as goal directed. Furthermore it 
suggests that the actor has to be human (some might comment that the macaques’ MNS reacted to human 
motion, however humans are more like macaques than like rods). Furthermore Guajardo and Woodward 
(2004) showed that 7- and 12-month-old infants in a similar paradigm were unable to attribute a goal to 
an actor wearing a glove unless they were familiarized with the actor wearing gloves prior to the task.  
Sommerville, Woodward and Needham (2005) additionally showed that 3-month-old infants can attribute 
a goal when they observe an actor wearing a mitten if they are allowed to practice making contact and 
picking up toys by using a mitten covered with Velcro fabric. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence suggestive of other processes playing a role. For instance several 




attribution in infants to non-human actors. These studies used paradigms very similar to that of 
Woodward (1998). Biro, Csibra and Gergely (2007) argue that not only cues such as human features or 
human-biomechanical motion can elicit identifying an actor as such, but additionally propose cues such as 
self propulsion and behavioral cues such as equifinal movement to account for goal attribution to non-
human agents. Furthermore  Luo and Baillargeon (2005) found that goal attribution in a Woodward type 
paradigm did not take place when during familiarization only one object was presented, suggesting that 
infants only attribute a goal when the actor can express a preference. Thus, although the MNH has 
generated research that indicates that infants more readily interpret human- as opposed to non-human 
action as goal directed, this may be due to additional agency cues in human action not to the MNS. Thus 
the MNH may yet turn out to be an ineffective “weapon of mass explanation”.  
Action-Effect Learning 
Another theory related to motor resonance regarding goal attribution, that also emphasizes action 
experience as an important factor for action perception, is ideomotor theory. The theory states that infants 
perceive action goals by using previously acquired action-effect representations. The nature of the 
representations used however is more specified than in general motor resonance theory. Repeated 
experience with an action and its effect automatically binds the distal representations of the action and 
effect into an action-effect association. These action-effect associations are bidirectional. This is crucial to 
the theory since this allows the agent to activate the appropriate action by thinking of its effect. 
Furthermore, it allows predicting action outcomes by way of activation of the motor pattern. Notice that 
this process can only take place if a salient effect is presented. The theory thus predicts that bidirectional 





Although the theory was initially non developmental and mainly used to explain first-person 
action perception (see section 2 of the introduction), by now it has been extended to the development of 
third person action perception. This was done under the influence of theoretical elaborations on action-
effect theory like the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) 
and the discovery of the MNS. In TEC the authors proposed that humans use the same distal features to 
represent their own and others’ actions. Although these distal codes are similar to the “supramodal” codes 
Meltzoff (2007) proposes, TEC does not make the assumption that they are inborn. Thus action-effect 
theory is in itself not sufficient to explain goal attribution in third-person action. It additionally needs 
some kind of internal representational overlap between first-person- and third-person action 
representations.  
Indeed, salient action effects have been shown to aid third person goal attribution (e.g., Biro & 
Leslie, 2007; Jovanovic, Kiraly, Elsner, Gergely, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2007, for a review, see: Hauf, 
2007) even for unfamiliar actions (Kiraly, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003).  
Furthermore infants are more likely to imitate actions that have a salient action effect (Hauf & 
Aschersleben, 2008; Klein, Hauf & Aschersleben, 2006; for a review, see: Elsner 2007; Melzoff, 2007). 
And several studies have shown that own action experience (and thus action-effect knowledge) does 
affect the perception of third-person goal directed action (e.g., Hauf, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2007; 
Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a, 2005b). 
Teleological reasoning 
A third important theory regarding goal attribution to observed action, that directly confronts the 
motor resonance based view, was first formulated by Gergely et al. (1995) (for an explanation of the 
methodology of their experiment see above and Figure 2). The theory belongs to the tradition that poses 




infants perceive an action as goal directed when it follows the principle of rational action which states that 
“an action can be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most justifiable action towards 
the goal state that is available within the constraints of reality” (Csibra & Gergely, 1998). The action 
thus needs to be efficient towards the end state, considering the situational constraints, for goal attribution 
to occur. The theory is teleological in the sense that it does not require any mentalistic explanations to be 
attributed by the observer it requires that the end state of a certain action be explained by the action and 
the situational constraints (contrary for instance to the “like me” framework of Meltzoff (2007). 
Teleological reasoning is considered the core of the full blown theory of mind which allows humans to 
attribute intentions, feelings and (false) beliefs to others (Premack & Woodruff; 1978). Csibra and 
Gergely (1998) state that the principle of rational action is the initial state of the infants’ naïve 
psychological theory whereupon can be elaborated by adding mentalistic explanations later in 
development.  
 The results of Gergely et al. (1995) and others who used similar paradigms (e.g., Csibra, 
Gergely, Biro, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Csibra, Biro, Koós, Gergely, 2003; Csibra, 2008; Wagner & 
Carey, 2005; Sodian, Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004) indeed suggest that means-selection information is 
crucial to goal attribution. Support for the theological stance also comes from imitation studies (e.g., 
Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002) which show that infants’ imitation also depends on the efficiency of 
the shown action (for a contradictory view on these results see Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers & Beckering, 
2011a-2011b; Beisert et al., 2012). 
Taken together the theoretical views outlined above provide several different mechanisms which 
could explain the emergence of goal perception in third-person action. In the first three empirical chapters 
of this thesis we will assess how each of these mechanisms affects goal perception and, where possible, 




Learning new goals by experience 
The second question explored in this thesis is “How do infants acquire new goals through 
experience?”. Infants start to show evidence of (primitive) being goal-directed in their behavior from a 
very early age on. The onset of intentional behavior depends on the exact definition of goal-directed 
action adhered to. If one does not dwell too long on in how far these behaviors are actually planned and 
intentional, primitive and easily disrupted goal-directed behaviors such as moving a hand towards the 
mouth (Butterworth & Hopkins, 1988) or orienting towards sound (Zelazo, Brody, & Chaika, 1984) are 
evident in neonates (e.g., Bertenthal, 1996; Metzoff & Moore, 1997; von Hofsten, 2004). Slightly more 
demanding behaviors such as grasping an interesting object in order to examine it, appear around 5 
months of age (Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Clearfield & Thelen, 2001). More sophisticated intentionally 
planned goal-directed behavior, for which infants need to be able to distinguish means from ends, starts to 
appear around nine months of age (Claxton, Keen, & McCarty, 2003; Hauf, 2007; Willatts, 1999; Piaget, 
1936; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000; Woodward et al., 2009).  
Altogether these findings underline a developing ability to represent first-person action goals. In 
principle goals could be innate and just mature during development. However, given the world’s ever-
changing nature and complexity, and the dramatic development the mind and body of infants undergo, it 
is plain common sense to assume that goal representations are not innate, finite and permanent (e.g., 
Greenwald, 1970; Hommel & Elsner, 2009).   
Piaget (1936) was the first cognitive developmental psychologist, to systematically research the 
origin of emerging knowledge during infancy.  In his genetic epistemological approach (origin of 
knowledge) he firstly suggested that goals should be adaptive to the infant’s changing skills and abilities. 
He suggested that goals may derive from its own sensorimotor exploration and experience motivated by a 




with their effects into schemata necessary for perception and action, he does not elaborate on the 
underlying cognitive mechanism (Piaget, 1954). 
Ideomotor theory 
Exactly such a mechanism was proposed in the late nineteenth century, though largely neglected 
in psychology for a century. Following the lead of Lotze (1852) and Harless (1861), James (1890) 
suggested a cognitive mechanism that does what Piaget (1936) proposed; it provides actors with action 
goals that are rooted in their own sensorimotor experience. In his ideomotor theory James stated that all 
actions are necessarily involuntary when being carried out for the first time. Indeed, if one defines action 
as goal-directed movement, it presupposes some sort of anticipation of its effect. This again implies 
knowledge on action-effect relationships, which needs to be acquired before the action can be carried out 
“in order to” produce the outcome intentionally. Ideomotor theory suggests that such knowledge is 
acquired on the fly: whenever people move, they automatically and unintentionally create bidirectional 
associations between the perceived effects and the motor pattern producing them. This association brings 
the movement under voluntary control: Once acquired, the agent can now activate the motor pattern 
producing a movement by “thinking of” (i.e., endogenously activating the representation of) a perceptual 
effect. Indeed, infants start to motor babble (i.e., produce random movements) in utero (cf., Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1997)—which could explain the possible presence of goal representations at birth—and they are 
consistently exploring their environment. This provides ample opportunity to acquire movement/action-
effect associations and thus a steadily increasing pool of possible action goals. Thus, James considered 
bidirectional movement/action-effect associations the fundamental building blocks of intentional action 
and provides a mechanism that could allow the emergence of goal-directed action in infants. Ideomotor 




Hommel, 2001) and is now part of a broader theoretical movement stressing the interplay between 
perception and action (Hommel et al., 2001; Meltzoff, 2007; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002). 
Seminal findings 
The quintessential paradigm that showed the formation and use of bidirectional action-effect 
associations was developed by Elsner and Hommel (2001). They designed the “two stage model of 
voluntary action” (Figure 3). Their paradigm closely resembles the two stages. In the first stage (the 
acquisition phase) actions are automatically bidirectionally bound to their effects. To accomplish this they 
had adults carry out self-chosen left and right key presses in response to a visual trigger stimulus. Each 
key press produced a particular sound (e.g., left key  low tone, right key  high tone), and even though 
these sounds were irrelevant for the task, it was assumed that participants would acquire bidirectional 
associations between the key presses and the tone representations. The second stage is the stage wherein a 
voluntary action is produced by anticipation of its action effect. Participants were again freely choosing 
left and right key presses, but in this test phase the visual trigger was replaced by an auditory trigger 
stimulus: high and low tones (identical to the previous action effects) presented in random sequence. As 
predicted, people were quicker and more likely to choose the action that previously had produced the 
currently presented trigger tone (e.g., they were quicker and more likely to press the left key when hearing 






Figure 3. Two stage model by Elner and Hommel (2001). At stage1, the motor patter producing a particular effect is 
automatically integrated with the cognitive codes representing this effect. At stage 2, the motor pattern is intentionally executed 
by activating the cognitive codes that represent its effect. This figure is partly adapted from Elsner and Hommel (2001). 
  




This seminal finding motivated numerous demonstrations of bidirectional action-effect 
acquisition in humans ranging from 4-year-olds (Eenshuistra, Weidema & Hommel, 2004; Kray, 
Eenshuistra, Kerstner, Weidema & Hommel, 2006) to adults (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Action-
effect acquisition was found for a wide range of actions and effects (for a review see: Hommel & Elsner, 
2009), suggesting a general action-effect integration mechanism. Additionally, action-effect acquisition 
has been found after just one trial (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009), suggesting that the mechanism is fast-acting 
and implicit. Action-effect acquisition is modulated by the same factors that influence instrumental 
learning (e.g., temporal contiguity and contingency of movement and effect: Elsner & Hommel, 2004) 
and does not depend on voluntary attention (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Band, 
Steenbergen, Ridderinkhof, Falkenstein & Hommel, 2009). Together with the fact that it was also found 
in animals (see Elsner & Hommel, 2001), this suggests that action-effect integration it is a fairly low-level 
and automatic process (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Except for Band et al. (2009) the studied mentioned 
above all involve the activation of actions thru presenting the effect that previously produced them. 
However recently a new type of paradigm emerged that assesses activation of expected effects by 
producing the action that normally precedes them. In such paradigms sensory attenuation (attenuation, in 
terms both of phenomenology and cortical response) to expected action effects is found (e.g., Cardoso-
Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach & Waszak, 2010; Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013b; for a review 
see: Hughes, Desantis & Waszak, 2013a).  
Corroborating evidence for ideomotor processes in infancy 
If bidirectional action-effect associations are indeed the fundamental building blocks for 
intentional action, the system that generates these associations should be operative early in life. Especially 
since infants show evidence of goal-directed behavior from a very early age on. As discussed above, 




action understanding in 7 months-olds (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007; for a review, see: Hauf, 2007; Kiraly et 
al., 2003) and imitation in 9-months-olds (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008; Klein et al., 2006; for a review, 
see: Elsner 2007; Meltzoff, 2007). Even though these findings do not provide direct evidence for 
bidirectional action-effect acquisition, theories that emphasize similar representational formats for first-
person experience and observed action (e.g., Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Hommel et al., 2001; 
Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 1999), and conceptualize action understanding as inverse planning (Melzoff, 
2007; Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum, 2009) consider them corroborative. Other corroborating evidence was 
found in studies that show very young infants to be sensitive to action-effect contingencies. For instance, 
newborns actively adjust their sucking rate in response to their mothers’ voice as ongoing conditional 
feedback (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980) and 2-month-olds pursue interesting action effects by intentionally 
varying their sucking rate (Rochat & Striano, 1999) or varying gaze direction (Watson, 1967; for a 
review, see Gergely & Watson, 1999). Another line of research by Carolyn Rovee-Collier shows that 
action effects aid memory retrieval for actions from two months of age (Rovee & Rovee, 1969; for a 
review, see Rovee-Collier, 1999). Telling as these studies may be (they show that action contingent 
effects play an important role in infant behaviour and memory) they were not designed to directly asses 
the bidirectionality of action-effect associations and their use for action planning and may thus confound 
actual action-effect learning with simple operant conditioning. Nonetheless, these findings may reflect a 
developing ability for learning action-effect contingencies. 
Validating ideomotor theory as a developmental theory 
Ideomotor theory is rapidly gaining a following among developmental scientists. Many 
researchers apriori assume that learning new goals (learning new bidirectional action-effect associations) 
should be supported by the same mechanism as it is in adults. Although there is a lot of corroborating 




in infancy is premature since the most important piece of the puzzle is still missing: direct evidence for 
uptake of bidirectional action-effect associations in infancy. Such evidence would greatly validate the 
application of ideomotor theory as a developmental theory for goal perception. Furthermore, it would 
greatly broaden the scope for ideomotor theory as a whole. Thus the first aim of the second section of the 
thesis will be to generate such evidence. Under the assumption that we will succeed at fulfilling the first 
aim, the second aim regarding the application of ideomotor to developmental psychology will be to 
discover the developmental pathway the uptake of bidirectional action-effect associations follows. 
The first crucial challenge in our quest to find direct evidence for bidirectional action-effect 
associations in infants will be to come up with a paradigm that is both suitable for infants and can provide 
such evidence. To meet this challenge we will modify the original Elsner & Hommel (2001) paradigm 
and rely on a number of different measures. Modifications will include great simplification of the 
paradigm and making the paradigm attractive to infants. Furthermore, we will employ the relatively new 
technique of eye tracking to overcome any motoric challenges infants face. Lastly we will use the recently 





Outline of the thesis 
 As mentioned above the main question of the current thesis can be divided into two, to a certain 
degree, interrelated questions: “How do infants learn about goals be perceiving third-person action?” and 
“How do infants learn new goals by experience?”.  The questions of the first part of the thesis, regarding 
the perception of third-person action, will mainly concern what kinds of information infants use for goal 
attribution, and their relative importance. The importance of the chosen outcome of an action will be 
compared to the importance of the efficiency of the action in regard to the (changing) situational 
constraints. Furthermore, we will explore the role action experience plays in goal attribution. Another aim 
of this part of the thesis will be to establish if the different VoE paradigms (one type of paradigm 
concentrates on outcome selection information, the other type systematically varies the efficiency of 
actions in relation to changing situational constraints) tap into a unitary concept of goal. The questions of 
the second part of the thesis, regarding the way infants pick up new goals by experience, will mainly 
concern the conformation of the ideomotor processes for first-person action perception and action control 
in infancy. In addition, the developmental timeline of these principles will be investigated.  
Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between findings from the Woodward-(1998) and the 
Gergely et al. (1995) type paradigm. In the Woodward-type paradigm infants are shown actions in which 
the actor consistently chooses one of two possible outcomes, whereas in the Gergely-type paradigm the 
actors use efficient means, depending on situational constraints, toward one outcome. Since these 
paradigms capitalize on different kinds of information the question arises which type of information is 
more important for goal attribution. To answer this question, we combined the two types of information 
into one VoE paradigm.  
Chapter 3 utilizes a similar paradigm to investigate if infants can transfer goal attribution from a 




possible outcomes. In other words, does observing an actor efficiently adjusting his action to situational 
constraints, lead infants to expect that the actor will continue to approach the same goal after another 
potential outcome is presented in the scene? Such transfer would indicate that both the Woodward- (1998) 
and Gergely et al.-(1995) type paradigms tap into the same unitary concept of goal that relies on both 
outcome- and means- information.  
In the fourth chapter we explore the question if first-person experience with a certain movement, 
or only first-person action-effect associations, can influence goal attribution to a novel action wherein no 
effects are presented.  
 The second part of the thesis will concern the second of our two questions “How do infants learn 
new goals by experience?” To further validate ideomotor theory as a cognitive developmental theory, as a 
starting point, chapter five replicates previous findings (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006) that 
indicate that 4-year-old children can form bidirectional action-effect associations and compare their 
performance to adults. The secondary aim of the study was to investigated whether action-effect 
associations are also acquired under explicit-learning conditions and whether familiar action-effect 
relations (such as between a trumpet and a trumpet sound) are learned the same way as novel, arbitrary 
relations are.  
The next two chapters represent the first attempts to provide direct evidence for the spontaneous 
acquisition of bidirectional action-effect associations in infancy. In chapter six we applied a highly 
simplified version of the Elsner and Hommel paradigm (2001).  
Chapter seven is methodologically more advanced adaptation of the Elsner and Hommel 
paradigm (2001). The paradigm was made suitable for all age groups ranging from 7-month-old infants to 
adults and employed a novel pupillometric and oculomotor paradigm to study developmental changes in 




that both 7- and 12-months olds (and adults) can use acquired action-effect bindings to predict action 
outcomes but only 12-months-olds (and adults) showed evidence for employing action-effects to select 
actions. This dissociation supports the idea that infants acquire action-effect knowledge before they have 
developed the cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform intentional 
actions.  
In the last empirical chapter of the thesis we used the newly developed methodology from chapter 
seven to investigate, from an ideomotor point of view, how infants represent sequential action. We aimed 
to contrast chaining-, concurrent- and integrated models of sequential-action representation. 9- and 12- 
month olds were taught action sequences consisting of two elementary actions. Thereafter the secondary 
action was selectively activated to assess any interactions with the primary action.  
Finally chapter 9 will summarize the most important theoretical insights the thesis has to offer 
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Chapter 2: Means selection information overrides 
outcome selection information in goal attribution 
 










 It has been shown that, when observing an action, infants can rely on either outcome selection 
information (i.e. actions that expresses a choice between potential outcomes) or means selection 
information (i.e. actions that are causally efficient toward the outcome) in their goal attribution. However, 
no research has investigated the relationship between these two types of information when they are 
present simultaneously. In an experiment that addressed this question directly, we found that when 
outcome selection information could disambiguate the goal of the action (e.g., the action is directed 
towards one of two potential targets) but means selection information could not (i.e., the action is not 
efficiently adjusted to the situational constraints), 7- and 9-month-old infants did not attribute a goal to an 
observed action. This finding suggests that means selection information displays primacy over outcome 
selection information not only for adults but also for infants. The early presence of this bias sheds light on 









To infer that an observed action is goal-directed (as opposed to random or accidental), i.e., that it 
is performed in order to achieve a particular outcome, one can make use of two types of information that 
can be directly observed in a given situation. One type of information consists of the observation of the 
way in which the actor adjusts the action to the situational constraints in order to achieve the end-state. 
Relying on this type of information implies the understanding of the relation between the means and the 
goal and the expectation that the actor will select the most efficient means action toward the goal. The 
other type of information consists of the observation that there are potential alternative outcomes and that 
the actor expresses a choice for a particular outcome via the action. We refer to these two types of 
information as "means selection" and "outcome selection" information, respectively. 
While there are some situations in which only means selection or outcome selection information 
is present, in most situations both types are available. That is, it is often observed that an action is 
adjusted to situational constraints in order to achieve one of multiple potential outcomes. In this case both 
types of information contribute to a converging inference about the goal that the action is directed to. For 
example, stepping onto the bottom shelf in order to reach a bag of tortellini from the top shelf from 
among other types of pastas in a supermarket illustrates such a situation. Imagine, however, that you 
observe the same action, but that the tortellini is on the middle shelf (not on the top) and would thus be 
easily reachable without stepping onto the first shelf. In this case, the action expresses a choice between 
potential targets, but it does not seem to be adjusted efficiently to the situational constraints. The 
inference about the (goal-directedness and the) goal of the unexplained action (stepping on the shelf) will 
remain uncertain. Thus, when means selection information does not allow disambiguating the goal, even 
though the outcome selection information by itself could, no unambiguous goal-attribution can be made. 




interpretation of goal-directed actions, namely means selection information is primary to outcome 




In this paper we investigate whether the relationship between the two types of information is 
similar in infants' interpretation of observed actions as in adults' interpretation, that is, whether means 
selection information also holds primacy over outcome selection information. Infants' ability to interpret 
observed actions as goal-directed has been investigated using two distinct experimental paradigms that 
have so far tested if and how infants can rely on one or the other type of information. However, until now 
no research has addressed the question of how infants interpret observed actions when the two types of 
information are present simultaneously. 
Evidence for reliance on outcome selection information was found by showing that infants, after 
having watched an actor repeatedly acting upon (e.g. grasping) one of two objects, expect that the actor 
will continue to direct the action toward the same target after the spatial arrangement of the two objects 
has been altered (e.g., Woodward, 1998, 1999; Kiraly et al., 2003; Biro & Leslie, 2007). Furthermore, 
when outcome selection information is not provided in this experimental paradigm, that is, when the 
actor’s action could not express a choice because there was only one object present, infants do not 
generate the expectation that the actor will act upon the same object after a novel object has been 
introduced (Baillargeon & Luo, 2005; Biro et al, 2012; Hernik & Southgate, 2012). Note that in these 
settings no (unambiguous) means selection information is available because the information about 
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 Note that we consider only directly observable information here. Additional, not directly perceivable or 
previous information about the actor (traits, habits, preferences, and beliefs) or the situation can alter the 
interpretation of means selection information and may allow disambiguating the goal (e.g., if you know that the 




situational adjustment of the action is non-sufficient (see Biro et al, 2012). Together, these findings 
suggest that outcome selection information is critical in infants’ goal-attribution and that they rely on it 
from at least as early as 6 months.  
The second experimental paradigm demonstrates infants' reliance on means selection information 
(Csibra et al., 1999, 2003; Sodian et al, 2004; Csibra, 2008). Infants are typically presented with a 
scenario in which there is only one potential outcome, which the actor repeatedly achieves by adjusting 
the action to the situational constraints (e.g., approaching a target by getting around an obstacle). When 
the situational constraints change, infants are found to predict that the actor will perform a novel and 
efficiently adjusted means action to achieve the original outcome (as opposed to repeating the familiar but 
no longer efficient means). If, however, the actor’s action is not adjusted to the situation efficiently in the 
initial scenario, then infants do not generate a particular expectation about the new means action of the 
actor in a new situation. Thus, means selection information also has an important place in infants’ early 
(also from around 6 months) goal-directed action interpretation.  
In the present study we investigate how infants deal with situations which provide both types of 
information, means selection and outcome selection, to disambiguate the goal. Does means selection 
information have primacy over outcome selection information as in adult cognition? Or does outcome 
selection information dominate in infants’ developing ability to attribute goals? The crucial situation, in 
which one can test this question, is when the two types of information lead to opposite conclusions, as in 
the tortellini example above. When an action is performed in the presence of multiple potential outcomes, 
but is not adjusted efficiently to the situational constraints, it remains ambiguous whether it was 
performed in order to achieve the outcome it led to. If outcome selection information has primacy, infants 




inefficient toward this goal. If, on the other hand, means selection has primacy, then infants would not 
attribute a goal when the means is inefficient, even in the presence of outcome selection information. 
To test this question, infants participated in three conditions. The Efficient Action condition 
involved familiarizing infants with a hand that first opens one of two transparent boxes that each contain a 
toy and then grasps the toy. In the non-efficient Gratuitous Action condition, the hand performs the same 
action, but the toys are in front of the boxes. Opening the box is therefore unnecessary and does not relate 
efficiently to the grasping
2
. In the non-efficient Superfluous Action condition, the boxes are not present, 
the hand grasps one of the toys after making some unnecessary movements in the air above and behind 
the toy (which actually mimic the opening of a box). The test events were identical for all conditions: two 
toys are present in swapped positions (no boxes) and the hand simply grasps either the same toy as before 
or the other toy.  If outcome information has primacy over means selection information, then infants in all 
conditions should expect the hand to grasp the same toy as before. This expectation would be indicated by 
looking longer in the new toy test event than in the old toy test event in all three conditions. If means 
selection is the dominant source of information, then infants should attribute a particular goal and thus 
look longer in the new toy test event than in the old toy test event only in the Efficient Action condition, 
but not in the non-efficient conditions. Furthermore, the two types of non-efficient approaches allow us to 
investigate whether the inefficiency of the action can only prevent goal attribution if there is only one 
action involved (as in the Superfluous Action condition) or when the means can be considered as a part of 
a sequence, a sub action leading to an overarching goal (as in the Gratuitous Action condition). One could 
argue that inferring the goal by considering the inefficiency of a sub-action might be too demanding for 
young infants, and thus they might only rely in their interpretation on the second reaching action 
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 These two conditions were based on a previous study in which it was shown that 12-month-olds 
understand the causal relationship between opening a box and getting the object inside, and that they understand that 




containing only outcome information. In the case of the presence of this transitional period, we would 
expect longer look in the new toy than in the old toy test event in the Efficient and the Superfluous Action 
conditions but not in the Gratuitous Action condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two 7-month-olds (mean age=31.10 weeks; SD=1.7 weeks; 36 girls and 36 boys) and 
seventy-one 9-month-olds (mean age=39.60 weeks; SD=1.08 weeks; 39 girls and 32 boys) were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions: Efficient Action (23, 24), Gratuitous Action (24, 24) and Superfluous 
Action (24, 24, respectively). An additional eight 7-month-olds and fourteen 9-month-olds were excluded 
due to experimental error (3, 7) and fussiness (5, 7, respectively). 
Stimuli 
Infants were shown video recordings (Fig.1). In all conditions infants saw 6 familiarization 
events. In the first familiarization event of the Efficient condition, two toys (a bear and a ball) were sitting 
on a stage which had a curtained opening on the right side. In the second familiarization event, infants 
were shown that the two toys were sitting inside two transparent boxes with red lids. In the 3-6 
familiarization events a hand reached through the opening, opened one of the boxes by removing the lid, 
and grasped the toy inside. The hand remained still and kept grasping the toy until the end of the event. 
The Gratuitous Action condition was identical to the Efficient Action condition except that the toys were 
not inside but in front of the boxes. Thus, after the hand removed the lid, it grasped the toy in front of the 
box. In the Superfluous Action condition the boxes were absent during all familiarization events. In the 3-
6 familiarization events the hand mimicked the action of removing a lid of a box and then grasped the toy 




Following familiarization, the same pre-test event was presented in all conditions. The boxes 
were absent and the two toys were shown in switched positions. This pre-test event was followed by two 
test events. In the Old toy test event the hand reached through the opening and simply grasped the same 










Apparatus and Procedure 
 During the experiment infants sat on their caregivers' lap in a curtained experimental 
booth. The stimuli were presented on a 31 inch widescreen monitor that was placed approximately 70 cm 
in front of infants' eye level. Two hidden cameras recorded the infants' faces and the stimuli. The on-line 
experimenter, who was blind to the condition, used specially built software (Schrama & Biro, 2005) to 
control stimulus presentation and to register infants' looking. At the start of trial the experimenter used an 
attention getter sound. When the infant was looking at the screen, the experimenter started the 
presentation of the event. If the infant watched the test event for less than 5 sec, then the trial was ignored 
and started again. (This was the minimum time required to ensure that the infants saw which toy was 
grasped in the test events.) If the infant looked away for more then 2 sec or if 120 sec had elapsed, the test 
event ended. Each infant saw both types of test events. The order of the presentation of the test events 
(New goal first/second), the type of object touched during familiarization (bear/ball), and the object’s 
position (left/right side of the stage) were counterbalanced in all conditions. 
The looking times of the test-phase and familiarization phase were re-coded off-line by a 
secondary coder. The inter-coder reliability for the test events was 96.86%. 
Results 
Looking times during familiarization were analysed first. A multivariate ANOVA revealed no 
significant difference between the three conditions and between the two age groups in the looking times 





Figure 2. Mean looking times during familiarization for all conditions (s). The actual durations of the familiarization events were 
5 seconds in events 1-2, 15 seconds in events 3-6 and the pre-test event lasted 10 seconds.  
  




















































Second, the effects of order, gender, and toy position on the looking times in the test events were 
investigated. None of these factors had any main or interaction effect. These variables were therefore 
omitted from further analyses. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the looking times in the 
test events with condition, age-group and toy type (ball vs. bear) as between-subject variables. A 
significant main effect of condition was found [F(2,131)=4.258, p=0.016, effect size: 0.06]. Pair-wise 
comparisons indicated that infants overall looked longer in the Gratuitous Action than in the Superfluous 
Action condition (p=0.005). There was, however, no difference between the two non-efficient conditions 
and the Efficient condition. No main effects or interactions with age-group were found.  
A strong interaction between test event type and condition was also found [F(2,131)=7.139, 
p=0.001, effect size=0.098]. Paired t-tests revealed that infants in the Efficient condition looked longer in 
the New toy test event than in the Old toy test event (t(46)=-2.583, p=.013, two-tailed). In the Gratuitous 
Action condition, the opposite pattern was found: infants looked longer in the Old toy test event than in 
the New toy test event (t(47)=2.310, p=0.025, two-tailed). No difference was found between the two 
types of test events in the Superfluous Action condition (Fig.3). A non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank 
test confirmed these results (Efficient condition: Z=-2.423, p=0.015, Gratuitous Action condition: Z=-





Figure 3. Mean looking times and standard errors (s) in the two test events by the three conditions. (* = p < 0.05) 
  















































Furthermore, a three-way interaction between test-type, condition and toy type was found 
[F(1,131)=4.056, p=0.020, effect size=0.058]. Follow-up tests revealed that only in the Gratuitous Action 
condition and only when the ball was the target, infants looked longer in the Old toy test event than in the 
New toy test event (t(23)=3.130, p=0.005, two-tailed), in the other conditions infants produced the same 
looking patterns in the two test events for both toys. 
Discussion 
We have investigated the nature of the relationship between outcome selection and means 
selection information in young infants' goal attribution. Infants were presented with situations in which 
both types of information were available to interpret and generate an expectation about the goal of an 
observed action. We found that 7- and 9-month-old infants only expected the actor to continue to direct 
the action toward the same target if both types of information were converging on the same goal-directed 
interpretation (Efficient action condition). In the other two situations, in which the outcome information 
could be used to disambiguate the goal but the means selection information did not justify this 
interpretation, infants did not generate a specific expectation about the actor's goal in a new situation 
(non-efficient action conditions). These findings together support the hypothesis that means selection 
information holds primacy over outcome selection information in infants’ action interpretation.  
In neither of the two non-efficient conditions did the infants expect the actor to pursue the 
original outcome. This suggests that inefficiency of means action prevents goal attribution not only when 
there is a single action (with unnecessary detours, Superfluous condition), but also when the action can be 
considered to be part of an action sequence (Gratuitous condition). Our finding that infants as young as 7 
months can evaluate the causal efficiency of a sub-action (opening the box) leading to an overarching 
goal (getting the toy) is quite remarkable as this ability had previously only been demonstrated at 10-12 




ability is also supported by previous evidence showing that by 5½ months infants can understand the 
physical constraints of containment events in goal attainment (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos & Black, 
1990), which is certainly necessary for the evaluation of the efficiency of the means in our containment 
event.  
Recall that while the looking patterns in the non-efficient conditions were different from that in 
the Efficient condition, they were also different from each other. Looking equally long in the two test 
events in the Superfluous Action condition suggests that infants had indeed no specific expectation about 
which toy would be grasped. In the Gratuitous Action condition, infants looked significantly longer in the 
old toy than in the new toy test event. While this looking pattern also shows that infant did not expect the 
same goal to be achieved, the difference might reflect the fact that infants encoded the action in terms of 
its spatial properties (see also Woodward, 1998, Experiment 2). Infants might thus have expected to see 
the action to be performed on the same side of the stage as in the new toy event. One can speculate that 
the presence and the manipulation of the box in the Gratuitous Action condition highlighted the spatial 
position of the action, while the mimicked action in Superfluous Action condition did not tie the action as 
clearly to one side of the stage because no box was present to emphasize a particular location.  
A further caveat that needs to be considered is whether infants in the Gratuitous Action condition 
might have evaluated the action of opening the empty box as being efficient action - despite our intention 
for it to look inefficient - by inferring that the goal of the action was to put a toy into the box
3
. Since the 
boxes were no longer present in the test events, this interpretation was not tested in the test events and this 
possibility can thus neither be verified nor rejected. However, we argue that this interpretation is quite 
unlikely, because it requires the inference of a hypothetical state of affairs since this goal has not been 
seen achieved. Inferences about hypothetical scenarios are above the level of the representational ability 
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of infants at the age tested in the current study (Csibra et al., 2003; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999). 
Furthermore, in the familiarization events, after opening the box the hand kept grasping the toy for 5 sec 
until the end of the event, which would be unnaturally long if the goal had been putting the toy into the 
box. Note, however, that such an interpretation of the familiarization phase of the Gratuitous Action 
condition would have involved relying on the means selection information rather than on the outcome 
selection information. Hence, it would not change our main argument about the relation between the two 
types of information. 
Our findings provide a crucial piece of supporting evidence for a proposed theory about the 
mechanism underlying infants’ understanding of goal-directed actions. This theory states that infants are 
equipped with an abstract interpretational system, the teleological stance, which represents goal-directed 
actions by relating three elements: the observed action, the end state of the action, and the physical 
context in which the action takes place (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). The central claim of this theory - that 
infants only attribute a goal to an action if the action can be evaluated as an efficient action toward the 
end-state in the given situation - has so far only been supported by relatively indirect evidence. The 
experimental paradigm that had been used to investigate this theory tested infants’ predictions about the 
means, and not the goal, of the action. However, the finding that infants do not generate a specific 
expectation about the new means if the initial action is non-efficient only suggests, but does not prove, 
that infants do not in the meantime attribute a goal to the initial action. Infants may have given up on 
predicting the means, but could in principle have relied on the end-state of the action to infer it as the 
goal. Our current setting enabled us to directly test the expectations about the goal of the action by 
providing two possible end-states. Our finding thus confirms that if the action, the end-state, and the 
situational constraints do not form a relation that satisfies the principle of efficient action, then infants do 




Another related point that needs to be addressed is how our design and research questions differ 
from those of Woodward and Sommerville (2000). In that study 12-month-olds were shown the same 
familiarization events as in the Efficient and the Gratuitous Action condition of the present study. 
However, in the test events, only the two means actions were shown and not the goal attainment: the 
boxes were still present, the toys were either inside or in front of the boxes, and the hand only touched 
one of the boxes without grasping the toy. Therefore, the finding that infants did not have specific 
expectations about the means in their non-efficient condition did not necessarily prove that they did not 
interpret the grasping of one of the toys in the familiarization phase as goal-directed. While both the 
current and Woodward and Sommerville’s experiments provided simultaneous presence of outcome 
selection information and means selection information, only the present study clarified that means 
selection information overrides outcome selection information in specifying the goal of the observed 
action. 
Our findings reveal that means selection information has priority over outcome selection 
information from a very young age. It is an interesting question whether there exists any period during the 
development of action interpretation in which infants would preferentially rely on outcome selection 
information if means selection information is also available. On the one hand, processing means selection 
information is more demanding in terms of computational resources and background knowledge, which 
would suggest that at the very beginning infants might primarily rely on encoding the end-state of an 
action in goal attribution. On the other hand, from birth infants perceive a flow of action sequences in an 
ever-changing rich environment. To interpret every perceptually salient end-state as a goal, even if that 
interpretation is not justified by the means in the given context, would be counterproductive since it could 
lead to misinterpretation and false action predictions, and would certainly not allow infants to start to 
parse the flow of actions into meaningful and hierarchically related goal-directed action units (Baldwin, 




The demonstration of the primacy of means selection information does not imply that outcome 
selection information is unimportant in action understanding. On the contrary, it is very useful 
information when it is the only observable information one can rely on and it is very likely crucial for 
understanding and attributing preferences. In fact, there is an on-going debate about whether the 
experimental paradigm that investigates sensitivity to outcome selection information alone (Woodward, 
1998) is a test for preference attribution rather than for goal attribution or both (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Hernik & Southgate, 2012; Jacob, 2012). In any case, recent studies have demonstrated that 9- and 12-
month-old infants can transfer their goal attribution from a situation that contains only means selection 
information to another situation in which only outcome selection information is available (Biro et al, 
2012; Hernik & Southgate, 2012). These findings suggest that these two types of information feed into a 
unitary goal concept. 
In sum, our current study shows that infants' early understanding of goal-directed actions is 
similar to that of adults as far as the relationship between means selection and outcome selection 
information is concerned. The early presence of the preferential bias for means selection information 
suggests that this bias is not an acquired, but rather a core property of the cognitive mechanisms of goal 









Chapter 3: Evidence for a unitary goal concept in 
12-month-old infants 
 










We investigated whether infants can transfer their goal attribution between situations that contain 
different types of information about the goal. We found that 12-month-olds who had attributed a goal 
based on the causal efficacy of a means-end action, generated expectations about the actor's action in 
another scenario in which the actor could choose between alternative outcomes. This finding suggests 










Goal-directed actions never take place in an empty space, they are embedded in a particular 
situation. To interpret an observed action as goal-directed, that is, to infer that its outcome is not random 
or accidental but carries explanatory power about the action, one can make use of two types of 
information in a given situation. One type of information consists of the observation that, to achieve the 
goal, the actor adjusts the action to the situational constraints. We refer to this type of information as 
"means selection". The other type of information is the availability of alternative outcomes and the 
expression of a preference for a particular outcome by the actor's action ("outcome selection"). 
Infants' ability to interpret actions as goal-directed has been investigated using two distinct 
experimental paradigms that have separately tested if and how infants can rely on one or the other type of 
information. The first paradigm, introduced by Amanda Woodward (1998), assesses infants' sensitivity to 
outcome selection. Typically, infants are habituated to an event in which two distinct toys sit on a stage 
and an actor repeatedly acts upon, for example grasps, one of the toys. Thus, infants observe that the actor 
consistently chooses one of two potential targets. In the test events the locations of the toys are swapped 
and the actor acts upon either the same toy or the other toy. Infants are found to look longer in the other 
toy than in the same toy test event. This looking pattern (combined with appropriate controls that 
excluded simple association) is interpreted as evidence for infants' ability to encode the action as directed 
to a particular outcome and to expect that the actor will continue to act to achieve the same outcome. 
Further evidence that outcome selection is critical for infants’ expectations in this paradigm 
comes from a study showing that if outcome selection information is not provided in the 
habituation/familiarization phase, infants do not seem to interpret the action as goal-directed (Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005). In this variation, only one toy is present during the familiarization phase when the 




which the actor acts upon either the same toy as before or the novel toy. Infants look equally long in the 
two tests events, showing that they do not develop an expectation about which toy the actor would act 




The second paradigm investigates infants' reliance on means selection information (e.g., Gergely 
et al., 1995; Csibra et al., 1999, 2003; Csibra, 2008; Wagner & Carey, 2005; Sodian et al., 2004). Infants 
are typically habituated to a scenario in which there is only one potential outcome, but which the actor 
achieves by adjusting the action to the situational constraints (e.g., approaching a target by getting around 
an obstacle). In the test events, the situational constraints change (e.g. the obstacle is removed) and the 
actor either adjusts his/her behavior to the new situation or performs the same means action, which, 
however, is no longer efficient with respect to the outcome. Infants' looking time pattern in the test events 
suggests that they interpret the action as goal-directed and expect the actor to perform the novel and 
efficiently adjusted means action to achieve the goal. However, if no means selection information is 
included, either because the actor’s action does not appear to be efficiently adjusted to the given situation 
constraints during the habituation phase (e.g. the actor takes a detour even though a more direct and 
shorter route is available) or because the action does not show any adjustment due to a lack of situational 
constraints, infants do not develop specific expectations for the actor's novel means to achieve the 
outcome (e.g. Csibra et al., 2003; Biro et al., 2007). These findings suggest that, in this paradigm, infants 
only attribute goals to actions when unambiguous information about means selection can be obtained. 
The differences between the two paradigms in terms of the type of information they provide to 
interpret and predict actions, raise a question about the unitary nature of the goal concept that infants 
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 The interpretation of the results on the one-target version (Luo and Baillargeon, 2005) is further discussed 




apply in these situations. It is possible that infants appeal to one goal-like notion (e.g., 'preference') in 
situations that provide outcome selection information, and to another one (e.g., 'planning') when they 
receive evidence on means selection. Alternatively, a unitary concept of goal explains the results of both 
kinds of studies, which takes input from either type of information. In the latter case, one would expect 
transfer of goal attribution from situations with one type of information to situations in which the other 
type of information is available.   
Such transfer between situations with the two different types of selection information often 
occurs in everyday life when we make predictions about others' actions. Consider, for example, the 
question of a disappointed wife to her husband: "You went to the Moon and back in order to marry me 
and now you leave me for your young secretary?" This question clearly expresses the expectation that the 
husband, who, in the past, apparently showed that he could efficiently overcome large obstacles to 
achieve his desired goal (means selection information was used to justify the goal), would continue to 
desire the same goal even if other potential desirable objects appeared in a future situation (when outcome 
selection information became available to make a goal-directed action prediction). 
Our aim in the present study was to combine the two paradigms in order to test whether infants 
can transfer goal attribution from a situation in which only means selection information is present to a 
situation in which outcome selection information is available.  
In particular, we investigated whether infants are able to attribute a goal in the one-toy variation 
of the Woodward paradigm (for which it was previously found that they could not, Luo and Baillargeon, 
2005) if means selection information were provided during the familiarization phase. In other words, does 
observing an actor efficiently adjusting the action to situational constraints lead infants to expect that the 




Infants participated in three conditions. The Efficient action condition involved familiarizing 
infants with a hand that opened a transparent box and grasped the toy inside. This condition was 
contrasted with two control conditions. In the Non-efficient action condition the hand performed the same 
action, but the toy was in front of the box. Opening the box therefore was unnecessary and did not relate 
efficiently to the grasping
5
. In the second control condition, the Simple action condition, the box was not 
present, and the hand simply grasped the toy. Grasping an object does not qualify as an inefficient action 
per se, at least for an adult viewer. However, a simple grasping action does not provide unambiguous 
information on means selection because it does not show adjustments to situational constraints. The test 
events were identical for all conditions: two toys were present and the hand grasped either the new or the 
old toy. If infants can transfer goal attribution from means selection to outcome selection, they should 
only look longer in the new toy than in the old toy test event in the Efficient action condition. 
Method 
Participants 
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 These two conditions were based on a previous study in which it was shown that 12-month-olds 
understand the causal relationship between opening a box and getting the object inside, and that opening the box is 
unnecessary if the toy is not inside but in front of the box (Woodward and Sommerville, 2000). However, note that 
our study differs from the one of Woodward and Sommerville's both in its design and in its research question. In 
their study, two different boxes were used with two toys during the habituation (instead of a single box with a single 
toy as in the current study). Thus, it could be argued that both types of selection information (means and outcome) 
were present in their study. Furthermore, only the means action (touching the box) was shown in the test events and 
not the goal attainment (grasping the toy, as in the current study). The question they asked was: are babies able to 




 Fifty-two full-term 12-month-olds (mean age = 52.44 weeks; SD=1.4 weeks; 24 girls and 
28 boys) participated in the experiment. An additional eight infants were excluded due to experimental 
error (3) or fussiness (5). The infants were recruited through direct mail. Infants received toys and 
certificates as gifts and parents could opt for compensation for travel expenses. The infants were 




Infants were shown video recordings. In all conditions, infants saw 6 familiarization events. In the 
Simple action condition, the first and the second familiarization events (each 5 sec) showed a puppet 
stage with a curtained opening on the right side. A toy (bear or ball) was sitting at one side of the stage 
(left or right). In the 3-6 familiarization events a hand reached through the opening and grasped the toy 
(Figure 1). The hand remained still and continued to grasp the toy until the end of the event (15 seconds 
each). The Efficient action and Non-efficient action conditions were identical to the Simple action 
condition except that the toy in the second familiarization event was, respectively, inside or in front of a 
transparent box. During the 3-6 familiarization events the hand reached through the curtain, opened the 
lid of the box and then grasped the toy inside/in front of the box. These events also lasted 15 seconds, but 
the duration of the phase in which the hand was in motion was 5 seconds longer than in the Simple action 
familiarization events. 
Following familiarization, a pre-test event was presented. In all conditions the familiar toy was 
shown on the opposite side of the stage while a novel toy was sitting in the familiar place (10 sec). This 
pre-test event was followed by two test events. In the Old toy test event the same toy was grasped as in 










Apparatus and Procedure 
 During the experiment the infant sat on their caregivers' lap in a curtained experimental 
booth. The stimuli were presented on a 31 inch widescreen monitor that was placed approximately 70 cm 
from the infant’s eye level. A hidden camera located above the monitor recorded the infant’s face. 
Another camera behind the infant recorded the stimulus presentation. The cameras fed a mixer that 
produced a split-image movie of the infant and stimuli. The on-line experimenter, who was blind to the 
condition, used specially built software (Schrama & Biro, 2005) to control stimulus presentation and to 
register the infant’s looking. At the start of the session the experimenter used an attention getter (a 
doorbell type of sound). When the infant was looking at the screen the experimenter started the 
presentation of the familiarization event. The attention getter was used before each trial. The experimenter 
measured the infant's looking time in the test events on-line by pressing a key when the infant was 
looking at the monitor. If the infant did not watch the test event for at least 5 s, then the trial was ignored 
and started again. (This was the minimum time required to ensure that the infants saw which toy was 
grasped in the test events.) The test event ended if the infant looked away for more than 2 s or if 120 s had 
elapsed. 
Each infant saw six familiarization events, one pre-test event and both types of test events. The 
order of the presentation of the test events (New toy first/second), the type of object shown during 
familiarization (bear/ball), and the position of the object (left/right side of the stage) were 
counterbalanced in all conditions. 
The looking times during the familiarization and test events were also measured by an off-line 






 Looking times during familiarization were first compared for the three conditions. A one 
way ANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference between the average looking times in the 3-
6 familiarization events [F(2,51) = 7.892, p = 0.001]. Post-hoc comparison (LSD) showed that this effect 
was due to the fact that, in the Simple action condition, infants looked less at the familiarization events 
than in the Efficient (p < 0.0001) or Non-efficient action conditions (p = 0.032), while these latter two 
conditions did not differ from each other. There was no difference between the conditions in looking 
times for the first two familiarization and the pre-test events. (See Figure 2 for mean looking times.) 
 
Figure 2: Mean looking times during familiarization (s). The actual durations of the familiarization events were 5 












































 Second, the effects of the order, gender, toy type and toy position on the looking times in the test 
events were investigated. None of these factors had any main or interaction effect. These variables 
therefore were omitted from the main analyses. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
looking times in the test events with condition as a between-subject variable. A significant main effect of 
test event type was found, indicating that overall infants looked longer in the New toy test event than in 
the Old toy test event [F(1,49) = 5.997, p = 0.018, effect size = 10.9%].  An interaction between test event 
type and condition was also found [F(2,49) = 4.305, p = 0.019, effect size = 14.9%]. Paired t-tests 
revealed that infants in the Efficient condition looked longer in the New toy test event than in the Old toy 
test event (t(17) = 3.059, p = 0.007, two-tailed). There was, however, no difference between the two test 
events in the Simple action and in the Non-efficient action conditions (see Figure 3). A non-parametric 





Figure 3: Mean looking times and standard errors (sec) in the two test events by the three conditions. (* = p < 0.05) 
 
Discussion 
In the present study we investigated whether observing an actor who engages in an efficient 
means action towards a goal, leads infants to expect that the actor will continue to approach the same goal 
even when another potential outcome is present. We found that in the Efficient means action condition 
infants looked longer in the new toy test event than in the old toy test event, that is, they expected the 
action to be directed towards the same target in the new situation. In the Non-efficient and the Simple 
action conditions, however, infants generated no expectation about the possible target of the action, as 
















































infants can transfer their goal-directed interpretation and prediction of action from a situation containing 
means selection information to a situation with outcome selection information. 
The lack of looking time difference between the two test events in the Simple action control 
condition serves not only as a replication, but also as an extension of the previously mentioned finding in 
the one-target variation of the Woodward paradigm (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). In that study the actor 
was an inanimate self-propelled box that approached the toy in a straight line movement. Thus, our null 
result shows that goal-directed interpretation of the action in the one-object familiarization setting is not 
only disrupted in the case of inanimate actions, but also for human hand action
6
. In comparison to the 
Efficient action condition, the null result in the Simple action also suggests that a simple grasping action 
does not contain sufficiently unambiguous means selection information to compensate for the lack of 
outcome selection information. 
The null result in the Non-efficient control condition indicates that goal-directed interpretation is 
also prevented if the means action is clearly not efficient in the given situation toward the outcome. 
Furthermore, this null result is also important because it excludes alternative, lower-level explanations for 
the difference in looking times between the Efficient and the Simple action conditions. For example, 
saliency or increased attention due to the longer and more complex actions during familiarization in the 
Efficient condition compared to the Simple action could in principle have caused the different looking 
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 Lou and Baillargeon (2007) reported an unpublished study (Song et al., 2006) finding a similar null result 
in a one-object setting in which a hand grasped and lifted the object. In addition, Luo and Baillargeon (2007) and 
Luo and Johnson (2009) showed that the absence of “outcome selection” information from the perspective of a 
human actor also prevents infants from generating expectations about a goal-directed action of the actor. In their 




patterns in these two conditions for the test events. However, none of these factors can account for the 
difference between the Efficient and Non-efficient conditions. 
Overall, our findings demonstrate that infants are able to transfer goal attribution based on means 
selection information to a situation in which outcome selection information is available. Furthermore, the 
present study also adds to previous findings that demonstrated the critical role of infants' sensitivity to the 
efficiency of the means in goal-attribution.  
The present study raises two questions about the relationship between the two types of 
information that infants utilize in their interpretation of actions. One question concerns the direction of 
transfer in goal-directed interpretation. Our study demonstrated transfer from situations with means 
selection to situations with outcome selection information. Would the transfer also work the other way 
around? In other words, would providing infants with outcome selection information lead them to expect 
that in a changed situation the actor will engage in an efficiently adjusted action to achieve the original 
goal? 
The second issue concerns the primacy of one of the two types of information in goal attribution. 
Which type of information would infants rely on if both types were available in one situation? Two 
studies have varied the efficiency of the means in the standard two-object setting of the Woodward 
paradigm. Woodward and Sommerville (2000) showed that 12-month-olds only develop an expectation 
about a specific means action if this means was previously shown to be causally (and efficiently) related 
to the goal of the action. However, this study did not test the goal attribution directly. Biro and Verschoor 
(2007), however, found that 7-12 months old infants only expect the same goal to be achieved if the 
means was efficiently related to the outcome. These findings suggest that means selection information 
may overwrite the outcome selection contrast, that is, infants only consider the outcome of the action in 




For the two-target setting it has also been shown that the outcome selection information is not 
exploited if the action is performed by an inanimate object (Woodward, 1998) or if the action is 
unfamiliar (Woodward, 1999; Guajardo & Woodward, 2004). However, when these types of actions were 
enriched with certain movement characteristics, infants did develop particular expectations of goal-
directed actions of the actor (Kiraly et al., 2003; Biro & Leslie, 2007; Johnson, Shimizu & Ok 2007a). 
One can speculate that these movement cues (variation of action, self-alignment, salient effect) served as 
hints for means selection information and could thus replace (similarly to our present study), or at least 
facilitate, the use of outcome information. Furthermore, in a one-target situation with a non-human actor, 
infants only interpreted the approached target as the goal of the action, and expected the non-human actor 
to approach the same target when another target was also available, if the action was efficiently related to 
the target (Hernik & Southgate, 2012). This study independently corroborates and extends our finding as 
it indicates that transfer of goal attribution between situations providing two different types of information 
occurs even in the case of non-human actors. 
Finally, our finding that 12-month-old infants can transfer goal attribution from a situation in 
which one type of information is available to a situation in which the other type of information is present, 
suggests that they may possess a unitary goal concept that can take input from different types of evidence 
to generate expectations for goal-directed actions. Such a unitary notion of goal may allow infants to 
recognize the "common denominator" in different aspects of human behavior, such as planning or the 
expression of preferences. Both planning (based on selection between means) and preference (based on 
selection between outcomes) imply that the actor is making a choice regarding her/his actions. Recent 
theoretical proposals have given a prominent role to the assumption of "choice making power" in the 
understanding of agency (Leslie, 2010; Gergely, 2009). By showing that infants can connect these two 















Chapter 4: Outcome potential influences twelve-
month-olds’ interpretation of a novel action as goal-
directed 
 















Learning about a novel, goal-directed action is a complex process. It requires evaluating the 
causal potential of the action and linking the action to its outcome for later use in new situations to predict 
the action or to anticipate its outcome. We investigated the hypothesis that linking a novel action to a 
salient change in the environment is critical for infants to assign a goal to the novel action. We report a 
study in which we show that 12-month-old infants, who were provided with prior experience with a novel 
action accompanied with a salient visible outcome in one context, can interpret the same action as goal-
directed even in the absence of the outcome in another context. Our control condition shows that prior 
experience with the action, but without the salient effect, does not lead to goal-directed interpretation of 
the novel action. We also found that, for the case of 9-month-olds infants, prior experience with the 
outcome producing potential of the novel action does not facilitate a goal-directed interpretation of the 
action. However, this failure was possibly due to difficulties with generalizing the learnt association to 










As adults, we habitually see actions of social agents as bent toward particular ends. However, 
learning about a novel, goal-directed action is not a straightforward process, it involves multiple steps. 
When one observes a novel action for the first time, one has to be able to identify the outcome of the 
observed action and figure out which aspects of the action are essential for achieving the outcome, that is, 
one has to evaluate the causal potential of the action. A second necessary step is to store the link between 
the observed novel action and its outcome for future use. Finally, one has to be able to retrieve the stored 
link and to use it in an entirely new context. For example, observation of the novel action in a new 
situation can lead to the anticipation of the outcome without having witnessed the attainment of the 
associated outcome. This last step of appreciating that the novel action has the potential to produce a 




A number of mechanisms have been suggested for the above steps in the process of learning 
about a novel goal-directed action. Teleological reasoning (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) and simulation 
procedures (e.g. Meltzoff, 2002; Tomasello, 1999) have been suggested to solve the inferential problem 
of action and goal selection, and a bi-directional action-effect association mechanism (Hommel et al., 
2001) has been proposed to take care of the linking and retrieval of stored means-end relations. While 
there is debate about the relations between these mechanisms and the role they play in the emergence and 
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 Note that by the term “outcome” we mean the actual (causal) effect of the action, while we use the term 
“goal” to refer to the mental representation of this outcome. An action is thus considered goal-directed if it can be 




development of goal-directed action interpretation in infancy (e.g., Woodward, 2009; Biro & Leslie, 
2007; Biro et al., 2011; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 2000), most of these mechanisms seem to 
share an assumption about an important precondition in infancy for interpreting novel actions as goal-
directed. For infants to be able to successfully identify the outcome, and to link it to the action, the 
outcome of the novel action needs to involve a salient and easily detectable change in the environment 
(e.g. Király et al., 2003;  Elsner, 2007,  Biro & Leslie, 2007; Meltzoff, 1988; Verschoor et al., 2010). 
The assumption of the necessity of a salient outcome is inherent in teleological reasoning 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003), which states that an action is judged as a well-formed goal-directed action if it 
can be justified as an efficient action towards the outcome. Thus, when one observes a novel action, the 
goal of the action can be inferred by considering what change of state would be efficiently brought about 
by this action in the given situation. However, young infants have only limited background resources – 
such as knowledge about physical constraints - to make such inferences when the outcome is not 
immediate, not directly visible, or only one of many co-occurring outcomes (e.g., Csibra et al., 2003). The 
presence of a salient effect can therefore considerably ease the evaluation of the causal potential of an 
observed novel action. The role of salient changes is also central in the theoretical account proposed to 
explain the development of action planning and perception (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) on the basis of 
William James' ideomotor principle. This theory states that actions are inherently represented and linked 
to each other by their distal effects. Furthermore, theories that credit infants with domain specific modular 
systems that are sensitive to behavioral cues have also emphasized the role of salient outcomes caused by 
the means in infants' attribution of goal-directedness (e.g. Leslie, 1994; Gergely et al., 1995). In 
particular, Biro and Leslie recently proposed a cue-based bootstrapping model (2007) which claims that 
infants’ innate sensitivity to behavioral cues (such as salient outcomes, self-propelledness, variations of 
the action) is coupled with a learning mechanism that can link behavioral cues to other surface features 




goal-directed actions from actors identified by surface features without collecting direct evidence for 
behavioral cues. 
While the influence of observed salient action effects on infants' own exploratory or imitative 
behavior is well-documented (e.g. Elsner, 2007; Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003; Hauf et al., 2004, Rovee-
Collier, 1987; Verschoor et al., 2010), there is much less evidence of their impact on infants' 
understanding of and prediction for others’ observed novel actions (see discussion below). The aim of the 
current paper is to investigate the role of a salient outcome in the process of interpreting a novel action as 
goal-directed. Thus, we asked whether infants can appreciate the link between a novel action and its 
salient outcome and whether they can make use of the learnt link in a new context by interpreting the 
observed novel action as directed to a particular goal even in the absence of the salient outcome. In other 
words, we tested whether infants can assign a goal to an unfamiliar action that in a different context they 
had previously associated with a salient visible effect. 
There is evidence that infants can already interpret a familiar hand action such as grasping as 
goal-directed as early as six months of age. In a study using a visual habituation method, infants watched 
a hand repeatedly grasping one of two toys on a stage (Woodward, 1998). After habituation, the positions 
of the toys were swapped and the hand grasped either the new toy in the old location or the old toy in the 
new location. Infants looked longer at the new toy test event indicating that they expected the hand to 
grasp the same toy. However, when 6 and 9-month-old infants were habituated in a similar setting with an 
unfamiliar novel action in which the back of a hand simply touched one of the target toys, the infants 
looked equally long in the two test events, which suggests that they did not specifically expect the hand 





It has been suggested, however, (Király et al., 2003, Biro & Leslie, 2007) that infants’ predictions 
in the grasping hand condition might not have been based on the grasping action per se, but rather on the 
strong association of the potential salient outcome that a grasping action can produce (such as the picking 
up of an object), a means-end relation with which infants are very familiar (Leslie, 1982, 1984). The 
crucial role of a salient action effect in interpreting a novel action as directed towards a particular goal-
state has been demonstrated by replicating the “back of the hand touch” experiment in which the back of 
the hand did not only touch, but also pushed the target toy to a new location in both the habituation and 
test phases (Király et al., 2003; Jovanovic et al., 2007). In these experiments, infants from 6 months 
seemed to interpret the action as goal-directed: they expected the hand to touch and push the same object. 
A similar looking pattern was found when other types of unfamiliar actions with salient outcomes were 
used in the same experimental paradigm (Hofer et al., 2005; Biro & Leslie, 2007), for example when a 
wooden rod touched and - with the help of a Velcro piece - picked up the target toy. 
Woodward and colleagues (Heineman-Pieper &Woodward, 2003; Cannon & Woodward, 2010) 
have criticized these studies, however, by arguing that moving a new object can explain longer looking 
time to the new toy test event rather than a violation of expectation regarding the goal of the action. 
However, in the Biro and Leslie study (2007), the force of this alternative explanation is considerably 
weaker. In that study, 9- and 12-month-old infants looked longer in the new toy than in the old toy test 
events, even when there was movement only during the familiarization but not in the test events, in which 
the toy was touched only.
8
 This finding also indicates that 9- and 12-month-old infants were able to 
generate an expectation about the novel action during the test phase without seeing the salient outcome. 
Thus, they were making use of the learnt association between the action ("touching the toy") and the 
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 Furthermore, 6-month-olds did not look longer to the new toy than in the old toy test event when the 
action-effect was present during both familiarization and test phases, as they should have if they had reacted only to 
the movement. This age group only interpreted the unfamiliar action in terms of a goal when other action 




salient outcome ("being picked up") in a new spatial arrangement. Note, however, that the retrieval of this 
association was taking place in the same general context involving the same objects. It therefore does not 
prove that infants are indeed able to make use of the learnt link between the novel action and the salient 
outcome in an entirely new situation. To show that infants are able to fully generalize the particular 
outcome producing potential of a novel action which they learnt by previously associating the action with 
a salient outcome, the learning phase has to take place separately from the testing phase and they have to 
be in different situations. 
In the current study, 9- and 12-month-old infants therefore first participated in a training session 
in which they gained experience with a novel action and its salient outcome. Infants observed the 
experimenter touching wooden blocks on a table with the back of her hand and picking them up with the 
help of a Velcro band that she was wearing on her hand. The infants were themselves also given the 
opportunity to perform this novel action and to produce the interesting outcome. (Note that the aim of the 
study was not to disentangle the role of observational versus own action experience with the novel action. 
Our design in the training aimed to allow the infants to gain ample experience about the salient outcome 
of the action from either of the two sources.) Following the training phase, the infants were moved to 
another experimental area and participated in a looking time study identical to Woodward’s “back of the 
hand touch” study (1999). This familiarized them with the back of the hand touching one of two toys 
without picking it up. After the two toys’ positions had been switched, they were shown two test events in 
which the back of the hand touched either the same or a new toy. 
If the salient effect (pick up) during the training phase enables infants to interpret the novel action 
(touch with the back of the hand) as being goal-directed, and if they were then able to rely on this 
interpretation in a new situation even without witnessing the salient effect, then they should be able to 




infants to look longer in the new toy test event than in the old toy test event. Two control conditions were 
also included to make sure that it is indeed the presence of the action effect that causes the difference in 
the subsequent interpretation of the novel action in the new situation. One of the control conditions 
differed from the experimental condition only in that no salient effect was produced during the training 
phase. That is, the touch of the back of the hand did not result in the picking up of the wooden blocks. In 
the other control condition, no training phase was included. Infants participated only in the looking time 
study. We expected that infants would not be able to generate a particular expectation about the target of 
the action in the two control conditions and that they would thus look equally long in the two test events. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four 9-month-olds (11 males and 13 females, mean age = 39.1 weeks, SD = 1.36 weeks, 
range from 37.1 weeks to 41.6 weeks) participated in the experimental condition. Seventy-two 12-month-
olds (40 males and 32 females, mean age = 52.8 weeks, SD = 2.3 weeks, range from 47.7 weeks to 56.4 
weeks) were assigned into three groups: experimental (24), control 1 (24) and control 2 (24). An 
additional 9 nine-month-olds and 15 twelve-month-olds were excluded due to fussiness (5, 5), 
experimenter error during the training or test session (4, 10, respectively). The infants were recruited 
through mailings or advertisements. 
Apparatus 
Training session  
The infant sat at a table in his/her parent’s lap in the infant lab. The experimenter sat at the other 




size from 8 cm
3
 to 32 cm
3
) were used, each had a piece of red Velcro attached to its top. The experimenter 
had a red Velcro band (about 4 cm wide) on her right hand. The infant was wearing a mitten with red 
Velcro pieces sewed on the back of it
9
. See Figure 1. The pre-training session (which took 3 minutes on 
average) was video-taped for later scoring. The training sessions for control group 1 and the experimental 
group were identical except that for control group 1 the Velcro pieces on the wooden blocks did not stick 
to the band or mitten (because the same "soft" side of Velcro was used on both the blocks and the 
band/mitten).  
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 The idea of using a mitten with Velcro came from the study of Needham et al., 2002 that investigated if 
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Infants sat on their parent's lap in a darkened and curtained booth that was situated in another part 
of the infant laboratory room. Infants were facing a stage from a distance of approximately 70 cm. The 
stage was 60 cm high x 85 cm wide x 40 cm deep and was made from white cardboard. A curtain could 
be raised to block the stage from view between trials. An opening on the right side of the stage, which 
was covered by white curtain, allowed the experimenter to enter her arm into the stage area. Two 
concealed lamps illuminated the stage. A computer signal could turn the lamps on and off to inform the 
experimenter to start and stop the trials, respectively. A video camera focusing on the baby’s face was 
mounted above the stage peeping through the opening of a dark curtain. A hidden observer, blind to the 
test condition and experiment type, timed the infants' looks in the test trials by using a specially built 
computer program at the displays from head-and-shoulders en face video image. Another camera 
mounted above and behind the head of the infant also recorded the stage area (a split screen recording was 
made of all infants, with the stage image on the top and, the baby’s face on the bottom part of the 
display). 
Procedure and Stimuli 
Training session for the experimental group 
After the parent with the infant sat down at the table, the experimenter placed the first wooden 
block in front of her on the table and drew the infant’s attention to it. Then the experimenter dropped the 
back of her hand on the wooden block and, thanks to the Velcro band she was wearing, her hand stuck to 
the block. Then she lifted up the block. She made sure that the infant was watching and focusing on her 
action by saying: "Look at my hand!". After this, she separated the wooden block from the band and 




infant’s hand (on the preferred hand if there was such) and the experimenter placed the wooden block in 
front of the infant. The infant then was encouraged by the experimenter and the parent to imitate the same 
action with his/her mittened hand (“Do you want to do this too?” or “It's your turn now!”). Parents were 
instructed to help infants – if necessary - perform the action by gently pressing the back of the mittened 
hand of the infant against the wooden block. The infant or the experimenter removed the block from the 
mitten and the infant was offered to pick up the same block once more. The experimenter then hid that 
block under the table and placed the next block in front of her on the table. The same sequence was 
repeated with all four blocks. After the training session, the infant and the parent were immediately asked 
to move to the curtained booth for the test session. The experimenter was the same person for both 
sessions. 
 
Training session for the control group 1: 
The procedure was equivalent to that of the experimental group, with the exception that the 
experimenter could not pick up the wooden blocks by the band with the back of her hand and thus she 
simply touched them (since the Velcro pieces did not stick together) and then lifted her hand. Similarly, 
infants could only touch the wooden blocks with their mittened hand but could not pick them up. 
 
Test session for both the experimental and control groups: 
Familiarization phase: 
Infants saw four identical familiarization trials. At the start of each trial, the experimenter lowered 
the curtain to reveal the stage. On the stage floor, there were two toys of around the same size: a yellow 




to the top of both toys. After the online observer turned the lights on above the stage using a computer 
signal, the experimenter reached in through the opening on the right side of the stage holding her palm up. 
She was wearing the same Velcro band as in the training session. She dropped her hand on top of one of 
the two toys and stayed still for 15 seconds. (Note the hand did NOT pick up the toys.) See Figure 1. 
When the end of the 15-second interval was indicated to the experimenter by the light switching off, the 
experimenter raised the curtain. The position of the toys and location of the action were counterbalanced 
in the familiarization trials.  
 
Test trials 
After the fourth familiarization trial the positions of the two toys were switched behind the 
curtain. Then the curtain was lowered and the changed positions without the presence of the hand were 
shown to the infants for 5 sec. Following this short pre-test trial, one of two types of test events was 
presented to the infants. Half of the infants saw two identical tests trials in which the back of the hand 
dropped on the same toy as in the familiarization (old toy test event). The other half of the infants saw 
two tests trials in which the back of the hand dropped on the new toy (new toy test event). In both types of 
test trials, after the hand dropped on the toy it stayed still as long as the infants watched the scene. (Note 
that the hand did NOT pick up the toys during the test phase either.) See Figure 1. The online observer 
started to measure the looking times when the hand touched the toy and if baby was looking at the stage. 
The test trial ended when infants had looked continuously for a minimum of 2 sec and then looked away 
continuously for 2 sec. If infants looked away before 2 sec had elapsed, then the trial was ignored and 
started again. The experimenter raised the curtain when the end of a valid or ignored trial was indicated to 
her by the light switching off. Parents were asked to close their eyes during the test trials and instructed to 




Reliability coding and scoring of the training session: 
To assess reliability in the test session and measure behavior in the familiarization phase, an 
offline observer measured each infant’s looking times from the videotaped record. The offline observer 
was also unaware of the type of the test trials and the experiment type. Inter-observer agreement was 
computed for each infant’s looking times in the two test trials and the agreement was accepted if it was 
above or equal to 95%. (This was the case for 70% of the cases.) For the rest of the cases a second offline 
observer was asked to measure the looking times again independently. If this did not lead to agreement 
with one of the other observers, then the looking times of that infant were excluded from the analyses 
(this happened in two cases). 
In the training session, two offline observers independently scored the infants’ behavior from the 
videotaped records. Infants’ observational experience was scored by the absolute duration of their 
attention to the action demonstration by the experimenter. Since the action demonstration in the 
experimental groups lasted somewhat longer than in control group 1 due to the fact that the experimenter 
had to separate the block from the Velcro band, we also calculated the duration of attention relative to the 
length of the demonstration (duration ratio). Infants’ own action experience was scored by the number of 
times infants properly performed the action. Since turning the hand outward is an awkward and difficult 
movement for infants, any attempt that resembled such a movement was counted (this was only an issue 
in the control condition because there was no pick-up). The number of any other actions related to 
touching the blocks, such as grabbing them with the other hand, banging or shoving them, shaking the 
mittened hand with the block stuck on, or separating the block with the other hand from the mitten, was 
also scored. The sum of these two scores was also calculated to obtain an indication of the general level of 
activity of the infants. Furthermore, the duration of infants’ own acting and the latency to start to act were 




the duration of parent-assisted action. In addition, we also scored whether infants looked at their hand 
while their parents moved it and then we calculated the ratio of attended parent-assisted actions by 
dividing the number of attended parent-assisted actions by the total number of parent-assisted actions. 
Inter-observer agreement was computed for each score and the agreement was between 0.71 and 0.88. 
Test session 
Infants' looking times during the familiarization trials were analyzed first. Univariate ANOVA showed no 
significant difference between the experimental and control groups for the 12-month- olds, F(2,68) = 
2.44, p = .10, ηp
2 
= .07, or between the 9 and 12 months old experimental groups, F(1,46) = .57, p = .45, 
ηp
2 
= .01, in the average looking times of the four familiarization trials. Infants in all groups showed a 





familiarization trials were significant in all groups, 9 months: t(23) = 5.45, p < .001
 
; 12 months 
experimental: t(23) = 5.17, p < .001; 12 months control 1: t(23) = 4.25, p < .001; 12 months control 2: 
t(23) = 4.24, p < .001. The looking times in the pre-test trial in which the infants could see the changed 
position of the toys on the stage did not differ between the experimental and control groups for the 12-
month-olds, F(2,68) = 2.51, p = .09, ηp
2 
= .07, or between the 9 and 12 months old experimental groups, 
F(1,46) = .89, p = .35, ηp
2 






Figure 2. Mean looking times during the familiarization trials for the 9- and the three 12-month-old groups. (The 
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The looking times of the two test trials were analyzed separately for the two age groups. Preliminary 
analysis of looking times for the two test trials did not reveal any effect of gender, location of the action 
(near side vs. far side), type of toy touched (bear vs. ball) or the position of the toys (bear left vs. bear 
right) in any of the groups. Therefore, these factors were omitted from further analyses. Using test type 
(2, new toy and old toy) and experiment type (3, experimental, control 1 and 2) as between-subject factors 
and trial (2, first and second) as a within-subject factor, a repeated measures ANOVA was carried out for 
the 12 months old infants. The analysis found a main effect of trial, F(1,66) = 4.99, p = .029, ηp
2 
 = .07, 
indicating that infants overall looked longer in the 1
st
 than in the 2
nd
 test event. A significant effect of trial 
x test type x experiment type interaction, F(2,66) = 3.74, p = .029, ηp
2 
 = .10,  was also revealed
10
. To 
explore this interaction, separate ANOVAs were carried out in each experiment type group. The 
ANOVAs showed no main or interaction effects of trial or test type factor in control group 1, control 
group or 2. On the other hand, in the experimental group a trial and test type interaction was found, 
F(1,22) = 6.13, p = .021, ηp
2 
 = .21. T-tests showed that infants looked longer in the new toy test event 
than in the old toy test event in the first test trial, t(22) = 2.54, p = .019, two-tailed, but not in the second 
test trial, t(22) = -.74, p = .46, see Figure 3. These results were confirmed with non-parametric tests (first 
test trial in the experimental group: Mann-Whitney U = 33.5, z = -2.22, p = .024, two-tailed). In addition, 
further analyses revealed that during the 1
st
 test event infants who saw the old toy test event in the 
experimental group looked significantly less long, F(2,34) = 4.80, p = .014, ηp
2 
 = .22,  than infants who 
saw the same test event in the control 1 (p = .046) or control 2 group (p = .005). There was no difference 
between the three groups in the looking times of infants who saw the new toy test event or during the 2
nd
 
test event in any of the test types. 
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familiarization trials was included as a covariate in the analysis. Thus, the amount of decline had no effect on the 





In the 9 months old group a repeated measures ANOVA for looking times in the test events with trial (2) 
as within-subject factor and test type (2) as between-subject factor revealed only a trial effect, F(1,22) = 
7.23, p = .013, ηp
2 
 = .24, indicating longer looking times in the first than in the second trial. No effect of 
test type was found, see Figure 3. We also compared the two age groups in their looking times in the test 
events by using a repeated measures ANOVA with trial as within-subject factor and test type and age 
group as between-subject factors. We found a three-way interaction between trial, age group and test type, 
F(1,44) = 4.09, p = .049, ηp
2 
 = .08. This interaction indicates that -  in addition to the looking pattern that 





 test trials in the 9 months old group that saw the old goal test event, t(11) = 2.85, p = .016, 
















Figure 3. Mean looking times with standard errors in the 1st test trial (sec) by test event type for the 9- and the three 12-
month-old groups. * = p<0.05  
 
Training session   
Since the demonstration during the training session was somewhat longer in the experimental 
group than in the control due to the fact that the experimenter had to separate the block from the Velcro 
band in the experimental group, the absolute time the 12 months old infants attended the demonstration 
was longer in the experimental group  than in the control 1 group condition, t(46) = 3.72, p = .001] . 
However, there was no difference between the two groups in the time infants spent attending the 
demonstration relative to the total time of the demonstration (duration ratio), t(46) = - 2.25, p = .06 The 
two age groups in the experimental condition (9 and 12 months) did not differ from each other in absolute 
attention duration, t(46) = -.66 , p = .50, or relative attention duration, t(46) = .91 ,p = .36. We found no 
further differences between any of the groups in the scores for infants’ own action experience or parental 
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groups in the ratio of attended parent-assisted action, t(46) = -2.89, p = .006, indicating that the 9 months 
olds were paying significantly less attention to their own hand while their parents moved it than the 
experimental 12 months old group did. See Table 1 for a summary of the training scores. 
 
Next, we checked whether there was any difference in age, looking times during the familiarization trials 
or in the training scores between infants who were allocated to the group that saw the New toy or the Old 
toy test event. No difference was found in any of these measures in any of the groups (ps > .15). Finally, 
to examine whether the behavior of the infants during the training session had any effect on their looking 
patterns in the subsequent test session, all the analyses of variance of looking times for the test events 
were also carried out with all training scores entered as covariates (ANCOVAs). The pattern of results 










































s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. 
9 month 
experimental 
47.73 3.42 .97 .01 1.71 .43 4.67 .94 6.38 1.10 30.24 5.52 2,14 0.51 19.10 2.57 4.92 .44 .74 .05 
12 months 
experimental 
51.11 3.71 .96 .02 1.33 .32 4.79 .77 6.13 .86 23.59 3.47 2.83 0.66 15.58 1.69 4.83 .56 .91 .03 
12 months 
 control 1 






We tested the ability of 9 and 12 months old infants to interpret a novel action as goal-directed 
when they previously could associate this novel action with a salient effect in another situation. We found 
that 12 months old infants who took part in the experimental training session in which they were provided 
experience with a novel action accompanied by a salient effect, looked longer in the new toy test event 
than in the old toy test event in the subsequent testing session. This result thus suggests that the infants 
were able to generate a particular expectation about the goal of this novel act in a new situation even in 
the absence of the salient action effect. Note that the difference in looking time was only present in the 
first test trial and not in the second, which is however not surprising or unprecedented as during repeated 
presentations infants’ expectation may change by reinterpreting the situation on the basis of previous test 
trials. The 12 months olds in the two control conditions in which the novel action did not produce a 
salient effect, did not show evidence of being able to interpret the novel action as goal-directed in the 
testing session, as they looked equally long in the two test events. In addition, infants in both control 
groups looked longer at the old toy test event in the first test trial than infants in the experimental group 
which further supports the interpretation that only the experimental group expected this event to take 
place. In the 9 months old group there was no difference in looking times between the two test events, 
which indicates that the training session with salient effect did not facilitate a goal-directed interpretation 
of the novel action for these infants. Taken together we demonstrated that, by 12 months of age, infants 
can generalize the outcome producing potential of a novel action to interpret the novel action as goal-
directed. 
The performance of the 12 months olds in the two control conditions clearly indicates that it was 




subsequent interpretation of the novel action. The lack of influence of the training session in control 
condition 1 excludes the possibility that the facilitating effect of the training in the experimental condition 
was achieved simply by receiving more prior (observational) experience with the unfamiliar action or by 
seeing this action being performed by a person who was interacting with the infants and who drew their 
attention to the action. The lack of difference between the looking times for the test events in control 
condition 2 shows that  the original "back of the hand touch" action without effect is not interpreted as 
goal-directed not only by 6- and 9- as had previously been demonstrated (Woodward, 1999), but also by 
12-month-olds. Furthermore, this latter result also excludes the possibility that the difference between the 
experimental and control 1 conditions reflects disruptive effects of the control training rather than a 
facilitating effect of the experimental training.  
Our study suggests that a) a salient outcome is critical in interpreting a novel action as goal-
directed and that b) 12 months old infants can make use of a learnt link between the action and its 
outcome in a new context by interpreting the novel action in terms of a goal even in the absence of the 
salient outcome. These findings can be viewed as a demonstration of cue-based bootstrapping by which 
infants’ initial sensitivity to behavioral cues is united with a learning process about different types of 
actions (Biro & Leslie, 2007). 
Why did the 9 months olds not benefit from the training? One simple answer could be that 
younger infants would have needed more experience with an unfamiliar action and its effect in order to 
link them together. Another possibility is that the infants could link the novel action to the outcome, but 
had difficulties with retrieving the learnt association. Studies on imitation and memory of own action-
effect contingencies show that contextual changes such as changes in the room surroundings or cues can 
greatly influence the quality of imitation or the memory of actions (Rovee-Collier, 1996; Moore & 




generalization was certainly necessary. It has been suggested that the ability to generalize across contexts 
develops somewhere around 9 months of age. However, the exact age at which infants can transfer certain 
information seems to depend on the degree of change and on the task involved, which makes different 
studies difficult to compare. In the domain of action understanding, Sommerville and her colleagues 
(2009) recent study is the most relevant one for our purposes. They found that 10 months olds could only 
use prior information about the particular goal of an action to generate an expectation about a means 
action if the information was given in the same room. Imitation studies also show that, by 12 months, 
infants are not affected by context change in their recall of observed actions (e.g., Klein & Meltzoff, 
1999).  
Besides contextual differences, the difficulty with the retrieval and generalization of the 
associated link may also have been caused by the manner in which the infants encoded the observed 
action during the training session. As we have argued, an important step in learning a new goal-directed 
action is to be able to determine which aspects of the action are causally necessary to achieve the 
outcome. For example, if the infants assumed that the person as a whole, her other movements, her smile, 
or the particular objects that were used were (also) relevant to produce the salient effect in the training 
session, then the absence of these features in the test session could have prevented the infants from 
making use of the association. Thus, the retrieval/generalization problems may not (only) stem from the 
way memory for events are organized, but also from the difficulties with applying teleological reasoning 
due to the limited prior experience and knowledge about actions and actors at this age. 
It is also important to differentiate our study from other training studies with similar features. 
Elsner and Ashcerleben (2003), for example, investigated the influence of salient action effects produced 
by a novel object by providing observational training to 9-18 months old infants. They found that only 




not whether the effect influenced infants' goal-directed interpretation of an observed novel action but 
whether it changed their own exploratory behavior. Nevertheless, their developmental pattern fits with 
our finding. 
Hofer and her colleagues (2005), on the other hand, tested 9 months old infants' goal-directed 
interpretation of a novel tool by providing a short prior demonstration in which the tool was handled by 
both a model and the infants themselves. Here, however, the subsequent test session did provide salient 
action-effects. Their training study therefore did not aim to test whether infants can interpret a novel 
action as goal-directed in the absence of the outcome.  
In two training studies, one that provided observational experience with the particular goal of an 
actor (Sommerville & Crane, 2009) and one that provided own action experience with a novel means-end 
action (Sommerville et al., 2008), it was found that 10 months old infants had benefited from these 
trainings when they were subsequently tested on their understanding of observed means-end relationships. 
However, the entire means-end sequence was presented in the habituation phase of the testing, thus the 
infants were not required to solely rely on the association between the action and the outcome that they 
had built up during the training.  
Sommerville, Woodward and Needham's (2005) study is the most similar to the current training 
study. In their study 3.5 months old infants, who cannot reach and grasp objects themselves, participated 
in a training in which they were wearing a mitten with Velcro attached to the palm and with which they 
could pick up two toys. This experience allowed them to interpret a grasping hand of another person 
(without the salient effect of pick-up) as goal-directed. How can we reconcile the large age difference 
between that study and ours? One possibility might be that in Sommerville, Woodward and Needham's 
study the objects that the infants picked up during the training were identical to those that were used in 




outcome producing potential of the mittened grasping hand from training to test. Alternatively, while 
grasping and then transferring an object is a natural hand action with which even young infants have 
ample prior observational experience, picking up objects by touching them with the back of the hand is 
unnatural, violates infants' existing physical knowledge (about support and mechanics) and may thus be 
harder to learn. 
A further possibility to explain the difference between these studies leads us to the question of the 
role of the type of experience that infants can benefit from to interpret an observed novel action as goal-
directed. Note, however, that the current study was not designed to test whether the interpretation of an 
observed action is primarily influenced by infants' own experience with the action or by observational 
experience. Instead, we emphasized the importance of appreciating the power of an action to produce 
outcomes in infant's goal-directed action interpretation. We therefore varied the presence or absence of a 
salient effect via both types of experience. 
A recent study that has contrasted the impact of infants' own action experience and observational 
experience on the interpretation of means-end actions, found self-experience to be primary (Sommerville 
et al., 2008). However, in both this study and in those that show a strong correlation between infants' own 
ability to produce certain means-end actions and their understanding of others' similar actions in terms of 
goals (Sommerville and Woodward, 2005a, 2005b), a salient action outcome was always produced by the 
infants' own action. Our study is the first to show that, without this salient outcome, own action 
experience with the novel action does not enhance the ability to interpret the novel action as goal-
directed. The salient outcome thus seems to be the crucial mediating factor. 
Another reason for the age difference between our study and Sommerville, Woodward and 
Needham's (2005) might therefore be that the amount of own action experience with the novel action and 




that infants indeed scored low on the number of proper own action scale. This might have been due to 
difficulties with imitating the awkward back of the hand touch action or due to a dislike of wearing the 
mitten. On the other hand, the 12-month-olds scored just as low on this scale, which suggests that either 
even a small amount of self experience was sufficient for them or that they could make better use of the 
observational experience by this age. We found, however, that, compared to 12-month-olds, 9-month-olds 
looked less at their own moving hand while their parents helped them to produce the novel action with its 
effect. It is therefore possible that 9-month-olds indeed gained somewhat less experience with the effect 
of the novel action from the training session due to their relative lack of attention during parental help. 
Future research, however, is required to clarify the exact role of observational vs. motor experience in 
learning about novel goal-directed actions. 
Finally, it is important to point out that in the current study it is hard to distinguish whether 
infants learnt a new means action or the function of a novel tool, or both. In other words, during the 
training infants may not (only) have associated the salient effect with the “back of the hand touch” action, 
but (also) with the Velcro band itself. That is, the infants may have learnt that the Velcro band is for 
picking things up. In the testing phase, the hand was presented with the Velcro band on and the infants 
could thus rely on the inferred function of the Velcro band in their interpretation of the action
11
. Future 
research can for example disentangle these possibilities by using a Velcro band with two different types 
of hand actions during the test and training phases. 
The function of a tool is usually learnt together with a certain action by which the tool can be 
used to produce an outcome. While for certain tools the proper (i.e. most efficient) use requires very 
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 This could also have added to the possible generalization difficulty of the 9 months olds, because the 





specific actions (e.g. a pair of scissors), for other tools the range of actions that allows proper functioning 
is much wider (e.g. a towel). An interesting question is therefore what types of cues help infants to figure 
out the level of specificity of the action by which a tool can best be operated. 
In summary, we have shown that experiencing a salient effect of a novel hand action (or use of a 
novel tool) can alter 12 months old infants’ interpretation of the action (or the tool). By appreciating the 
potential of the action (or tool) to produce an outcome, infants can attribute a goal when they observe the 
novel action (or novel tool) in a new situation. Our finding shows the essential role a salient outcome 






Chapter 5: Explicit learning of arbitrary and non-
arbitrary action-effect relations in adults and 4-year-
olds 
 











Ideomotor theories claim that carrying out a movement that produces a perceivable effect creates 
a bidirectional association between the two, which can then be used by action control processes to retrieve 
the associated action by anticipating its outcome. Previous implicit-learning studies have shown that 
practice renders novel but action-contingent stimuli effective retrieval cues of the action they used to 
follow, suggesting that experiencing sequences of actions and effects creates bidirectional action-effect 
associations. We investigated whether action-effect associations are also acquired under explicit-learning 
conditions and whether familiar action-effect relations (such as between a trumpet and a trumpet sound) 
are learned the same way as novel, arbitrary relations are. We also investigated whether these factors 
affect adults and 4-year-old children equally. Findings suggest that explicit learning produces the same 
bidirectional action-effect associations as implicit learning does, that non-arbitrary relations improve 
performance without affecting learning per se, and that adults and young children show equivalent 
performance—apart from the common observation that children have greater difficulty to withstand 











James' (1890) ideomotor theory claims that consciously thinking of an action goal automatically 
triggers the accompanying actions that will help to reach that goal. This ideomotor approach has proved 
to be very useful in interpreting and explaining goal-directed behavior. For example, if you intend to 
watch your favorite sitcom, it would be of good help if actions such as finding the remote control, switch 
on the TV and looking for the right channel already get activated in order to accomplish your goal 
smoothly and correctly. If no actions get primed if an action plan comes to mind or if incorrect actions get 
triggered, such as getting a spoon or opening a door, reaching your goal would be severely disturbed or 
delayed. As the example shows, planning and control of goal-directed actions does not only require 
knowledge or expectations about the outcomes of these actions, it also implies that the relationship 
between the action and the action outcomes has to be bidirectional in order to use action-outcomes as a 
trigger for action initiation: even though acquiring an action-effect relation implies that the cognitive 
representation of the given action gets activated before the representation of this action’s effects (as the 
action precedes its effects), planning that action later on requires the representation of the effect to get 
activated before the representation of the action.  
Ideomotor approaches to action planning and action control recently regained interest (Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 1996; Hommel et al., 2001; Stock & Stock, 2004) and a number of studies have 
demonstrated that subjects indeed acquire and use bidirectional action-outcome contingencies to plan and 
guide their actions (for an overview, see Hommel & Elsner, 2009). Most of these studies adopted the 
experimental design introduced by Hommel (1996; Elsner & Hommel, 2001), which comprises of two 
phases: an acquisition phase, in which an action-outcome contingency is learned, and a subsequent 





In an acquisition phase of this design subjects freely choose among several actions (say, the key-
pressing response R1 or R2) and each action is consistently followed by an effect stimulus (say, sound E1 
or E2). The effect stimulus is not relevant to the task and subjects are not encouraged in any way to attend 
to, or acquire the action-effect relationship. In the transfer phase the effect stimuli are now being 
presented as target stimuli, and the sound-key mapping can be either consistent (E1  R1 and E2  R2) 
or inconsistent (E1  R2 and E2  R1) with the key-sound mapping of the acquisition phase. In general, 
it is found that subjects perform better during the transfer phase when an acquisition-consistent effect-
action mapping is required as compared to an inconsistent mapping (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001). 
Meaning that subjects respond faster and/or make fewer errors during the transfer phase when asked to 
respond to effects with the keys that previously caused these effects during acquisition, than when this 
mapping is reversed from that acquired during acquisition. This effect of mapping consistency on RTs 
and errors suggests that, despite the task-irrelevance of the action effects and the action-effect relationship 
during acquisition, bidirectional action-outcome associations (R1  E1 and R2  E2) were created 
during acquisition and this knowledge transfers to the transfer phase. Subjects with an acquisition-
consistent mapping during the transfer phase apparently benefited from the action-outcome contingencies 
learned during the acquisition phase and use this knowledge to guide their actions in the transfer phase. It 
is also possible that performance on acquisition-inconsistent mappings was hampered by having learned 
inconsistent contingencies, but there is some evidence that positive transfer effects by far outweigh 
negative effects (Hommel, 2004). 
The available studies on action-effect learning have used novel, arbitrary relations between action 
effects, so that the amount of learning could be experimentally controlled. Moreover, as the novel action 
effects are commonly task-irrelevant and subjects are often explicitly instructed to ignore them, the 
acquisition of action-effect associations must be considered implicit or at least non-intentional. Indeed, 




causal relationship between action and effect in the acquisition phase and the size of the consistency 
effect in the test phase. Verschoor et al. (2013) recently showed that no awareness of action-effect 
relationships is required at all to nonetheless show action-effect learning in a transfer phase.  
Even though it is theoretically important to demonstrate that spontaneous action-effect learning 
can take place under such “unfavorable” circumstances, one may argue that these circumstances are not 
particularly ecologically valid. Infants, children, and adult novices facing a new task will often actively 
explore the appropriateness and potential of alternative actions to reach a particular goal, and thus 
explicitly carry out specific actions to produce specific effects. In the present study, we investigated 
whether these circumstances also allow for the acquisition of bidirectional action-effect associations. 
Apart from ecological validity considerations, this research goal was motivated by some recent 
observations that seem to call into doubt that intentional action-effect learning leads to bidirectional 
associations. 
As Verschoor, Eenshuistra, Weidema and Hommel (submitted) demonstrated, requiring subjects 
to verbalize the causal relation between actions and effects eliminates the consistency effects in the 
transfer phase of the Elsner and Hommel (2001) paradigm. This might suggest that consciously 
representing causal relations emphasizes their unidirectional nature and thus either prevents the creation 
of bidirectional associations between action representations and effect representations or blocks them 
from impacting action control (Verschoor et al., submitted). A similar line of reasoning is suggested by 
more general views about associative and causal relations between events. While associative relations are 
supposed to be bidirectional and thus insensitive to the temporal sequence between the represented 
events, causal relations are usually seen as asymmetrical and irreversible (Hausman, 1998; Hume, 
1739/1964; see Waldmann, 1996). Consistent with Verschoor et al. (submitted), Arcediano, Escobar and 




and as consequence could constrain the direction of the association. A study of Fenker, Waldmann and 
Holyoak (2005) also attributed the difference between associative and causal relations. When subjects had 
to judge if sequences of two words (e.g., spark  fire or fire  spark) were presented in a causal (cause 
 effect) order or in a diagnostic order (effect  cause), they were much faster in judging the causal 
relations than the diagnostic relations. However when subjects were asked to judge if the same word 
sequences had an associative relation (spark  fire or fire  spark), the temporal order was of no 
importance anymore. It thus makes sense to assume that relations between actions and effects can be 
represented in both a bidirectional, associative manner that previous studies on implicit action-effect 
learning seem to have tapped, and a unidirectional, causal way that emphasizes, or is a consequence of 
emphasizing, the temporal sequence of actions and effects.  
The question of this study thus was whether explicit action-effect acquisition would be sufficient 
to eliminate bidirectional associations, which would put rather tight constraints on ideomotor theorizing 
in the context of action control, or whether explicit acquisition would be comparable to implicit 
acquisition as measured by many other studies on action-effect learning (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001). 
In the acquisition phase of the present experiment we made up a cover story that explicitly related key-
pressing actions to auditory effects in a causal fashion. The two response keys were introduced to 
symbolize (and labeled by pictures of) two sound-producing objects, a trumpet and a bell. Pressing the 
key was described as acting upon the respective object and subjects were instructed to make the musical 
instruments sound by pressing the corresponding keys. Consequently, subjects were made aware of the 
action, the outcome, and the sequential and causal relation between the two. If indeed, as Verschoor et al. 
(submitted) claim, explicit acquisition of action-effect knowledge is sufficient to render action-effect 




In an additional attempt to consider more realistic situations, we were also interested to see 
whether pre-existing knowledge about the causal relationship between an action and its effects would 
alter the directionality of the respective association. To investigate that, we compared learning of a novel, 
unfamiliar, and arbitrary pairing of a key-pressing action with a tone, with learning of a pairing that we 
considered familiar to our subjects from pre-experimental experience (i.e., non-arbitrary, as defined in 
reference to that experience). To accomplish this contrast between non-arbitrary and arbitrary action 
effects, we manipulated the actions effects so that one key would produced the sound that the respective 
object was known to produce (e.g., pressing the trumpet key produced a typical trumpet sound, from here 
on symbolized as <toot>), whereas pressing the other key produced a novel and arbitrarily chosen sound 
(e.g., bell key  <piew>). There are at least two possible outcomes of this familiarity manipulation (a 
further possibility will be discussed later). First, one may assume that pre-existing associations facilitate 
bidirectional learning, so that the familiar relationship produces a stronger consistency effect. Second, 
however, it may be that knowing about the causal relationship between trumpets and the sound they 
produce strengthens the association from trumpet to <toot> but works against creating a bidirectional 
association. This should reduce or eliminate the consistency effects on RTs and error rates in the transfer 
phase for the non-arbitrary action effects. 
A final purpose of the present study was to compare the learning performance of adult subjects 
with 4-year-old children. In previous studies we obtained evidence of action-effect acquisition in both 
adults and children, even though the performance profiles differed in detail (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray 
et al., 2006): Whereas RTs showed equivalent mapping-consistency effects in adults and children (with 
acquisition-consistent mappings yielding faster RTs), error rates exhibited considerably stronger 
consistency effects in children (with greater error rates in acquisition-inconsistent mappings). Indeed, in 
young children facing a just-acquired action effect seems to prime the associated action so strongly that 




observation that Eenshuistra et al. (2004) considered an example of goal neglect in the sense of Duncan 
(1995). Considering this systematic difference between adults and young children, we were interested to 
see whether comparable differences would be obtained under conditions that make the causal relation 
between actions and effects explicit, as in the present study, and whether possible effects of pre-
experimental knowledge would affect adults and children in the same fashion. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 34 4-year-old children (M = 4.54, SD = 0.37) recruited from two kindergartens 
in the Netherlands and 35 undergraduate students from the Leiden University (M = 21.86, SD = 3.29). 
The data of two children and three students were excluded from the analysis because they were unable to 
perform the tasks and did not adhere to the task instructions, respectively. The children received small 
presents for participating, and the kindergartens received book tokens. Students received course credits or 
€3.50 for participating.  
Tasks and Stimuli  
The experiment was divided into an acquisition phase and a transfer phase. Trials in the 
acquisition phase started with the presentation of a visual stimulus, a picture of Ernie or Bert from Sesame 
Street. A picture of Ernie signaled a go trial, which required a freely chosen left or right key press on a 
specially designed two-key keyboard. One key was marked with a picture of a trumpet and the other key 
with a picture of a bell. Pressing one of the two keys was always followed by a sound that was plausibly 
related to the picture marking the key (trumpet key followed by <toot> or bell key followed by <tring>) 
resulting in a non-arbitrary action-tone relation. Pressing the other key led to the presentation of a sound 
that bore no pre-experimental relation to the picture label of the key (trumpet key and <piew> or bell key 




could be followed by a <toot> sound and pressing the right bell key by a <piew> sound. All key-sound 
mappings were balanced across subjects and all sounds were presented for 200 ms. Ernie’s picture 
remained on the screen until a response was given or until 7 s had passed. The next trial started 1500 ms 
after a response. When a picture of Bert was presented, no response was required (a no-go trial). The 
picture of Bert remained on the screen for 2 s. 
The transfer phase consisted of a go/no-go two-choice reaction-time task. Again a picture of 
Ernie signaled a go trial and a picture of Bert a no-go trial (no-go trials were used to make the task more 
appealing). The picture of Ernie staid on screen until a response was made or until 2 s had passed. In a no-
go trial a picture of Bert without any sound was presented for 2 s. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. 
A go trial started with the presentation of the picture of Ernie together with one of the two sounds 
that in the preceding acquisition phase served as action effects (200 ms). The action effects now served as 
imperative stimuli. Participants were to respond to the stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible 
according to a fixed stimulus-response (S-R) mapping. They were randomly assigned to either a 
consistent- or an inconsistent S-R mapping in the transfer phase. In the consistent mapping condition, the 
sound-key mapping matched the key-sound mapping of the acquisition phase (e.g., trumpet key → <toot> 
and bell → <piew> in the acquisition phase became <toot> → trumpet key and <piew> → bell in the 
transfer phase). In the inconsistent mapping condition, the sound-key assignment was reversed (e.g., 
trumpet key → <toot> and bell → <piew> in the acquisition phase became <piew> → trumpet key and 
<toot> → bell key in the transfer phase). As in our previous study (Eenshuistra et al., 2004), each key 
press in the transfer phase triggered the same sound as in the acquisition phase, to avoid extinction of the 
action-effect associations. Previous research shows that this does not alter effect patterns on RT & errors 




children. This finding was taken to suggest that action-effect knowledge in children quickly fades during 
transfer if the effect tones in response to a keypress are absent. 
Associatedness was coded with respect to the relation between the key label (trumpet or bell 
label) and the sound; e.g., responding with the trumpet key to <toot> would fall into the non-arbitrary 
category while responding with the bell key to <piew> would count as arbitrary. 
Procedure 
The acquisition phase consisted of 18 practice trials (12 go trials, 6 no-go trials) and 144 test trials 
(96 go trials and 48 no-go trials). Subjects were instructed that Ernie “likes music” and that they could 
“make music” for Ernie. They were told that they could choose freely which sound to make for Ernie by 
pressing the trumpet key or the bell key. The causal relation between pushing one of the keys and the 
resulting auditory effect was made explicit by instructing participants that “If you want the trumpet to 
make a sound you should push the trumpet-key” and giving them the opportunity to explore the 
corresponding contingency by pressing the key. The same instruction followed for the bell key. 
Additionally, subjects were instructed that they could freely choose how often they pressed a key but that 
in total they had to press both keys about equally often. When participants persevered in pushing only one 
button during acquisition (predominantly children were prone to this), the experimenter reminded them to 
change keys now and then. Furthermore, they were told that Bert “does not like music” and that no 
response should be given when a picture of Bert appeared. To motivate subjects—especially the 
children—to complete the acquisition phase, they were told that Ernie was allowed to play until 
lunchtime. A picture of a clock that was colored for one third and two third was presented after 48 and 96 
trials, respectively. After 144 trials the clock was completely colored, indicating that lunch time had 




In the transfer phase participants were told that Ernie was making music and wanted them to 
participate. When a picture of Ernie appeared together with one of the two effect sounds, they should 
press the trumpet key and when they perceived Ernie together with the other effect sound they should 
press the bell key, thus motivating the (consistent or inconsistent) S-R mapping required for the transfer 
phase. Again, subjects were instructed to withhold their response when Bert appeared, because ‘‘Bert 
hates music and likes the silence’’. As in the acquisition phase, subjects were informed about their 
progress in the transfer phase. However, now they were instructed that Ernie was allowed to make music 
until bedtime and the same clock procedure was used to indicate when bedtime had reached and the 
transfer phase had finished. The transfer phase consisted of 18 practice trials (12 go trials, 6 no-go trials) 
and 90 test trials (72 go trials and 18 no-go trials). 
Results 
Acquisition Phase 
Left and right hand responses were equally distributed (49.8% vs. 50.2%, t(63) = .42, p > .65) and 
equally fast (F(1, 60) = .37, p > .5). As expected, adults were substantially faster than 4-year-olds (428 vs. 
1215ms respectively), F(1, 60) = 290.09, p < .001, η2p = .83) . Overall, responses were faster when they 
were followed by a sound effect that was pre-experimentally associated with the key label than by a 
sound that was not (805 vs. 839ms respectively), F(1, 60) = 6.82, p < .02, η2p = .10. This effect of 
associatedness interacted with age group (F(1, 60) = 4.75, p < .04, η2p = .07) due to that the 
associatedness effect was reliable in the children (1185 vs. 1246ms for non-arbitrary and arbitrary 
relations) (F(1, 30) = 5.92, p < .05, η2p = .17) but not in the adults (p > .20). No a priori effects of 







RTs. Mean RTs of the transfer phase were analyzed as a function of age group, associatedness 
(arbitrary versus non-arbitrary), and mapping (consistency versus inconsistent), with mean overall RT of 
the acquisition phase as covariate. Unsurprisingly, the adults were faster than the 4-year-old children (630 
vs. 1120ms for adults and children), F(1, 59) =  47.41, p < .001, η2p = .45. As predicted by the hypothesis 
of bidirectional action-effect associations, the consistent mapping yielded faster responses than the 
inconsistent mapping (consistent mapping 801ms inconsistent mapping 950ms), F(1, 59) = 25.03, p < 
.001, η2p = .30 (see Figure 1). The interaction between age group and mapping consistency was not 
significant, p >.5, suggesting that action-effect learning was comparable in children and adults. Overall, 
responses were faster to non-arbitrary action-tone relations than to arbitrary relations (873 vs. 879ms 
respectively), F(1, 59) = 4.33, p < .05, η2p = .07. Like in the acquisition phase, this effect was 
numerically more pronounced in children (1096 vs. 1145ms for non-arbitrary and arbitrary relations, 
respectively) than in adults, where it was reversed in sign (650 vs. 612ms), but the interaction between 
associatedness and age was not reliable, p = .19. All other interactions with associatedness also failed to 






Figure 1. Mean RTs (upper panel) and percentages of errors (lower panel) for performance on arbitrary and non-





Accuracy. Figure 1 shows the main effects for age, with adults making fewer errors than children 
(7% vs. 16%) (F(1, 60) = 18.92, p = < .001, η2p = .24).  As predicted by our bidirectional-association 
hypothesis, mapping yielded a main effect with fewer errors made in the consistent mapping (consistent 
mapping 7%, inconsistent mapping 16%), F(1, 60) = 17.87, p = < .001, η2p = .23. This effect was 
involved in a significant interaction with age group, F(1, 60) = 7.38, p < .01, η2p = .11. Follow-up 
separate analysis for both age groups revealed that this was due to the mapping effect being significant in 
children F(1, 30) = 15.34, p <  .001, η2p = .34 (consistent mapping 8%, inconsistent mapping 23%) but 
not in adults, p > .11, a pattern that replicates Eenshuistra et al. (2004). Overall, fewer errors were made 
with non-arbitrary action-tone relations than with arbitrary tone relations (10 vs. 12% for non-arbitrary 
and arbitrary relations, respectively), F(1,60)= 4.06, p < .05, η2p = .06  irrespective of mapping. All other 
interactions with associatedness failed to reach significance (p>.2). Moreover, children committed more 
no-go responses than young adults (5.3% vs. 0.5%), F(1, 60) = 6.51, p < .02, η2p = .98. This effect was 
not modulated by consistency (p > .25). 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was threefold. First, we were interested to see whether action-effect 
relations that are explicitly described as causal, and in a context where the effect is willfully produced by 
carrying out the respective action, are acquired in the same way as implicit action-effect relations. In 
particular, we asked whether explicit, intentional acquisition would lead to the creation of unidirectional 
associations between the representations of the action and the effect. If that would have been the case, no 
consistency effects would have been expected in the transfer phase. Given that such effects were 
obtained, and that the size of these effects is almost identical to what has been observed under implicit-
learning conditions (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Elsner & Hommel, 2001), it makes sense to assume that 




bidirectional associations between action and effect representations. This is an important extension of 
previous findings and suggests that ideomotor logic applies to both the accidental pickup of possible 
future action goals during non-intentional movement (as typical for infants and young children) and the 
intentional acquisition during active exploration of action possibilities and affordances (as more typical 
for novices facing a new task and more experienced agents fine-tuning their actions). Finding evidence 
for bidirectional action-effect associations under explicit-learning conditions provides further theoretical 
constraints on the explanation of Verschoor et al.’s (submitted) observation that asking subjects to repeat 
the task instructions in their own words prevents transfer from the acquisition to the transfer phase. Even 
though this manipulation is likely to render the causal relation between actions and effects in the 
acquisition phase explicit, the present findings do not suggest that this is sufficient to eliminate transfer 
effects in bidirectional binding.  
The second aim of the present study was to compare the learning of novel, arbitrary relations 
between actions and effects, as often used in ideomotor studies, with the learning (or, better, 
strengthening) of action-effect relations that fit with pre-experimental knowledge. Although the effects of 
pre-experimental knowledge on RT’s and errors were small, they were coherent and reliable. Non-
arbitrary, familiar relations affected performance and allowed for faster responding in both the acquisition 
and the transfer phase and more accurate responding in the transfer. However, there was no evidence that 
the type of relationship interacted with any other variable, including consistency. On the one hand, this 
means that our manipulation was successful in contrasting familiar and unfamiliar relations. On the other 
hand, however, the familiarity of a relation does not seem to modulate the format of the emerging or 
strengthened association. In particular, greater familiarity with the relationship between an action and its 
consequences does not seem to induce a unidirectional action  effect association per se. Given that our 
subjects were likely to know that trumpets and bells are causally related to the sounds they produce, we 




representations were not activated in the context of the transfer phase. This confirms the consideration of 
Fenker et al. (2005) and Verschoor et al. (submitted), that unidirectional and bidirectional associations 
between events can coexist and be selectively activated in some contexts but not in others, presumably 
depending on instructions and task requirements. From a more general point of view, our findings are also 
consistent with the observation of Namy, Campbell, and Tomasello (2004) that arbitrary relationships 
between events are learned just as well as non-arbitrary relationships. In their study, children were 
exposed to pairings between particular plastic toys and particular gestures, with some gestures bearing an 
iconic relationship to the toy (e.g., a hopping gesture and a rabbit) and others bearing an arbitrary 
relationship (a dropping motion and a rabbit). Learning was equally efficient in both conditions in 18-
months-olds and 4-year-olds.  
Our third aim was to compare transfer effects in young children and adults. Mapping consistency 
affected performance to the same degree in either group as far as reaction times are concerned. The error 
rates were also sensitive to consistency but more so in the 4-year-olds than in adults. This profile amounts 
to a perfect replication of previous observations (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006). It suggests 
that young children were less able than young adults to keep the instructed stimulus-response mapping 
active during the transfer phase, presumably due to less mature executive functioning and more resulting 
“goal neglect” (Eenshuistra et al., 2004). That is, stimuli related to possible action effects seem to 
reactivate the associated action to such a degree that this tends to overwrite the stimulus-response 
mapping held in working memory. However, in the trials where children do manage to keep the stimulus-
response mapping active and make a correct response, they show a similar effect of mapping on RTs as 
observed in the adults. In other words, the established task set seems to be equivalent in children and 
adults but the likelihood of keeping it sufficiently active is higher in adults. Most important for present 
purposes, however, this profile does not seem to change with explicit action-effect acquisition—as even 




or the familiarity of the action-effect relation. Given that adults are likely to have had more experience 
with trumpets and bells and the sounds they produce than 4-year-old children have, this corroborates the 
conclusion, contrary to Verschoor et al. (submitted), that familiarity with the (unidirectional) causal 
connection between actions and effects does not prevent the creation of bidirectional associations between 
their representations.  
To summarize, the present study shows that experiencing sequences of actions and effects 
induces the creation of bidirectional associations between action and effect representations, no matter 
what the degree of familiarity with related action-effect contingencies and irrespective of whether the 
sequence is picked up implicitly or the action is explicitly carried out to produce the effect. This 
corroborates predictions from ideomotor approaches to action control (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 
1996; Hommel et al., 2001; James, 1890) and demonstrates their broad applicability. At the same time, 
this converging evidence for bidirectional associations in children and adults raises the interesting issue 
how these associations, and their underlying learning processes, relate to causal learning proper, that is, to 
the acquisition of what Tolman and Brunswik (1935) have called “the causal structure of the environment. 
On the one hand, bidirectional associations can be considered to represent empirically derived knowledge 
about objective action-effect contingencies, which renders it some sort of causal knowledge. On the other 
hand, however, the bidirectionality of these associations—which the present findings seem to confirm—
neglects the empirical and formal difference between cause and effect and, thus, violates the requirements 
of causal-learning theories (e.g., Gopnik, Glymour, Sobel, Schulz & Kushnir, 2004; Waldmann & 
Martignon, 1998). Given the observations that perceived causality does not depend on, and is no 
requirement for action-effect acquisition (Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Verschoor et al., submitted), this 
suggests that the acquisition of formal causal relationships is independent of ideomotor action-effect 
acquisition. This would imply that voluntary action control does not rely on a formal understanding of the 










Chapter 6: Where do action goals come from? 
Evidence for spontaneous action-effect binding in 
infants 
 












One of the great questions in psychology concerns how we develop to become intentional agents. 
Ideomotor theory suggests that intentional actions depend on, and emerge from the automatic acquisition 
of bidirectional action-effect associations: perceiving an action-effect sequence creates an integrated 
representation that can be employed for action control in the opposite order, selecting an action by 
anticipating its effect. We provide first evidence for the spontaneous acquisition of bidirectional action-
effect associations in 9- 12- and 18-month-olds, suggesting that the mechanism underlying action-effect 










Humans actively manipulate their environment to reach goals, that is, to produce particular 
intended effects. As the selection of goal-directed actions logically depends on associations between 
actions and their consequences, memories for actions and their consequences must exist to permit the 
actor to choose the right action for a given desired outcome. Some authors have suggested that intentional 
action and the capability to create goal representations are with us from birth on—or even earlier (e.g., 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rochat, 2001). However, given that a meaningful 
representation of an action goal requires knowledge about action-effect relations, the complexity and 
flexibility of human behaviour make it unlikely that action goals are innate (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). 
Accordingly, other authors have suggested that action goals emerge through experience (Heyes, 2001) 
and through the observation of the relationship between actions and their perceptual consequences in 
particular (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel & Elsner, 2009; James, 1890; Lotze, 1852).  
One of the first theories addressing how infants (and older learners of novel actions) acquire 
action-effect associations and how they utilize these associations to produce goal-directed actions was put 
forward by James (1890). His ideomotor theory states that all actions (or movements) are necessarily 
involuntary at first and thus no more than motor babbling (cf., Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). However, 
through experience actions and their effects are automatically integrated and become associated in a 
bidirectional fashion. This renders action-effect representations mental cues of actions, so that actions can 
be performed voluntarily by imagining the wanted action effect—which reactivates the respective effect 
representation and primes the associated action. Ideomotor theory was revived and refined by Greenwald 
(1970), Prinz (1990, 1997), and Hommel (1996; Elsner & Hommel, 2001), and then elaborated into the 




common representational domain and stresses the interplay between, and mutual dependency of 
perception and action. This provides a broad theoretical background and motivation for the assumption 
that actions and codes of their perceptual consequences are associated in a bidirectional fashion. This 
bidirectionality is particularly important for ideomotor theorizing because it assumes that perceiving the 
sequence of action and effect creates a representational structure that can be used for action control in the 
opposite order (anticipation of action effect leading to action). TEC also suggests that the same 
representational format is used for observed and self-initiated action thus also providing a framework for 
action understanding. 
Evidence for the acquisition of bidirectional associations between actions and their effects has 
been found in different species, such as cats, rats and pigeons, in humans ranging in age from 4-year-olds 
(Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006) to adults (Elsner & Hommel, 2001), and for a wide range of 
actions and effects (for a review see: Hommel & Elsner, 2009). Action-effect acquisition is modulated by 
the same factors that influence instrumental learning (e.g., temporal contiguity and contingency of 
movement and effect: Elsner & Hommel, 2004) and does not depend on voluntary attention (Dutzi & 
Hommel, 2009; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Band et al., 2009), suggesting that it is a fairly automatic 
process indeed (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Additionally, action-effect acquisition has been found after just 
one trial (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009). 
Given this apparently high degree of automaticity and the strong evidence that very young infants 
are sensitive to action-effect contingencies (e.g., Rochat & Striano, 1999; Gergely & Watson, 1999; 
DeCasper & Fifer, 1980; for a review, see Rovee-Collier, 1987), it seems likely that the proposed 
mechanism is already operative in early infancy. However, even though the role of action-effect learning 
in the development of voluntary action is receiving increasing attention, this interest is mostly focused on 




underlying various studies is that acquired action-effect associations are instrumental in understanding 
and imitation of actions. Indeed, action effects have been shown to be important for action understanding 
(e.g.; Biro & Leslie, 2007; for a review, see: Hauf, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2003) and in imitation behavior, as 
infants are more likely to reproduce actions that have a salient action effect (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008; 
Klein et al., 2006; for a review, see: Elsner 2007; Melzoff, 2007). Although these studies suggest that 
observed action-effect relations in other people’s actions can influence infant’s imitation behavior and 
action understanding, they do not tell whether infants learn action-effect associations by exploring the 
world themselves. Furthermore, these studies do not provide direct evidence for the assumed 
bidirectionality of action-effect associations, which according to ideomotor theory allows the infant to 
select  and produce actions by activating their perceptual consequences. 
The present study sought for more direct evidence for the acquisition of bidirectional action-
effect in infancy. Although we hypothesize that the ability to learn action-effect associations  is present 
from early infancy, action production and action control are extremely limited in very young babies, thus 
rendering behavioural measurements difficult. Since investigating bidirectional action-effect acquisition 
requires participants to carry out some sort of motor actions, a possible lack of evidence in very young 
infants could simply be due to limitations in their motor capabilities rather than to the inability to 
associate and rely on action-effect relations. Adult and children studies on learning action-effect 
associations typically used manual actions such as pressing a button. Good control over these types of 
manual actions develops in the second half of the first year (Belsky & Most, 1980). In addition, previous 
research showed that the earliest age at which infants' own actions are influenced by observed effects of 
others' actions is around 9 months (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008). At this same age infants begin to 
distinguish means from ends in their own behaviour (Piaget, 1936; Goubet, Rochat, Maire-Leblond, & 
Poss, 2006; Willatts, 1999). This ability is often thought to be a prerequisite for goal-directed action 




(Hauf, 2007). Therefore, we expected that at 9 months infants will likely show evidence for bidirectional 
action-effect acquisition via their own manual exploratory behaviour. Furthermore, Elsner and 
Aschersleben's study (2003) suggests that there are developmental changes in the effect that observed 
action-effect relations have on infants' own behavior. They found that with a higher task demand the 
behavior of 12 but not 9 months old infants was influenced by an observed action-effect. In addition, a 
further step was made at around 15-18 months when infants' behavior started to be affected by whether 
the effect they could produce matched with the observed effect. Testing 9, 12 and 18 months olds' ability 
to acquire bidirectional action-effects by their own exploratory behavior can help clarify whether the 
nature of these changes lies in the development of specific imitative skills for transferring others action 
into one's own action or in the accuracy of encoding specific action-effect relations due to, for example, 
increasing working memory capacity or brain maturation (Diamond, 2006).  
Our task was modelled after the experimental setup used in the free-choice experiments of Elsner 
and Hommel (2001). Elsner and Hommel had adults carry out self-chosen left and right key presses in 
response to a visual trigger stimulus. Each key press produced a particular sound (e.g., left key  low 
tone, right key  high tone), and even though these sounds were irrelevant for the task, it was assumed 
that participants would acquire bidirectional associations between key presses and tone representations. 
After this acquisition phase, participants were again freely choosing left and right key presses, but in this 
test phase the visual trigger was replaced by an auditory trigger stimulus: high and low tones (identical to 
the previous action effects) presented in random sequence. As predicted, people were quicker and more 
likely to choose the action that previously had produced the currently presented trigger tone (e.g., they 
were quicker and more likely to press the left key when hearing the low than the high tone), suggesting 




When adopting this paradigm for our infant subjects, we realized after piloting that versions of 
the original binary-choice task were too demanding. We therefore simplified the task in such a way that 
only one (very large) touch-sensitive key was presented to the infants, the two action alternatives being 
the touching or not touching of the key. Moreover, given Dutzi and Hommel’s (2009) demonstration of 
action-effect learning after just one presentation, we also greatly reduced the number of acquisition- and 
test trials, so to minimize demands on infants’ limited attention. In the acquisition phase, infants were 
presented with two multimodal (and thus very salient and attention-grabbing) events, one being self-
produced by touching the key (a true action effect) and another that was presented while infants were 
prevented from touching the key, so that the event was not self-produced. In the test phase, we presented 
the two multimodal events in different blocks and expected the previously self-produced event 
stimulating quicker and more spontaneous key touches than the action-independent event. 
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
Three groups of infants were tested: 22 9-month-olds (mean: 9.09 months, SD= .18, 7 female), 21 
12-month-olds (mean: 12.10 months, SD= .26, 10 female), and 22 18-month-olds (mean: 18.02 months, 
SD= .32, 8 female). Four additional 9-month-olds, three 12-month-olds, and two 18-month-olds were 
excluded due to fussiness. One 12-month-old was excluded due to experimental error. The participants 
were recruited through advertisements in local papers, daycares, maternity wards, and general 
practitioners. Infants were randomly and equally distributed across conditions, and they received small 






During the experiment infants sat in their caretaker's lap in a curtained booth. The multimodal 
stimuli (sounds and images) were presented via a 30-inch widescreen monitor with built-in speakers 
situated at a distance of 60 cm from the infants. A brightly-colored touch-sensitive key was placed right in 
front of the infant. The key was built into a wooden board that was attached to the booth below the 
monitor (see Figure 1). Presentation and latency recording was controlled by E-prime™ software. A 
camera located above the booth recorded the touch-sensitive key. Another camera behind the infant 
recorded the stimulus presentation. The cameras fed a mixer that produced a split-image movie of the 







Figure 1. Experimental set-up. The infant sat on the caretaker’s lap while perceiving the stimulus events and pushing 






Instructions were given to the caretakers prior to the experiment. The experiment consisted of two 
phases: the acquisition phase and the test phase. The acquisition phase was composed of two blocks of 
five trials with self-produced multimodal events and two blocks of five trials with action-independent 
multimodal events, in an alternating order. This setup resulted for all infants in 20 acquisition trials, 10 
self-produced effect trials and 10 action-independent effect presentations. We chose multimodal events to 
maximize their discriminability and attention-grabbing potential. 
In blocks with action-independent events, infants were presented with one of the two audiovisual 
events five times in a row, while the caregiver prevented the infant from touching the key by gently 
holding the infant’s hands. To ensure the infant paid attention to the screen the presentation was triggered 
by the experimenter, who monitored the infant on-line. In case of distraction the experimenter waited for 
attention to return. In blocks with self-produced events, the infant's hands were free and could press the 
touch-sensitive key. Each touch of the key immediately elicited a presentation of an audiovisual event. 
Before another effect could be elicited the previous effect had to end.  The caretakers were instructed to 
encourage the infants to press the key. Between the blocks there was a short break of 10 seconds to ensure 
that infant and caretaker were ready for the next block. Additionally, a red or green dot was presented on 
the monitor during the blocks to remind the caretakers which block they were in. The bimodal effects 
were two distinct 500-ms long meaningless sounds that started simultaneously with the 1000-ms 
presentations of a picture (either bright-colored cartoon of a car or a mouse)
12
. 
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 We decided not to balance action-independent and self-produced effects across participants 
after a pilot experiment had revealed no preference for one or the other effect. The pilot investigated 15 
participants, five from each of the three age groups. Infants were shown the button but prevented from 
touching; and it was checked whether the infant was actually looking at the button. We then presented the 
two bimodal events in random order, and the infant had the opportunity to touch the button for 30 
seconds. A short break, during which infants were prevented from reacting again, divided the two 




After the acquisition phase there was a 30-second break during which caretaker and infant turned 
away from the monitor while engaging in entertaining the infant. The test phase consisted of three trials, 
in which the previously self-produced event, the previously experienced action-independent event, or no 
event was presented. Each of these trials lasted 30 seconds, during which the infant could freely touch the 
key. In between the test trials there was a 10-sec break during which the caretaker prevented the infant 
from responding by holding his/her hands. The self-produced and action-independent events were 
presented first and second, or vice versa, with the order being balanced across participants, while the 
baseline trial was always administered last—so to minimize possible forgetting and extinction of action-
effect associations. Methods were approved by the ethical committee of the Leiden University, Institute 
for Psychological Research. 
Data acquisition 
In acquisition trials, we measured latencies online and, based on the offline inspection of the 
video tape, the number of undetected motor responses (visible scratches and touches of the key that were 
too light for the conductance-sensitive key to detect) and the number of responses on which the infants 
were helped by the caretaker. Given that the acquisition of action-effect associations is sensitive to 
contingency and extinction (Elsner & Hommel, 2004), the undetected (and therefore not “effect-
rewarded”) motor responses were considered particularly important. In test trials, we measured the 
latency of the first response and the number of responses (key touches). From the latter, response 
                                                                                                                                                                           
p=.444) or the number of responses (F(1,13)=.398, p=.389), nor was there any hint to interactions with 







frequency was calculated for each infant based on his/her total number of responses in all three test trials, 
thus correcting for motivational differences (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1. Mean number of responses (#) and mean percentage (%) of responses for 9-month-olds (n = 22), 12-month-
olds (n = 21) and 18-month-olds (n = 22) in Self-Produced, Action-Independent and No-Event test-trials. 
 
  




Age groups # % # % # %
9-Month olds 5.00 38.95 4.91 41.23 2.50 19.73
12-Month olds 3.67 36.38 4.33 41.60 2.24 22.02






One-way between-subjects ANOVAs were carried out to assess possible differences between the 
three age groups in the acquisition phase. No reliable differences were obtained for the mean latencies for 
responses in trials with self-produced events, in the percentage of responses in which the infants were 
helped by the caretaker, or in the timing of the presentation of the action-independent events (Fs<1). 
However, we did find an effect of age group on the number of undetected key touches, F(2,62)=3.23, p = 
.032, η
2
p = .105: Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 12-month-olds overall had significantly more 
undetected responses (3.33) than the 9-month-olds (0.95), p=.01, but not than the 18-month-olds (1.82). 
Test phase 
To assess possible differences in motivation and/or motor abilities, we ran an ANOVA on the 
total number of responses made in all three test trials, but no effect of age was obtained. The mean 
number of responses during the test-phase was 11.45. 
A between-subjects ANCOVA was carried out on the latencies of first responses in the test trials, 
with trial type (previously self-produced vs. action-independent stimulus event) as within-subjects and 
age group (9, 12, 18 months) as between-subjects factor (see Figure 2). In this analysis we considered the 
number of undetected responses during acquisition as a covariate, so to control for extinction, and the 
total number of responses during all three test trials, so to control for the overall level of activity. We 
found a significant main effect of trial type, F(1,51)=4.67, p = .035, η
2
p = .564: Infants responded 
significantly faster to self-produced events (5.57 s) than to action-independent events (6.64 s). No effects 







Figure 2. Mean Latencies (+ SE) for 9-month-olds (n = 22), 12-month-olds (n = 21) and 18-month-olds (n = 22) in 































Latencies to associated effect




We ran another mixed-factor ANCOVA on the response proportions in the test trials, normalized 
through an Arcsin transformation. Trial type and age group served as factors (see Figure 3) and the 
number of undetected responses during the acquisition as covariate. There was no main effect of trial type 
( F(1,61)=0.70, p = .41, η2p = .011) but a close-to-significant interaction of trial type and age group, 
F(2,61) = 2.89, p = .063, η2p = .087. Separate exploratory between-subjects ANCOVAs revealed that 
there was no trial-type effect in the 9- or the 12-month-olds, Fs<1, but responses were more frequent to 




Figure 3. Mean Percentage of responses (+ SE) for 9-month-olds (n = 22), 12-month-olds (n = 21) and 18-month-olds 




























Reactions to associated effect





In the present study we sought evidence for the spontaneous acquisition of bidirectional action-
effect associations in early infancy. As expected, 9-, 12- and 18- months-olds were faster to respond to 
events that they previously had actively produced than to action-independent events, indicating that all 
age groups indeed formed bidirectional action-effect associations during the acquisition phase. Moreover, 
at least the 18-months-olds also had a stronger tendency to perform the action again and more often 
compared when presented with the effect they previously caused than with the action-independent event. 
Altogether, we consider this pattern a rather close replication of the Elsner & Hommel (2001) finding in 
adults. 
Unexpectedly, the latency measure turned out to be more sensitive than the response-frequency 
measure, which showed evidence for action-effect acquisition in the 18-month-olds only. This differential 
sensitivity might be due to several, not necessarily mutually exclusive factors. For one, it is possible that 
the younger infants were creating weaker or less specific associations between action and effect 
representations in the acquisition phase. These weaker associations might have been sufficient to drive the 
first response, which therefore was faster to self-produced effects, but might have fallen prey to extinction 
too soon to produce a larger number of responses to self-produced effects than to action-independent 
effects. Indeed, some evidence for extinction has been obtained even in adults (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). 
For another, it is possible that younger infants were less likely to retrieve the required action-effect 
associations in the test phase—be it due to less flexible transfer from the acquisition to the test context or 
because of higher cortical noise (note that the greatest changes in myelination occur during the first three 
years: Carmody, Dunn, Boddie-Willis, DeMarco & Lewis, 2004). In any case, the fact that only 18 
months old infants showed evidence for action-effect acquisition in response-frequency measure, fits with 




before. Similar to the current finding, in their study the age groups did not differ from each other in their 
latency measures while only the 18-month-olds performed more target actions when the effect they could 
produce matched the effect of the observed model's action. Although the two studies are different in their 
design and in their research questions, our finding suggests that the differential frequency pattern found 
between age groups in their study was not, or not only, due to the development of imitative skills, but 
may have been due to differences in the strength of specific action-effect associations. Nevertheless, in 
our study the latency measures showed that all age groups acquired a bidirectional action-effect 
association. 
A disadvantage of our simplified design is that it does not allow distinguishing associations 
between the effect stimuli and specific motor responses from associations between effect stimuli and a 
broader range of motor activities. For instance, it is possible that the self-produced effect became 
associated not so much with particular manual key-reaching actions but with general motor activity or 
playing in general, while the action-independent effect became associated with lack of activity. On the 
one hand, such an approach does not seem to fit with the behavior of our participants in the action-
independent effect condition—as evident from the session tapes, which did produce motor activity that 
however was not specifically directed to the key. On the other hand, even such a rather unspecific 
association between effect stimuli and motor activation as such must rely on bidirectional associations 
between action codes and action-effects codes, as predicted from ideomotor theory. 
In summary, our findings demonstrate the spontaneous, non-intentional acquisition of 
bidirectional action-effect associations in infants no older than nine months. This observation by no 
means contradicts nativist ideas about action-goal representations but it does provide a theoretical 
alternative that makes the less parsimonious nativist assumptions unnecessary. Apparently, infants are 




associations between representations of these action effects and the motor actions (or class of motor 
action) producing them. This way, infants acquire not only possible future action goals but also the means 
to reach them whenever they might become interested in doing so later on. In other words, human action 
goals might be grounded in and through the acquisition and anticipation of action-contingent perceptual 
effects. This fits with findings from studies on action perception, showing that infants around 9 months 
more readily encode actions that have salient action effects as goal-directed (Biro et al., under revision; 
Biro & Leslie, 2007; Hauf, 2007), and with studies on imitation, showing that 9-months-olds can use 
observed action effects for action control (Elsner, 2007). Taken altogether, these previous and the present 
findings provide considerable support for the basic assumption of TEC (Hommel et al., 2001) that the 
integration of actions and their effects provides a common representational format for the coding of 









Chapter 7: From outcome prediction to action 
selection: 
Developmental change in the role of action-effect 
bindings 
 












Ideomotor theory considers bidirectional action-effect associations to be the fundamental building 
blocks for intentional action. The present study employed a novel pupillometric and oculomotor paradigm 
to study developmental changes in the role of action-effects in the acquisition of voluntary action. Our 
findings suggest that both 7- and 12-months olds (and adults) can use acquired action-effect bindings to 
predict action outcomes but only 12-months-olds (and adults) showed evidence for employing action-
effects to select actions. This dissociation supports the idea that infants acquire action-effect knowledge 
before they have developed the cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform 











Some authors have suggested a rudimentary ability to represent action goals to be present at birth 
(e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rochat, 2001). But where do such 
representations come from? Given the world’s complexity and the dramatic changes the mind and body of 
infants undergo during development, it is rather unlikely that they are innate and permanent (Greenwald, 
1970; Harless, 1861; Hommel & Elsner, 2009; James, 1890; Lotze, 1852). Piaget (1936), in his influential 
constructivist approach to cognitive development, firstly suggested that goals should be adaptive to the 
infant’s changing skills and abilities and may derive from its own sensorimotor exploration and 
experience motivated by a predisposition to adjust to its environment. Although he states that such 
exploratory actions are integrated with their effects into schemata necessary for perception and action, he 
does not elaborate on the underlying cognitive mechanism (Piaget, 1954). 
Exactly such a mechanism was proposed in the late nineteenth century, though largely neglected 
in psychology for a century. Following the lead of Lotze (1852) and Harless (1861), James (1890) 
suggested a cognitive mechanism that does what Piaget (1936) proposed; it provides actors with action 
goals that are rooted in their own sensorimotor experience. In his ideomotor theory James stated that all 
actions are necessarily involuntary when being carried out for the first time. Indeed, if one defines action 
as goal-directed movement, it presupposes some sort of anticipation of its effect. This again implies 
knowledge on action-effect relationships, which needs to be acquired before the action can be carried out 
“in order to” produce the outcome intentionally. Ideomotor theory suggests that such knowledge is 
acquired on the fly: whenever people move, they automatically and unintentionally create bidirectional 
associations between the perceived effects and the motor pattern producing them. This association brings 
the movement under voluntary control: Once acquired, the agent can now activate the motor pattern 




effect. Indeed, infants start to motor babble (i.e., produce random movements) in utero (cf., Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1997)—which could explain the possible presence of goal representations at birth—and they are 
consistently exploring their environment. This provides ample opportunity to acquire movement/action-
effect associations and thus a steadily increasing pool of possible action goals. Thus, James considered 
bidirectional movement/action-effect associations the fundamental building blocks of intentional action 
and provides a mechanism that could allow the emergence of goal-directed action in infants.  
Ideomotor theory was revived and refined by Greenwald (1970), Prinz (1990, 1997), and 
Hommel (1996; Elsner & Hommel, 2001) and is now part of a broader theoretical movement stressing the 
interplay between perception and action (Hommel et al., 2001; Meltzoff, 2007; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002). 
This motivated numerous demonstrations of bidirectional action-effect acquisition in humans ranging 
from 4-year-olds (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006) to adults (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Action-
effect acquisition was found for a wide range of actions and effects (for a review see: Hommel & Elsner, 
2009), suggesting a general action-effect integration mechanism. Additionally, action-effect acquisition 
has been found after just one trial (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009), suggesting that the mechanism is fast-acting 
and implicit. Action-effect acquisition is modulated by the same factors that influence instrumental 
learning (e.g., temporal contiguity and contingency of movement and effect: Elsner & Hommel, 2004) 
and does not depend on voluntary attention (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Band et 
al., 2009). Together with the fact that it was also found in animals (see Elsner & Hommel, 2001), this 
suggests that action-effect integration it is a fairly low-level and automatic process (Elsner & Hommel, 
2004). 
If bidirectional action-effect associations are indeed the fundamental building blocks for 
intentional action, the system that generates these associations should be operative early in life. Especially 




definition, goal-directed behavior is thought to start somewhere between birth (Metzoff & Moore, 1997; 
von Hofsten, 2004) and about nine months of age (Hauf, 2007; Piaget, 1936). Action-effect knowledge 
has been implicated to be operational in higher order cognitive functions such as action understanding in 
7 months-olds (e.g.; Biro & Leslie, 2007; for a review, see: Hauf, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2003) and imitation 
in 9-months-olds (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008; Klein et al., 2006; for a review, see: Elsner 2007; 
Meltzoff, 2007). Even though these findings do not provide direct evidence for bidirectional action-effect 
acquisition, theories that emphasize similar representational formats for first-person experience and 
observed action (e.g. Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Hommel et al.,2001; Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 
1999), and conceptualize action understanding as inverse planning (Melzoff, 2007; Baker et al., 2009) 
consider them corroborative. Other corroborating evidence was found in studies that show very young 
infants to be sensitive to action-effect contingencies. For instance, newborns actively adjust their sucking 
rate in response to their mothers’ voice as ongoing conditional feedback (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980) and 2-
month-olds pursue interesting action effects by intentionally varying their sucking rate (Rochat & Striano, 
1999) or varying gaze direction (Watson, 1967; for a review, see Gergely & Watson, 1999). Another line 
of research by Carolyn Rovee-Collier shows that action effects aid memory retrieval for actions from two 
months of age (Rovee & Rovee, 1969; for a review, see Rovee-Collier, 1999). Telling as these studies 
may be (they show that action contingent effects play an important role in infant behaviour and memory) 
they were not designed to directly asses the bidirectionality of action-effect associations and their use for 
action planning and may thus confound actual action-effect learning with simple operant conditioning. 
Nonetheless, these findings may reflect a developing ability for learning action-effect contingencies. 
The first study to find direct evidence for bidirectional action-effect associations in infants was 
undertaken by Verschoor et al. (2010) with 9-, 12- and 18-months-old participants. A simplified version 
of the free-choice design of Elsner & Hommel (2001) was used. In the acquisition there were two types of 




audiovisual effect, and another in which they were prevented from touching the key while another 
audiovisual effect was presented. When the two effects were replayed in the test phase, all infants were 
faster to touch the key again after the previously self-produced effect than after the action-independent 
effect. Moreover, the 18- months-olds responded more often following the self-produced effect. These 
results were taken as evidence for bidirectional action-effect learning, since the self-produced effect 
activated the response that previously caused the effect. Although this study shows direct evidence for 
action-effect learning in infants, the paradigm had some drawbacks compared to the Elsner and Hommel 
(2001) paradigm. The paradigm had only 10 acquisition trials and 2 test trials which resulted in slightly 
noisy data, and due to the nature of the task the paradigm was unsuited for comparison with adults. Thus 
it remains to be seen whether bidirectional action-effect learning works similarly in infants and adults. 
Furthermore, initial piloting showed that, due to difficulties with the button pushing action, it was 
unsuitable for infants younger than nine months (Verschoor et al., 2010).  
Overcoming these limitations, calls for a more natural type of action that is well established in 
very young infants. Eye movements seem to be the ideal candidate: Infants have been reported to actively 
and accurately control their eye movements from at least 4 months of age (Scerif et al., 2005) and, given 
that infants actively control their gaze to gather information (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Falck-Ytter, 
Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006), to direct or follow attention (Perra & Gattis, 2010), and to engage in 
social behaviors (Senju & Csibra, 2008; Johnson, Ok & Luo, 2007b), eye movements can be considered 
truly goal-directed actions. Moreover, a study by Herwig and Horstmann (2011) demonstrated saccade-
effect learning in adults in a paradigm conceptually very close to that of Elsner and Hommel (2001), 
which indicates that action-effect integration generalizes to oculomotor action. 
In the present study, participants made eye-movements towards visual stimuli appearing at the 




and Hommel (2001) paradigm. In the following test phase, participants were presented with the effect 
tones and could freely choose to make a saccade to the left or right of two simultaneously presented visual 
stimuli. We expected that the tone would prime the saccade that it was produced by in the acquisition 
phase, so that this saccade would be chosen more frequently and/or initiated quicker. This design allowed 
us to test both infants younger than 9 months of age and adults, and to run considerably more trials. 
We tested 7- and 12- months-olds and adults. 7-months-olds were chosen because this group is 
known to show understanding of goal-directed actions (e.g. Woodward 1998; Csibra, 2008, Verschoor & 
Biro, 2012). Since some action-perception theorists (Hommel et al., 2001; Meltzoff, 2007; Meltzoff & 
Prinz, 2002; Woodward, 2009; Rizolatti & Craighero, 2004) stress that the same representational format 
is used for observed and self-initiated action, even 7-months-olds should be able to pick up action-effect 
associations. A first study that shows action-effect acquisition in infants younger than 9 months was 
recently published by Paulus, Hinnius, Elk and Beckering (2012). They found electrophysiological 
evidence indicating that infants at 8 months of age, show stronger motor resonance when listening to 
previously self-produced action-related sounds than when hearing other sounds. It remains to be seen 
whether the underlying action-effect associations are bidirectional in the sense that they can be reversed 
to generate overt action. Dissociations between acquired action knowledge and the use of such knowledge 
are by no means new; for instance Keen (2005) found a similar dissociation in her work on reaching and 
looking for occluded objects which shows that infants’ looking behavior exhibits knowledge while 
actions are not conform to this knowledge. In a more general sense, such dissociations are apparent in 
looking-time studies wherein infants are reported to possess knowledge on actions they cannot perform 
themselves (e.g. Verschoor & Biro, 2012; Csibra et al., 1999). 
To maximize the chance of finding developmental changes in this study, we included the older of 




months olds in that study. They were also included to replicate Verschoor et al.’s (2010) finding that 
infants at this age show bidirectional action-effect learning and to contrast this ability with the suggested 
inability of the 7-months-olds to initiate true intentional action (Hauf, 2007). We included adults to 
confirm that the same principles of bidirectional action-effect learning can be shown in 12-months-old 
infants and adults. 
Using an eye-tracker enabled us to measure not only the choice of actions and the time to initiate 
them (reaction time), but pupil size as well. This is a relatively new measure in developmental studies 
(e.g. Falck-Ytter, 2008; Jackson & Sirois, 2009; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010, for a review, see Laeng, 
Sirois & Gredeback, 2012) but has been extensively used in psychological research on adults since the 
early 20
th
 century (Hess, 1975). Pupils have the interesting characteristic to react not only to luminance, 
they reliably dilate with superimposed sympathetic activation (Libby, Lacey & Lacey, 1973; Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). Although these dilations are not directly causally related to central processing 
load, they empirically reflect variations in central processing load with extraordinary precision (Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). Task-Evoked Pupillary Responses (TEPRs) can indicate motivational 
phenomena such as arousal (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig & Lang, 2008; Laeng & Falkenberg, 2007), 
attention allocation (e.g. Hess & Polt, 1960), cognitive load (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), and mental 
effort (Kahneman, 1973; Hess & Polt, 1964). TEPRs are pre-conscious and mediated by the locus 
coeruleus (Laeng et al., 2012). Whatever the exact interpretation of this measure, using it enables us to 
contrast acquisition contingent vs. non-contingent responses: whether TEPRs are taken to reflect 
differences in sympathetic activation in general or arousal, attention allocation, cognitive load or mental 
effort, all interpretations suggest that dilations should be larger for incongruent responses. 
We assumed that in our task two types of processes might play a role and affect TEPRs. For one, 




Elsner & Hommel, 2001), participants did not always choose the action that was previously associated 
with the present trigger stimulus. To some degree, this might be due to random noise but it may also 
reflect a strategy to create some variability and exert active control. Exerting control calls for the 
investment of more cognitive resources, which would suggest that selecting and/or performing an action 
that is not associated with, and thus primed by the trigger stimulus is more effortful. If so, one would 
expect that choices of tone-incongruent actions (i.e., of another action than the one that previously 
produced the present trigger stimulus) are accompanied by (greater) pupil dilation. 
For another, there is evidence that action-effect associations not only affect the choice of actions 
but also their evaluation. In the study of Band et al. (2009), participants performed a probabilistic learning 
task, in which key-presses triggered tones of a particular pitch in 80% of the trials and of another pitch in 
the remaining trials. The presentation of a less frequent action effect generated an electrophysiological 
component that is known as feedback-related negativity (Miltner, Braun & Coles, 1997), which is 
commonly observed when negative feedback is presented. This suggests that action-effect associations 
are used to generate particular expectations about effects given the execution of a particular action. In 
infant studies, TEPRs have been used as an index of the violation of expectations (Jackson & Sirois, 
2009; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). Accordingly, it is possible that carrying out a tone-incongruent 
action results in (more) pupil dilation reflecting the violation of a tone-induced expectation regarding the 
action outcome (i.e., the location of the action end point and/or the targeted stimulus). 
Although both processes would predict greater pupil dilations in incongruent responses, we 
considered that these might be distinguished in terms of their temporal dynamics: whereas a choice-
related process would be likely to affect pupil responses briefly before or after response execution, an 
expectation/evaluation-related process would be more likely to affect pupil responses after response 






Two groups of infants were tested: 15 7-month-olds (mean: 7.15 months, SD= .21, SE=.05, 8 
female) and 20 12-month-olds (mean: 12.11 months, SD= .26, SE=.05, 9 female). The infants were 
recruited through direct mail. An informed consent and a questionnaire regarding their general health 
were obtained from all caretakers. The infants were all healthy full-term and without any pre- or perinatal 
complications. Additionally, 24 undergraduate students (mean age: 23.8 years, SD= 2.47, SE= .50, 14 
female) participated in exchange for course credits. All reported to be healthy and to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. Two additional 12-month-olds and one adult were excluded due 
to technical error, and two more 7- and four 12-month-olds were excluded due to fussiness. Additionally 
two 7- and two 12-month-olds were excluded for not meeting the criterion for the minimal amount of test 
trials. 
Test environment and apparatus 
During the experiment participants sat in a specially designed stimulus-poor curtained booth 
(infants in the lap of their caretaker) in front of the monitor/eye-tracker apparatus. The distance between 
eyes and apparatus was approximately 70 centimeters (the screen’s viewing angle was 34.1° by 21.8°). 
Participant behavior was monitored online by means of a camera located above the apparatus. The 
experimenter controlled the experiment from a separate control room. A 17 inch TFT-screen, equipped 
with an integrated Tobii T120 eye-tracker operating at 60 Hz, was used for visual and auditory data 
presentation, and for data collection. The Tobii T120 has an average accuracy of .5 visual degrees and 
allows for a reasonable amount of free head movement by the subject (30x22x30cm). It recorded gaze 
direction and pupil-size. Stimulus presentation was controlled by a PC running E-prime® software 





Infants were tested at a time of day when they were likely to be alert and in good mood. 
Caretakers and participants were given instructions prior to the experiment. Adults were given no 
instruction with regard to the task. The caretakers were instructed not to move after calibration and gently 
fixate the infant against their tummy to maintain the eye-tracker alignment and to entertain the infant 
during the 1-min interruption between calibration and the experiment. The eye-tracker was calibrated 
using a 9-point calibration consisting of an animated dancing infant accompanied by music. The 
calibration was accepted with a minimum of eight points acquired successfully. The experimenter could 
play an attention-grabbing sound during the experiment to regain attention. If the attention grabbing 
sound did not work caretakers were encouraged to direct the infant’s attention to the middle of the screen 
by pointing to it. Lighting conditions were kept constant during testing and across subjects. Furthermore 
the luminance levels were controlled for by presenting the stimuli in a random fashion. After completion 
of the experiment, further information on the rationale was provided. 
Acquisition phase 
The experiment began with an acquisition-phase of 48 trials (see Figure 1). The background color 
of the screen was grey. An acquisition trial started with a brightly colored dot with a superimposed line 
drawing (4.3° by 4.3°) being displayed at the center of the screen (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). The 
dot served as start signal and fixation mark. To keep the display interesting to the subjects, the color of 
the dot changed randomly from trial to trial (selected from eight bright colors) and the superimposed line 
drawing was randomly selected (without replacement) from a selection of 50 drawings. The dot 
disappeared after the subject fixated properly for an interval that varied from trial to trial (so to remove 




Immediately after the dot disappeared, photographs of two different faces (randomly selected 
without replacement from 100 grayscale pictures from the “Nottingham scans” emotional faces database, 
http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk, displaying emotionally neutral faces of 50 men and 50 women from a frontal 
perspective), appeared left and right from the dot. Faces were chosen to elicit spontaneous saccades as 
they are known to attract infants’ attention (Goren, Sarty & Wu, 1975; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & 
Morton, 1991). The 5.3° by 5.3° pictures appeared at 9.7°, center to center, to the left and right of the 
center of the screen. To avoid perseverance to either left or right across acquisition trials, the images 
immediately started to pulsate. One of the faces started shrinking to 4.1° while the other started growing 
to 6.5° (which picture started shrinking was randomized); one cycle from intermediate size to small, to 
intermediate, to large and back to intermediate, took 2 s.  
The faces evoked spontaneous saccades and thus served as response locations. When a saccade 
towards one of the two face locations was detected, the face at the other location disappeared. The 
targeted face stopped pulsating and, depending on the targeted side, one of two distinct 200 ms effect-
sounds (“tring” or “piew”) was presented. Each effect-sound was consistently designated to either the left 
or the right response area (RA) during the entire acquisition phase (the mapping was balanced across 
participants); RA’s were defined as the maximum size of the pulsating images: 6.5° by 6.5°. A saccadic 
response was defined as an eye movement into the left or right response area, (minimal amplitude 4.3°). 
Reaction Times (RTs) were defined as the time it took from the disappearance of the central dot to the 
time one of the RAs was entered. The maximum allowable RT was defined as 2000 ms; when subjects 
did not respond within this time the same trial was repeated. After each trial, an inter-trial-interval of 500 
ms was presented. If during the acquisition phase the subject showed declining attention to the screen or 
was otherwise distracted the acquisition phase could be shortened (minimum amount of acquisition trials 





After acquisition, the test phase followed directly (32 trials) (see Figure 1). A test trial started 
with a similar dot with superimposed line drawing as in the acquisition phase, again serving as a start- and 
fixation-stimulus. However, after the subjects fixated on the dot (fixation time again varied randomly 
between 150-350 ms), the dot stayed on the screen for another 200 ms during which one of the effect-
sounds that was previously triggered by one of the two eye-movements, was played after which the dot 
immediately disappeared. Then two identical 5.3° by 5.3° images of the same face (again randomly 
selected without replacement from Nottingham scans’ emotional faces database) appeared 9.7° to the left 
and right of the center of the screen. The images were identical to avoid any influence on the subject’s 
gaze preference. To further minimize influence on preference, the faces now pulsated in synchrony, they 
either both started growing or shrinking (randomized and with the same motion parameters as in the 
acquisition). Again, this was expected to evoke a spontaneous saccade and the question of interest was 
whether the direction of this saccade would be biased by the tone. Saccades towards the location that 
previously produced the tone were considered congruent while saccades towards the alternative location 
were considered incongruent. The minimum amount of test trials to enter analysis was 21. Except for 
absence of the effect after the saccade, the remaining procedure was as in the acquisition phase. 
Awareness 
After the experiment, adults were asked if they noticed any regularity in the sound mapping in the 
experiment. If so, they were asked what it was (e.g., “When I looked to the right I heard sound x, when 
looking to left I heard sound Y”). Then, all subjects were asked whether they noticed that there were two 
parts in the experiment. If they did notice, they were asked more specifically if they noticed any regularity 
in the sounds during the first (acquisition) phase, if not they were scored as unaware. If they noticed two 




during the first phase there was a mapping between sounds and direction of looking. If they did they were 







Figure 1. Acquisition trial. T1: Each trial starts with an intertrial interval of 500 ms. T2: A fixation dot is displayed at 
screen center. T3: After succesful fixation, faces appear at either side of the screen where they started to pulsate. T4:  Depending 
on the saccade target, the face at the other side disappears and an effect sound is played for 200 ms. Test trial. T1: Each trial 
starts with an intertrial interval of 500 ms. T2: A fixation dot is displayed at screen center. After succesful fixation one of the 
previous action effects is played. T3: The dot diasppears whereafter the same face appears on both sides. T4: The participant 







E-prime® was used to collect RTs during acquisition and test phases, the number of left and right 
responses during acquisition, and the number of congruent and incongruent responses during test. 
Furthermore, the E-gaze data files produced by E-prime® were imported into BrainVision Analyzer 
software (Version 1.05, BrainProducts, Germany) to analyze gaze position and pupillary data. First pupil 
sizes of both eyes were averaged to create more stable data. Artifacts and blinks as detected by the eye-
tracker were corrected by using a linear interpolation algorithm. After this a 10 Hz low-pass filter was 
used, commonly used for pupil data (e.g., Hupe et al., 2009). To ensure there were no erroneous pupil 
data we then rejected artifacts using the parameters of a minimal pupil size of 1mm and a maximum of 
5mm, furthermore the maximum allowed change of pupil-size was defined as .03mm in 17ms.  
Given that the acquisition of action-effect associations is sensitive to the same factors as stimulus-
response learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2004), the bias to respond in either direction during acquisition was 
calculated (“Acquisition Bias”, AB=the number of leftward saccades minus the number of rightward 
saccades). As the size of this bias represents the degree to which participants were selectively exposed to 
one of the action effects, the AB variable was used as covariate in the analyses when appropriate. 
Results 
Acquisition phase 
RT and response frequency  
All ANOVA’s were performed with age group as a between subjects factor. ANOVA’s on the 





Another ANOVA on mean RT revealed a significant effect of age group, F(2,56) = 55.30, p < 
.001, η2p = .66: Post-hoc Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that adults responded significantly faster 
than infants, p’s < .001) (see Tabel 1).  
A repeated-measures ANOVA on RT’s with right-vs-left as within subjects factor showed no 
effects, p’s > .8. 
 
 
Table 1. Mean scores of acquisition phase (standard deviation in brackets). 
AGEGROUP SCORES 
Number of acquisition 
trials 
Percentage of left 
responses 




























Only 4- of 24 adult participants reported being aware of the action-effect mapping in the 
acquisition phase.  
Test phase 
Response frequency 
Again all ANOVA’s were performed with age group as a between subjects factor. An ANOVA 
on the number of completed test trials showed a significant effect of age group, F(2,56) = 7.71, p = .001, 
η2p = .22. Post-hoc Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that adults and 7-months-olds completed more test 
trials than 12-months-olds (mean adults = 32, 7-months-olds = 31.6, 12-months-olds= 29.6, p’s < .02). 
This is probably due to increased agility and fussiness in the 12-months-olds and increased motivation in 
the adults (see Table 2). 
A repeated measures ANOVA on percentage of responses with left vs. right as within subjects 
factor revealed that, overall, participants showed no tendency to saccade more often to either side, p > 
.05, however it did show an interaction with age group F(2,52) = 4.11, p = .02, η2p = .14. Separate 
comparison showed that while adults made more leftward saccades, F(1,23) = 4.23, p = .05, η2p = .16 
(18 left vs. 14 right), 12-month-olds did the opposite F(1,18) = 5.94, p = .03, η2p = .25 (12 left vs. 18 
right) (see Table 2). 
More importantly for our purposes, a repeated-measures ANOVA on response frequency with 
congruency as within subjects factor showed that the percentage of acquisition-congruent vs. incongruent 
responses did not differ and congruency did not interact with age group, p’s > .6.  
We additionally performed a median split on RT’s on each subject, classifying trails as either fast 




responses. We then performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on the percentage of congruent responses, 
with fast vs. slow as within subjects factor. We found no main effect of fast vs. slow on percentage (F > 
1), we did find a significant interaction of fast vs. slow with age group F(1,56) = 3.58, p = .03, η2p = .11. 
We then tested the age groups separately, showing that adults had a higher percentage of congruent 
responses in their fast responses as compared to their slow responses (54 vs. 45%)  F(1,23) = 11.5, p = 
.003, η2p = .33, while the infants showed no such effect (see Table 2).  
We also performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on percentage of congruent reactions with 
Time (dividing the responses in three bins; trial1 - 10, 11 - 21 and 22-32) as within subjects factor which 
did not yield any effects (p’s > .2). 
 


























































Again all ANOVA’s were performed with age group as a between subjects factor. Since the test-
phase was self paced we also performed an ANOVA on inter-trial interval (ITI) and found a significant 
effect, F(2,56) = 36.53, p < .001, η2p = .57. Post-hoc Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that adults 
responded significantly faster than infants, p’s < .001 (see Table 3). 
As in the acquisition phase, an ANOVA on RT’s showed that adults responded faster than the 
two infant age groups, F(2,56) = 89.07, p < .001, η2p = .76; all HSD ps < .001.  
Another repeated measures ANOVA on RT’s with left vs. right as within subjects factor showed 
no effect, p>.1 (see Table 3).  
More importantly for our purposes, we performed repeated measures ANOVA on RT’s with 
congruent vs. incongruent as within subjects factor, using AB as a covariate which showed that 
acquisition-congruent responses were initiated 14 ms faster than incongruent responses, F(1,55) = 4.20, p 
= .05, η2p = .07, and this effect interacted with age group, F(2,55)  = 4.38, p = .02, η2p = .14. Separate 
comparisons showed that the congruency effect was significant in adults, F(1,22) = 10.60, p = .004, η2p 
= .33, and 12-month-olds, F(1,18) = 8.51, p = .009, η2p = .32, but not in 7-month-olds, F(1,13) = 2.51, p 
= .14 (see Figure 2). Additional non parametric analysis in the 7-month-olds also failed to show an effect 
of congruency on RT’s in this group (see Table 3). 
We also performed a repeated measures ANOVA on RT’s with Time (dividing the responses in 
three bins; trial1 - 10, 11 - 21 and 22-32) and congruence as within subject factors using AB as a 
covariate. We found an overall tendency regarding the main factor of Time (F(2,102) = 2.64, p = .08, η2p 
= .05) with slower responses as the test progressed which interacted with age group F(4,102) = 3.72, p = 




as the test progressed,  F(2,32) = 7.02, p = .003, η2p = .31. No further interactions with Time were found 
p’s > .3. The main effect of congruency on RT’s was significant F(1,51) = 10.85, p = .002, η2p=.18, and 
showed that congruent responses were initiated 23ms faster. The interaction of congruency with age 
group on RT’s also reached significance F(2,51) = 5.70, p = .006, η2p = .18. Separate testing for the age 
groups revealed that the effect was significant in adults F(1,21) = 7.45, p = .013, η2p = .26, and in the 12-
month-olds, F(1,16) = 13.90, p = .002, η2p = .47, but not in 7-month-olds, F(1,12) = .95, p = .35 (see 
Table 3).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean reaction times (+SE) for adults (N=24) 7-month-olds (N=17) and 12-month-olds (N = 22) in congruent 

































Table 3. Mean RT scores of test phase (standard deviation in brackets).  
AGEGROUP 
























































Pupil dilation  
TEPRs were sorted according to congruency of the response and the stimulus- and response-
locked time functions were averaged. Segments were created, depending on the analysis, from 2000ms 
before the presentation of the sound or RT to 8000ms after while allowing for overlapping segments. 
Following the method used by Bradley et al. (2008), pupil-diameter measurement began after the initial 
pupil reflex caused by the fixation stimulus. Visual inspection showed the light reflex to end around 
500ms after effect presentation (see Figure 3). To accommodate for the variable RTs across age groups 
and conditions, we considered both stimulus-locked and response-locked TEPRs. TEPRs were calculated 
as the percentage of dilation relative to the baseline to make the data more comparable across age groups. 
First we analyzed whether the percentage of trials rejected due to erroneous data points differed 
across age groups. An ANOVA on the percentage of kept trials yielded a reliable main effect of age 
group, F(2,56)=4.30, p = .02, η2p = .13 (average percentage of kept trials: 7-month-olds  92%, 12-month-




segments were rejected than in the 12-months-olds (p = .03), and the same tendency was visible in the 
comparison of adults and 7-months-olds (p = .08), an unsurprising observation given the differences in 
attentional resources between infants and adults.  
The stimulus-locked analysis of TEPRs in congruent and incongruent trials used a 500 ms pre-
effect baseline (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). A repeated measures ANOVA pupil dilations with 
congruency as within subjects factor revealed no a priori effects of congruence on baselines (-500 to 0 
ms), p’s > .10. TEPRs start from 200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset and peak around 1200 ms post-
stimulus (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000) in the range of 500ms to 2000ms (Beatty, 1982).  We 
therefore calculated the mean TEPRs for congruent and incongruent responses as the mean percentage of 
change from baseline to 500-2000 ms post effect onset.  
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that, overall, participants showed larger relative dilations 
in incongruent trials, F(1,56) = 6.80, p = .01, η2p = .11, and this effect was not modulated by age group, 
p > .10 (see Figure 3). To have a closer look into developmental changes, we then analyzed the infant 
data separately. On average, infants showed larger relative dilations in incongruent trials, F(1,33) = 6.78, 
p = .02, η2p = .17, and this effect was not modulated by age group, p>.10. Of particular importance 
(given the reaction time results), the congruency effect remained significant when the 7-months-olds were 






Figure 3. Mean relative pupil sizes for congruent and incongruent responses, stimulus-locked. 
 
For the response-locked analysis, we calculated the percentage of dilation from a 700-ms time 
window from saccade onset on, to a 200-ms pre-response baseline. A repeated measures ANOVA showed 
no a priori effects of congruence on baselines (-200 to 0 ms), p’s > .10. The analysis of these data yielded 
a significantly larger relative dilation in incongruent than congruent trials, F(1,56) = 7.82, p =.007, η2p = 
.12, while the interaction with age group was not significant, p > .10 (see Figure 4). A separate analysis 
of the infant data showed a main effect for congruency, F(1,33) = 8.41, p =.007, η2p = .20, that was not 
modulated by age group, p>.10.  
Another version of this analysis with a 1000-ms pre-response baseline produced a different 
pattern (a repeated measures ANOVA revealed no a priori effects of congruence on baselines p’s > .10): a 
congruency effect, F(1,56) = 10.19, p =.001, η2p =.17 (see Figure 4), but also an  interaction of 




























only reliable in the 7-months-olds F(1, 14) = 10.59, p =.006, η2p = .43, while the other two groups did 
not reach significance.  
 
 






























The aim of the current study was to directly compare action-effect learning in infants and adults 
using a novel paradigm that relies on oculomotor actions that occur spontaneously and do not require 
verbal instruction. We succeeded in developing an eye-tracking paradigm that was equally suitable for 
both very young infants and adults. Moreover, the paradigm allowed for concurrently investigating the 
impact of action-effect learning on biases in, and the efficiency of action selection, as measured by 
response choice and RT, respectively, and on action effort and/or monitoring, as indicated by pupil 
dilation. 
As expected from ideomotor theory (James, 1890; Hommel et al., 2001), adults and 12-months-
olds were faster to carry out responses that were congruent with the present trigger tone (i.e., responses 
that produced this tone in the acquisition phase) than incongruent responses. The only difference between 
congruent and incongruent responses was their past relationship with the tones, which indicates that the 
congruency effect reflects associative knowledge acquired during the acquisition phase. Moreover, the 
fact that the tones now primed the response they previously had followed suggests that the underlying 
association was bidirectional in nature. Both observations are consistent with ideomotor theory and fit 
well with the observations of Herwig & Horstmann (2010), who reported oculomotor action-effect 
learning in adults. Interestingly, these authors used visual action effects while the present study employed 
auditory effects. This confirms that the mechanism underlying action-effect learning is general and not 
bound to a particular modality, as long as the effects are contingent on, and temporally close to the 
corresponding actions (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). We also found that most adults were unaware of the 
saccade-effect mapping, which is in line with the idea that action-effect acquisition is a low-level, fast and 
automatic process that does not require attention. It seems reasonable to assume that the same holds for 




The present findings fit with observations from manual actions in a developmental study of 
action-effect acquisition by Verschoor et al. (2010). In this study, reliable RT effects were found in 9-, 
12- and 18-months-olds, indicating action-effect acquisition in these age groups. We obtained a similar 
RT effect in 12-month- but not 7-months-olds. We take this to imply that, although ongoing contingent 
action-effects can influence behavior and memory at this age (Gergely & Watson, 1999; Rovee-Collier, 
1999), action-effect associations cannot yet be reversed to play an active role in prospective action 
control. This is in line with the dissociation between acquired action knowledge and the use of such 
knowledge found by Keen (2005) and Sommerville, Woodward, and Needham (2005). It also fits with 
similar dissociations in looking-time studies wherein infants are reported to possess knowledge on actions 
they cannot perform themselves (e.g. Verschoor & Biro, 2012; Csibra et al., 1999). 
Although we found an effect in the adults indicating that fast responses were more likely to be 
acquisition-congruent than slow responses (this can be taken as further evidence that action-effect 
learning relies on a fast and automatic mechanism, at least in adults), congruency effects were restricted 
to RT’s and did not affect response choice. One might assume that the lack of frequency effects suggests 
different developmental pathways with respect to manual and oculomotor actions. There are several 
arguments against this interpretation. For one, although manual free-choice studies have shown that 
presenting an action effect can bias response choice towards the response that had previously produced 
that effect in adults (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006), even in 
free-choice studies that did find a reliable effect on response frequency, frequency turned out to be less 
sensitive to action-effect learning than reaction time. For instance, Verschoor et al. (2010) obtained a 
congruency effect on response frequency in 18-month olds, but not in younger infants, while congruency 
affected reaction time in 12- and 9-month-olds as well. Since Verschoor et al. (2010) used only very few 
test trials, one might suggest that in their study extinction, which younger infants are more susceptible to 




contained considerably more test trials (which were necessary to get sufficiently clean pupil-dilation 
data). Our paradigm thus provided more opportunity for extinction since action effects were no longer 
presented during test-trials. However, we tested whether the effect of congruency on RT’s and response 
frequency declined over time and found no such effect. Even though action-effect learning can be 
demonstrated under extinction conditions in principle, extinction does make the effect weaker (Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001)—and it may have weakened it enough to selectively annihilate the frequency effect 
altogether. Moreover, Herwig and Horstmann (2011) showed under extinction conditions a reliable 
reaction-time effect in their very similar, albeit forced-choice occulomotor paradigm using even more test 
trials (32 vs. 96). This indicates long-lasting, extinction-resistant bidirectional associations.  
For another, since the current paradigm is conceptually very close to that of Herwig and 
Horstmann (2011), and the adults failed to show frequency effects, it is more likely that in the manual 
version of the action-effect task by Verschoor et al. (2010), the action effects affected response choice 
differently from the current paradigm. In manual action-effect paradigms the only attention-drawing 
events in the test phase are the presented action effects. Its mere presence is unlikely to affect action 
choice directly, so that all possible response biases can be attributed to the degree to which the action 
effect reactivated a previously acquired association, which then spread activation to the corresponding 
response representation. In other words, even though action effects attract exogenous attention, they 
eventually impact action selection in an entirely endogenous fashion. Indeed, neuroimaging studies have 
shown that the presentation of previously acquired action effects activates the supplementary motor area, 
which underlies endogenously-driven but not exogenously-driven action selection (Elsner et al., 2002; 
Melcher, Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel & Gruber, 2008; Paulus et al., 2012; Paulus, Hunnius & 
Beckering, 2013). In contrast, in our oculomotor version of the task, the endogenous impact of the action 
effect competes with the direct, exogenous impact of the saccade goals—the faces in our case. It is 




degree that the latter is too weak to determine which response is being chosen, even though it can still 
speed up congruent and/or slow down incongruent responses. Accordingly, the present findings do not 
necessarily require the assumption that action-effect learning is different in, or follows different 
developmental pathways with respect to manual and oculomotor actions. One could even speculate that 
the exogenous attention evoked had a stronger impact on the 7-months-olds, thus resulting in a lack of RT 
effect in this group. 
As expected, we found reliable effects of congruency on pupil dilation with incongruent saccades 
resulting in larger relative dilations. These findings need to be interpreted with caution, as there are no 
shared standards regarding the handling of TEPRs. TEPRs can start from 200-300ms after stimulus onset 
and peak around 1200 ms post-stimulus (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000), sometimes even later (e.g., 
Bradly et al., 2008; Beatty, 1982). The effects found do fit within these temporal dynamics. On the other 
hand, little is known about developmental and aging-related changes in these biometric variables across 
the lifespan. Since our experiment is self-paced (to ensure infant cooperation) ITI’s do vary 
systematically between age groups, with shorter ITI’s for the adults. What’s more, in the 12-months-olds 
and adults RT’s also vary with congruency. These timing factors could reduce pupillary effects in these 
age groups. Alas, due to the attentional abilities of infants standardizing the ITI’s was not an option. 
Furthermore, since light adaptation dilations decrease in amplitude and latency with increasing gestational 
age (Cocker, Fielder, Moseley, & Edwards, 2005) one could speculate that the same could hold true for 
TEPR’s. Thus ideal intervals for measuring TEPR’s and baselines may vary accordingly. Therefore, 
pupillary effects should be expected to be most pronounced in the 7-months-olds. This is indeed what we 
find. In the current study we chose intervals as suggested by the literature. However, in the literature there 




To accommodate for the variable RTs and ITI’s in the current experiment, we considered both 
stimulus-locked and response-locked TEPRs, which however yielded identical outcomes. Of particular 
interest, both analyses revealed main effects of congruency but no interaction with age. Moreover, the 
congruency effects remained reliable when being tested in the 7-months-olds alone, the only age group 
that did not show a congruency effect in RTs. On the one hand, the fact that 7-months-olds are sensitive 
to the congruency between their action and the presented action effect demonstrates that they have 
acquired information about the relationship between their actions and the novel auditory effects these 
actions produced in the experiment. Accordingly, we take this observation to indicate that even the 
youngest group was able to integrate some kind of information about actions and their effects. On the 
other hand, the dissociation between the dilation effect and the RT effect in these infants suggests that the 
two measures do not assess the same underlying processes.  
As suggested by Band et al. (2009) and Blakemore, Frith and Wolpert, (1999), action-effect 
associations may not only serve as an informational basis for action selection, the major theme of 
ideomotor theory, but also for predicting the perceptual consequences of an action. This prediction can be 
matched against the actually produced consequences in order to evaluate whether the action goal was 
reached. The late timing of our stimulus- and response-locked congruency effects in the TEPRs suggests 
that these effects were picking up processes related to action evaluation rather than action selection 
proper. Indeed, error-related-negativity-type patterns as reported by Band et al. (2009) in connection to 
action prediction have been found to be related to pupillary responses as well (Wessel, Danielmeier & 
Ullsperger, 2011). These pupillary effects might thus indicate a mismatch between expected and actual 
action effect in incongruent trials and/or reflect the thereby triggered adaptive processes that update the 
system’s knowledge about action-effect relationships. The first possibility would fit well with the 
violation-of-expectation approach suggested by Jackson and Sirois (2009), and Gredebäck and Melinder 




lines of the traditional TEPR literature—which focuses on arousal, attention allocation, cognitive load and 
mental effort. In any case, the effect reflects knowledge about action-effect contingencies, and our 
stimulus- and response-locked findings suggest that this knowledge is equally present in all three age 
groups.  
This dissociation between RT findings, which imply action-selection effects in adults and 12-
months-olds, and TEPRs, which suggest action-evaluation effects in all participants, allow for two 
important conclusions. First, the processing of an action-effect stimulus activates a representation that 
creates particular expectations, without necessarily activating the corresponding actions. This means that 
action-effect expectation may be correlated with, and perhaps even functional for action selection (Kühn, 
Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011) in older agents, but raising an expectation is not identical to 
selecting an action. Second, infants’ abilities to construct action-effect expectations develop earlier than 
their abilities to use action-effect representation for intentional action selection. A similar dissociation 
between acquisition of action-effect knowledge versus use of action-effect knowledge was reported by 
Sommerville et al. (2005). They showed that violation-of-expectation to a change of goal was influenced 
by action-effect experience in 3-months olds, while the observation of actions and their effects did not 
influence action production.  
There are several possible reasons for why selection abilities develop more slowly and why 
action-effect knowledge in the 7-months-olds affected expectation-related effects only. One possibility is 
that associations between motor patterns and novel action effects are either not yet bidirectional, too 
weak, or take too much time to retrieve to affect performance under our testing conditions. Another 
possibility is that novel action effects are not yet directly associated with actions but only with 




months of age, knowledge about relations between actions and their effects has a stronger impact on the 
prediction of action effects than on the selection of intentional actions.  
To conclude, the dissociation we obtained in 7-months-olds suggests a developmental precedence 
of action monitoring over intentional action selection. This again suggest that infants acquire the 
knowledge necessary for performing intentional actions sometime before they have (fully) developed the 
cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform intentional action (Keen, 2005; 
Sommerville et al., 2005). Combining the current data with those of Verschoor at al. (2010) suggests a 
major change in action-effect learning from just action monitoring to action selection, just before the 
ninth month of age. If one takes into account the functional and representational equivalence of self-
performed and perceived actions as suggested by Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), this 
pattern fits with data suggesting that at 6 months of age infants can understand goal directed action (e.g. 
Woodward, 1998), or more accurately, experience violation-of-expectation to a change of goal, but are 
unable to perform true intentional action (distinguishing means from ends) until around 8 to 9 months of 
age (Goubet et al., 2006; Hauf, 2007; Piaget, 1936). Our findings also fit with results from studies on 
action perception, showing that infants at 9- but not 7-months of age can use observed action-effect 
relations to guide behavior (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008). Additionally, our data suggest that motor 
resonance when listening to previously self-produced sounds in 8 months olds, as found by Paulus et al. 
(2012), might indeed reflect the existence of knowledge about action-effect relations; and yet, we do not 
necessarily expect this knowledge to result in overt behavior, at least not at 7-months of age. Similar 
evidence for action-knowledge activation during action observation has been obtained in infants as young 
as 6 months (Nyström, 2008). Some authors have argued that it is lacking representational equivalence 
between self-produced actions and observed actions that prohibits infants younger than nine months from 
imitation (Hauf, 2007). Our data, together with those of Paulus et al. (2012-2013), Verschoor et al. 




that is reached by 9 months of age, but the ability to successfully use bidirectional action-effect 














Chapter 8: The developing cognitive substrate of 
sequential action control in 9- to 12-month-olds: 
Evidence for concurrent activation models 
 
 









Nine-month-olds start to perform sequential actions. Yet, it remains largely unknown how they 
acquire and control such actions. We studied infants’ sequential-action control by employing a novel 
gaze-contingent eye tracking paradigm. Infants experienced occulo-motor action sequences comprising 
two elementary actions. To contrast chaining, concurrent and integrated models of sequential-action 
control, we then selectively activated secondary actions to assess interactions with the primary actions. 
Behavioral and pupillometric results suggest 12-month-olds acquire sequential action without elaborate 
strategy through exploration. Furthermore, the inhibitory mechanisms ensuring ordered performance 











Infants are active, goal-directed agents (e.g., McCarty, Clifton, Ashmead, Lee, & Goubet, 2001). 
Interestingly, some of the actions they produce can be considered sequential, such as reaching for a rattle 
in order to shake it — a rather simple sequence, that comprises two dissociable components that differ in 
function and motor demands. Piaget (1936) and others (Claxton, Keen, & McCarty, 2003; Hauf, 2007; 
Willatts, 1999; Woodward and Sommerville, 2000; Woodward et al., 2009) have stated that true goal-
directed action emerges around 9 months of age when infants begin to be able to organize means-end 
action sequences in the service of overarching goals. Yet, the cognitive substrate of early sequential 
action control in infants remains completely uncharted territory. The purpose of the current study is to 
explore the cognitive mechanism sub-serving sequential action control in infants. 
Development of action control in infancy 
There are three prerequisites for infants to control sequential action: that they can represent 
actions, that they can represent sequential information, and that they can combine those abilities to 
represent and control sequential action. Let us turn to the first prerequisite. There is ample evidence that 
actions are represented in terms of their effects. In his ideomotor theory, James (1890) states that actions 
are learned on the fly through sensorimotor exploration; an automatic mechanism creates bidirectional 
associations between perceived effects and the actions producing them (Hommel, 2009; Hommel et al., 
2001). These associations bring the actions under voluntary control, enabling the agent to activate the 
action by “thinking of” the corresponding effect. The theory can thus account for learning new actions 
and new goals.  
This idea is typically tested in a two-stage paradigm. Experimenters first let subjects perform 




action that previously caused it (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Greenwald, 1970). This approach resulted in 
demonstrations of bidirectional action-effect acquisition for a wide range of actions and effects in children 
(Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006) and adults, suggesting the mechanism responsible to be fast-
acting (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009), automatic (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Band et al., 2009), implicit (Elsner 
& Hommel, 2001; Verschoor, Spapé, Biro & Hommel, 2013), and modulated by the same factors that 
influence instrumental learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2004) (for a review on action-effect learning see: 
Hommel & Elsner, 2009). Furthermore, action-effects have also been found to be important for action 
evaluation (Band et al., 2009; Verschoor et al., 2013).  
Infant research has mainly been restricted to the importance of action effects for third-person 
action interpretation (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007; Hauf, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2003; Paulus, 2012; Paulus, 
Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013; Woodward, 1998, for a review, see: Hauf, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2003) and 
imitation (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008; Klein et al., 2006; for a review see: Elsner 2007; Paulus, 2014). 
Such findings are corroborative in view of the upsurge of theories stressing similar representations for 
first- and third-person action (e.g. Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum, 2009; Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; 
Melzoff, 2006, 2007; Tomasello, 1999). Interestingly, increased model- to self- similarity aids imitation 
(Shimpi, Akhtar & Moore, 2013). Yet given their focus on action understanding, such studies tell us little 
about the function action effects have for the development of action control in infancy.  
Direct evidence regarding action-effect learning was recently obtained from first-person 
paradigms similar to that of Elsner and Hommel (2001). Verschoor et al. (2013) showed that 7-month-
olds use action effects for first-person action monitoring. By eight months, infants show motor resonance 
when listening to previously self-produced action-related sounds (Paulus, Hinnius, Elk & Beckering, 
2012). The youngest infants showing evidence for reversing bidirectional action effects for action control 




and 18-month-olds (Verschoor et al., 2010). Additionally 6-, 8- (Wang et al., 2012) and 10-month-olds 
(Kenward, 2010) anticipate action outcomes. Taken together these studies illustrate that 7-month-olds 
represent and monitor first- and third-person action in terms of action effects, while 9-month-olds 
additionally use action effects for action control. 
Representing sequential information in infancy 
Another prerequisite for representing sequential action is the ability to encode sequential 
information. Infants can register whether items are consistent with familiarized deterministic or 
probabilistic sequences (Romberg & Saffran, 2013). For instance, infants are susceptible to sequential 
grammar information in speech from birth (Gervain, Berent, & Werker, 2012; Teinonen, Fellmann, 
Näätänen, Alku & Huotilainen, 2009), 3-month-olds are susceptible to spatiotemporal (Wentworth Hait & 
Hood, 2002) and audio-visual sequences (Lewkowicz, 2008) and 8-month-olds to analogous information 
in artificial sound (Marcus, Fernandes & Johnson, 2007). Studies like these suggest an implicit, early-
appearing, domain-general statistical information-acquisition mechanism for sequential information (e.g. 
Kim, Seitz, Feenstra & Shams, 2009; Kirkham, Slemmer & Johnson, 2002; Marcovitch & Lewkowicz, 
2009) thought to sub-serve action- and language-segmentation (e.g. Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran & 
Meyer, 2008; Saffran, Johnson, Aslin & Newport, 1999). Nonetheless these studies leave open whether 
infants encode ordinal information among sequence elements. Indeed, Violation Of Expectation (VOE) 
research suggests that while 4-month-old infants encode statistical sequential properties, they cannot code 
the invariant order of sequences (Lewkowicz & Berent, 2009). This ability emerges during the second 
half of the first year (Brannon, 2002; Picozzi, de Hevia, Girelli & Macchi-Cassia, 2010; Suanda, 






The reviewed literature shows that the first two prerequisites for infants’ representation of 
sequential action emerge around 9 months. Yet, the question remains whether they can actually combine 
these abilities to represent and control action sequences. Indirect evidence comes from research that 
suggests infants are able to interpret third-person sequential actions. Evaluating such actions requires 
them to be parsed in order to perceive overall syntax and ultimately their goal (Conway & Christiansen, 
2001; Lewkowicz, 2004; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark 2001). VOE studies report that around the age 
of 6 months infants start to evaluate the efficiency of sequential actions (Biro et al., 2011; Csibra, 2008; 
Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Verschoor & Biro, 2012) and causality towards their goals (Baillargeon, Graber, 
DeVos & Black, 1990; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000). Olofson and Baldwin (2011) found that 10-
month-olds take into account the kinematics of an observed reaching motion to judge whether it is part of 
a familiar action sequence. Yet, Paulus, Hunnius, and Bekkering (2011b) showed that 20-, but not 14-
month-old infants use such information to predict goals. Additionally, Gredebäck, Stasiewicz, Falck-
Ytter, Rosander and von Hofsten, (2009) showed that 14- but not 10-month-olds’ predictive eye 
movements are influenced by the models later intention with the object. Moreover, infants use social 
context to bind actions of two collaborating actors into action sequences for goal evaluation (Henderson 
& Woodward, 2011; Henderson, Wang, Matz & Woodward, 2013) and goal prediction (Fawcett & 
Gredebäck, 2013). Although these studies provide evidence that infants have some understanding of 
others’ sequential action, they do not reveal the cognitive mechanisms underlying infants’ control of their 
own sequential action 
Turning to infants’ own action control, studies on (deferred) imitation of enabling action 
sequences (sequences in which one action is temporally prior to and necessary for a subsequent action) 
report that only a subset of 9-month-olds can (immediately) reproduce such sequences under ideal 
circumstances (e.g., Bauer, Wiebe, Waters & Bangston, 2001; Carver & Bauer, 1999, 2001). Addition of 




2007). However, production of sequential action is in itself not enough to evince infants’ sequential action 
control, since subsequent actions may simply be subsequent. In enabling sequences, stimulus 
enhancement could externally trigger such sequences. Indeed, an advantage for imitating enabling- over 
arbitrarily-ordered actions is reported (e.g. Barr & Hayne, 1996; Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Wewerka , 1995; 
Mandler & McDonough, 1995, for a review see: van den Broek, 1997). Earliest evidence for imitation of 
arbitrarily-ordered action sequences is reported for 16-month-olds (Bauer, Hertsgaard, Dropik & Daly, 
1998). 
Advance planning would make a stronger point for sequential action control. Claxton et al. (2003) 
reported that 10-month-olds plan the kinematics of reaching depending on subsequent intentions. 
Furthermore, McCarty, Clifton and Collard (1999) showed that 19- but not 14-month-olds inhibit 
reaching for an object with their dominant hand when this is inefficient towards an overarching goal (see 
Cox & Smitsman (2006) for a conceptually similar result in 3-year-olds). Both McCarty et al.’s (1999) 
and Cox and Smitsman’s (2006) tasks depend on inhibition of pre-potent responses and suggest inhibition 
is important for sequential action planning (for a review see McCormack & Atance, 2011). Likewise, the 
disadvantage for reproducing arbitrarily-ordered action sequences seems to come from an increased need 
to temporally organize such sequences (Bauer, Hertsgaard, Dropik & Daly, 1998), which many theorists 
hypothesize inhibition to be crucial for (e.g. Constantinidis, Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 2002; Norman 
& Shallice, 1986). 
To sum up, the studies mentioned above suggest a rudimentary ability to control first- person 
sequential action emerges by the end of the first year. Nonetheless, these studies shed little light on the 
cognitive format of the representations themselves on which sequential action control operates. 
Understanding the cognitive ontology of such representations is essential in interpreting the results of 




Models of sequential action representation 
As there is little specific developmental literature on the subject, we turn to general psychological 
theories on sequential action control. Through the years many influential theoretical incarnations of 
sequential action representation have been conceived (de Kleijn, Kachergis, & Hommel, 2014). All of 
these theories hold that sequential actions consist of elementary actions that are somehow combined into 
sequences, as suggested the observation that the speed of sequence-initiation increases with the number of 
elements therein (e.g., Henry & Rogers, 1960; Rosenbaum, 1987). The theories can be distinguished into 
three ontological types that differ with respect to the representations action control operates on. We refer 
to them as chaining, concurrent, and integrative theories of sequential action control (see Figure 1). 
Chaining theories stress that elementary actions are selected and combined through association processes. 
Concurrent (Hebbian) theories focus on competitive processes that account for the orderly production of 








Figure 1. Models of sequential action. Schematic representation of activation in A: Chaining models of sequential 
action, activation cascades forward through the different elementary actions, B: Concurrent models of sequential action, all 
elementary actions are activated simultaniously whereafter competion through inhibition ensures the correct order of execution, 
C: Integrated models of sequential action, the sequence of actions has been integrated into a new elementary action 
. 
The prototypical theory of sequential action is James’ (1890) chaining theory. It holds that 
elementary actions can be chained by sequentially activating the anticipated effect of each element. With 
practice, the sensory effect of each elementary action becomes associated with the next elementary action 
through stimulus-response learning, thereby eliminating the need for sequential activation. The model 
thus effectively reduces sequential action representation to a combination of ideomotor and stimulus-
response learning. Furthermore, James’ theory can account for the finding that infants better encode 
enabling- than arbitrarily ordered  action sequences (Barr & Hayne, 1996; Bauer, Hertsgaard, & 
Wewerka, 1995; Mandler & McDonough, 1995), since the proposed feedback dependent effect-response 











temptingly simple, it has a number of important drawbacks resulting in additions to the model. Hull 
(1931) pointed out that to stay goal-directed and flexible during performance, the representation of the 
end state should remain active during execution to compare the actual to the expected outcome. Hull thus 
introduces hierarchy into the representation by proposing continuous activation of an overarching goal. 
Secondly, in the conception of James (1890) the second action of a sequence is cued by the sensory effect 
of the first, suggesting sequential action to rely on sensory feedback. Yet, empirical evidence suggests 
feedback mechanisms to be too slow to account for the speed of practiced sequential action (e.g. 
Sternberg, Monsell, Knoll & Wright, 1978). Greenwald (1970) suggested that instead of the sensory 
effects, the anticipated action effects of the preceding action are associated to those of the next action. 
This enables the initiation of the sequence by anticipating its end effect. However the model does not 
specify how the end effect activates the sequence instead of just the final elementary action. 
An important criticism on chaining models is that they seem to imply that elementary actions are 
equally associated with preceding and subsequent actions, making orderly performance of sequences 
impossible. In other words, chaining models of sequential action assume, but fail to describe how 
activation moves forward through the sequence. This lack of temporal dynamics in chaining models 
resulted in the emergence of a second ontological class of theories, the concurrent activation theories. 
Estes (1972) suggested an initial concurrent activation of all elementary actions by a superseding goal. 
Thereafter, temporal inhibitory processes ensure that activation moves forward through the sequence. To 
guarantee such forward flow he introduced inhibitory links flowing from each element to the next and 
secondary self-inhibition for completed elements (e.g., Henson, 1998, but also James, 1890), equivalent to 
inhibition of return in visual attention (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Houghton & Tipper, 1996). The 
concurrent model can account for the empirical finding of more prospective than retrospective intrusion 
errors (Dell, Burger, and Svec, 1997; Lindenberger, Rünger & Frensch, 2000; Rumelhart & Norman, 




thus utilize inhibition processes which are implicated in studies on action planning in infants (McCarty et 
al., 1999; Cox & Smitsman’s, 2006). 
The third class of theories, integrative theories of sequential action control, does not presuppose 
that action elements remain independent when combined into sequence. Such theories state that through 
practice elementary actions can be integrated into one common action plan or “chunk”, implying 
considerable crosstalk between the elementary actions (Miller, 1956; Sakai, Kitaguchi & Hikosaka, 
2003). Their main support comes from studies that find reductions in the sequence-length effect by 
extensive practice (e.g. Klapp 1995). Chunking of the elementary actions is possible by relating the 
sequences to internal or external context thus creating a unique identifying criterion for the associations 
(Hull, 1931). This Integration process can account for crosstalk between elementary actions and thus 
explains end-state comfort effects (Rosenbaum et al., 1990) as found in infant studies (Claxton et al., 
2003; Cox & Smitsman, 2006; McCarty et al., 1999). 
Experimental approach 
Chaining, concurrent and integrated models generate different predictions with regard to the 
spreading of activation from one sequence element to another. Consider a sequence of two elements, with 
element A preceding element B. All models imply that priming or otherwise activating A might spread 
activation to B, but they differ regarding their predictions when B is primed/activated. James’ (1890) 
chaining model would not predict that priming B leads to activation of A, since the sequence is assumed 
to be represented by unidirectional effect-response bindings (AB). Greenwald’s (1970) version would 
predict the spreading of activation from B to A, as sequences are represented by associations formed 
between the effects of the elementary actions. Conversely, concurrent activation models would predict 
that activating B leads to the inhibition of A, as activation is allowed to spread in forward direction only 




element would activate the representation of the entire sequence, including A. The aim of the present 
study was to pit these different predictions against each other. 
In the current study we were not only interested in the cognitive substrate of sequential action 
control, but also in the development thereof. Given findings that infants develop the ability for sequential 
action control around the end of the first year of life (e.g., Claxton et al., 2003), we hypothesized to find a 
developmental change in the cognitive substrate of sequential action control between 9 and 12 months of 
age. This line of reasoning is also supported by findings that the prerequisites for the ability seem to 
emerge in this interval. In 9-month-olds the ability to represent sequential information and action is 
rudimentary at best.  Nonetheless, and crucial to the experimental logic, 9-month-olds represent actions in 
terms of their effects. 
To tackle our questions regarding sequential-action control, we modified a recently developed 
gaze-contingent eye-tracking paradigm that assessed action-effect learning in infants and adults 
(Verschoor et al., 2013). This paradigm, conceptually identical to that of Elsner and Hommel (2001), 
overcomes problems arising due to limited motor control in infants (Verschoor et al., 2013; Wang et al., 
2012). Verschoor and colleagues (2013) first let subjects perform actions that lead to specific effects. 
After acquisition, they tested whether exogenously cueing the effects primes the action that previously 
caused it. The paradigm uses eye movements which infants can accurately control from 4 months of age 
(Scerif et al., 2005) and which can be considered goal-directed (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Falck-
Ytter et al., 2006; Senju & Csibra, 2008). The paradigm records Reaction Times (RTs) and Response 
Frequencies (RFs). The study of Verschoor and collegues (2013), and other recent studies that 
demonstrated saccade-effect learning in adults (Huestegge & Kreutzfeldt, 2012; Herwig & Horstmann, 
2011), showed shorter RTs for responses congruent with the previously acquired action-effect association 




effects depending on age. In 9- and 12-month-olds RT is a sensitive measure (Verschoor et al., 2010; 
Verschoor et al., 2013), while in 18-month-olds RF additionally diagnoses congruency effects (Verschoor 
et al., 2010). The paradigm concurrently records Task-Evoked Pupillary Responses (TEPRs). The use of 
TERPs is relatively new in developmental research (Falck-Ytter, 2008; Jackson & Sirois, 2009; Laeng et 
al., 2012; Verschoor et al., 2013). TERPs indicate motivational phenomena such as increased arousal 
(Bradley et al., 2008; Laeng & Falkenberg, 2007), attention allocation (e.g. Hess & Polt, 1960), cognitive 
load (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966) and mental effort (Kahneman, 1973; Hess & Polt, 1964). Whatever the 
exact interpretation of the measure, it enables us to contrast acquisition contingent vs. non-contingent 
responses since all interpretations suggested that dilations should be larger for actions requiring more 
processing. Furthermore, pupil TERPs are sensitive to congruency in all ages, showing lesser dilation 
during congruent action (Verschoor et al., 2013). Thus, given that we tested 9- and 12-month-olds, we 
mainly expected congruency effects on RTs and TERPs. 
In previous studies (that all used single-component actions), the definition of congruency  was 
straightforward: participants were exposed to two action-effect contingencies during acquisition, in which 
responses A a
congruent, while performing the same action in response to effect 2 
incongruent. Introducing actions that consist of two components (see Figure 2) renders the definition 
somewhat more complicated. Our participants were exposed to two pairs of actions and action effects 
the second components (3 or 4) and we tested whether this would affect processes related to the first 




the effect of the second element (C or D) could affect the activation of the first element (A or B). Finding 
any difference depending on congruency would provide evidence for a cognitive representation of 
sequential action in infants. Moreover, the direction of the effect would speak to the internal structure of 
that representation: While chaining and integrative models would lead one to expect facilitation (shorter 




Two age groups were tested: 14 9-month-olds (mean: 8.94 months, SD= .37, SE=.9, 5 female) 
and 16 12-month-olds (mean: 11.99 months, SD= .42, SE=.10, 9 female), another  4 9- and 7 12-month-
olds were excluded for not meeting the criterion for the minimal amount of test trials. They were recruited 
through the municipality and received small gifts as compensation. An informed consent and a 
questionnaire regarding general health and development were obtained. The infants were all healthy full-
term and without pre- or perinatal complications.  
Test environment and apparatus 
During the experiment the infants sat in a specially designed, stimulus-poor booth on the lap of 
their caretaker, who was seated in front of the eye-tracker apparatus. The distance between eyes and 
apparatus was approximately 70 centimeters (the screen’s viewing angle was 34.1° by 21.8°). The 
behavior of the infants was monitored online by the experimenter from a separate control room by means 
of a camera located above the apparatus. A 17 inch TFT-screen (1280 x 1024 pixels), equipped with an 
integrated Tobii T120 eye-tracker operating at 60 Hz, was used for visual and auditory data presentation, 




head movement by the subjects (30x22x30cm). It recorded gaze direction and pupil-size. Stimulus 
presentation was controlled by a PC running E-prime® software (Schneider et al., 2002).  
Stimuli 
The visual stimuli used were as follows (see Figure 2). The background color of the screen was 
grey. The fixation point was a brightly colored dot with a superimposed line drawing (4.3° by 4.3°). To 
keep infants interested, the color of the dot changed randomly from trial to trial (selected from eight 
colors) and the line drawing was randomly selected (without replacement) from a selection of 50 
drawings (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). As Response Areas (RA’s), we used 100 grayscale pictures 
from the “Nottingham scans” faces database, (http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk), displaying emotionally neutral 
frontal faces of 50 men and 50 women. Faces were chosen to elicit spontaneous saccades as they are 
known to attract infants’ attention (Goren at al., 1975; Johnson et al., 1991). To maximize the chance of 
finding an effect, the faces looked at the participant, since Sato and Itakura (2013) showed that eye 
contact enhances action-effect binding. We used two pairs of 200ms effect sounds which were equalized 
on loudness, “tring” and “piew” (Verschoor et al., 2013, 2012) and complex high- and low- note sound 
waves of 1574- and 776-Hz. 
Procedure 
Infants were tested at a time when they were likely to be alert. Prior to the experiment the 
caretakers were instructed not to move after calibration and gently hold the infant in order to maintain 
eye-tracker alignment, and to entertain the infant during the 1-min interruption between calibration and 
the experiment. The eye-tracker was calibrated using a 9-point calibration consisting of a small animation. 
The calibration was accepted with a minimum of eight points acquired. The experimenter could play an 
attention-grabbing sound during the experiment. If this no longer worked caretakers were encouraged to 




constant. Furthermore, luminance levels were controlled for by presenting the stimuli in a random 
fashion. After completion an explanation of the experiment was provided. 
Acquisition phase 
The experiment began with an acquisition-phase of 36 trials (see Figure 2). If during the 
acquisition phase the subject showed declining attention, the acquisition phase could be shortened 
(minimum number of acquisition trials was set at 24). In each trial participants could freely choose to 
perform one of two saccade sequences. Each saccade sequence consisted of two distinct actions, first one 
to the left or right whereafter an up- or downward action followed (depending on the mapping assigned). 
Each saccade was followed by an effect-sound which was consistently designated to left-, right-, up- and 
downward Response Areas (RA’s).  
A trial started with the fixation dot. The dot disappeared after fixation on it for an interval that 
varied (to remove any bias or habituation caused by fixed intervals), between 150- and 350-ms. After 
disappearance, photographs of two different faces (randomly selected without replacement from 100 
pictures) appeared to the left and right. The faces served as Response Area’s (RA’s). The 5.3° by 5.3° 
pictures appeared at 9.7° to center. To avoid perseverance to either side across trials the images pulsated. 
One of them started shrinking to 4.1° while the other started growing to 6.5° (side shrinking was 
randomized); one cycle from intermediate size to small, to intermediate, to large and back to intermediate, 
took 2 s.  
When a saccade towards one of the faces was detected it stopped pulsating and  the other face 
disappeared. Depending on the targeted side, one of two distinct 200ms effect-sounds (“tring” or “piew”) 
was presented (the mapping was balanced across participants). RA’s were defined as the maximum size 
of the pulsating images: 6.5° by 6.5°. A saccadic response was defined as eye movement (minimally 4.3°) 




reappeared 7.8° above or below that location (depending on the mapping) in the same dimension and 
continued to pulsate serving as RA again (again defined as the maximum size of the image). Upon 
detection of a saccade to that location (minimal 1.3°), one of two distinct 200ms effect-sounds (“high 
note” or “low note”) was presented (the mapping was balanced across participants). RTs were defined as 
the time interval between disappearance of the fixation dot and detection of a saccade in the secondary 
RA. The maximum allowable RT was 2000ms; if by then no response was detected, the trial was 
repeated. After each trial, an inter-trial-interval of 500ms was used. 
Test phase 
The test phase of 32 trials followed directly afterwards (see Figure 2). The minimum number of 
test trials to enter analysis was 22. A trial started with the fixation dot as during acquisition. However, 
after fixation (fixation time identical to acquisition), the dot remained on display for 200ms during which 
an effect-sound was presented that was previously triggered by one of the two secondary eye-movements. 
Thereafter the dot disappeared. Then, two identical 5.3° by 5.3° images of the same face (randomly 
selected without replacement) appeared 9.7° to the left and right of the screen center serving as RAs. The 
two images were identical to minimize gaze preference. To further reduce bias the faces pulsated in 
synchrony, meaning that they either both grew or shrank (randomized and with the same motion 
parameters as during acquisition). Again, the images were expected to evoke saccades. The question of 
interest was whether the direction of these saccades would be biased by the tones. Except for absence of 






Figure 2. Acquisition trial: Each trial started with an intertrial interval of 500ms. T1: A fixation dot was displayed at 
screen center. T2: After successful fixation, faces appeared at either side of the screen where they started to pulsate. T3:  
Depending on the saccade target, the face at the other side disappeared and an effect sound was played for 200ms. T4: Depending 
on which side was chosen the face moved up or down. Test trial: Each trial started with an intertrial interval of 500ms. T1: A 
fixation dot was displayed at screen center. After succesful fixation one of the previous action effects was played. T2: The dot 
diasppeared whereafter the same face appeared on both sides. T3: The participant freely chose where to saccade. 
 
Data acquisition 
E-prime® 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA) was used to collect RTs, the number 
of left and right responses and congruent and incongruent responses during test. The gaze- data files Tobii 
produced were imported into BrainVision Analyzer 1.05 (BrainProducts GmbH, Gilching, Germany) to 
analyse gaze position and pupillary data. Depending on analysis, segments were created from 2000ms 
before the presentation of the sound onset or RT, to 8000ms after, while allowing overlapping segments. 
Responses were sorted on congruency of the response and stimulus- and response-locked functions were 





after the initial pupil reflex caused by the fixation stimulus. Visual inspection showed it to end around 
500ms after effect presentation (see Figure 4) (see also Verschoor et al., 2013). Dilations were calculated 
as the percentage of dilation relative to the baseline to make the data comparable across age groups. The 
percentage of trials rejected due to erroneous data points (leaving 29 valid trials on average) did not differ 
across age groups, p > .8. Dilations of both eyes were averaged to reduce noise. Artifacts and blinks 
detected by the eye-tracker were corrected using a linear interpolation algorithm, after which a 10 Hz 
low-pass filter was applied (c.f., Hupe, Lamirel & Lorenceau, 2009). Further artifact rejection was done 
using a threshold based approach, including those segments with pupil sizes between 1 and 5 mm, and a 
maximum change in pupil size of .03mm in 17ms. Gaze data were recorded in pixel coordinates, averaged 
between eyes and filtered using a 10Hz low-pass filter. 
Given that the acquisition of action-effect associations is sensitive to the same factors as stimulus-
response learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2004), the Number Of Completed Acquisition Trials (NOCAT) 
was taken as an individual measure of action-effect learning. The Mean Acquisition Reaction Time 
(MART) was taken as an individual measure for general speed and activity. Both NOCAT and MART 
variables were used as covariates in the analyses when appropriate. 
Results and Discussion 
Acquisition phase 
First we tested for age group differences in dependent variables collected during acquisition to 
ensure that the learning experiences of the age groups were comparable (see Table 1). All ANOVA’s 
were performed with age group as a between-subjects factor. There were no effects for the percentage of 
completed acquisition trials (p >.5), mean RT (p >.5), or the percentage of right vs. left responses (p >.2) 




response location interacted with age group, F(1,25)=6.25, p= .019, η2p=.20. Separate analyses showed 
no main effect in 9-month-olds (RT-left=999ms, RT-right=104 6ms) and a tendency toward faster right-
ward responses in 12-month-olds, F(1,12)=3.84, p=.074, η2p=.24 (RT-right=982ms, RT-left=1089ms). 
Secondly, vertical response location interacted with age group, F(1,25)=4.63, p=.04, η2p=.16. Separate 
analyses showed no main effect in 9-month-olds (RT-up=1008ms, RT-down=1037ms) and a tendency 
toward faster downward responses in 12-month-olds, F(1,12)=3.82, p=.07, η2p=.24 (RT-up=1089, RT-
left=982ms). We also performed a repeated measures ANOVA on RT’s with Time (dividing the 
responses in three equal bins) and found no effect (p >.13). Lastly, we performed a repeated measures 
ANOVA on the partial RTs of the primary action to test if contraction vs. expansion had an effect on 
these  partial RTs. We found a significant effect, F(1,28)=175, p <.001, η2p=.86, indicating responses 
toward contracting pictures were slower (partial RT-contracting=603ms, partial RT-expanding=428ms). 
 



















































We concluded that the learning experiences were comparable across age groups. The interaction 
of horizontal response location and age on RTs might reflect the fluctuating emergence of general right-
side preference during the first year (Corbetta & Thelen 1999; Michel, 1998), which also affects infants’ 
eye movements (Cohen, 1972). An orthogonal effect may be reflected in our analysis of upward vs. 
downward RTs. However, little is known about such preferences. Additionally, we found that infants 
responded faster toward expanding pictures. This effect probably reflects automatic attentional processes 
to avoid collisions (e.g., Kayed  & Van der Meer, 2000; Van Hof, Van der Kamp  & Savelsbergh, 2006). 
Importantly, these observations are not detrimental to our research question since both age groups 
received approximately the same amount of training for all combinations of response locations. 
Test phase 
 All ANOVA’s were performed with age group as a between-subjects factor. There was no effect 
on the percentage of completed test trials (p >.4).  
Response frequency 
Overall, participants looked more often (64%) to the right than left side, F(1,28)=9.00, p=.02, 
η2p=.19, but the effect did not interact with age. More important for our purposes, ANOVA’s with 
congruency as within-subjects factor were not significant, adding MART,  NOCAT or both as covariates 
didn’t change this ( p’s >.2). We concluded that, if infants control sequential actions, this does not seem 
to affect the probability to choose a particular sequence. 
Reaction times 
There were no reliable effects with regard to overall RT (p > .6), left vs. right response location (p 




paced). More important for our purpose, an ANOVA with congruency as within-subjects factor, revealed 
a significant effect indicating 29ms-slower responses for congruent trials, F(1,28)=4.15, p=.05, η2p=.13; 
the interaction with age was not significant (p >.3). Although the statistics did not necessitate further 
exploration, given our directed hypothesis about age effects, we looked at both age groups separately. In 
the 9-month-olds the effect was not significant (p >.4) while in the 12-month-olds it was F(1,15)=5.47, p 
=.03, η2p=.27. A non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test confirmed these results (9-month-olds: Z=-
1.57, p=0.88, 6 of 14 infants showed the pattern, 12-month-olds: Z=-2.02, p=0.04, 12 of 16 infants 
showed the pattern). However, adding NOCAT as a covariate into the separate ANOVA for the 9-month-
olds resulted in a significant effect (F(1,12)=4.96, p=.05, η2p=.29). 
 
 























































Our main finding is: cueing of the secondary element of the action sequence interfered with 
executing its first, as evidenced by the longer RT’s for congruent responses in the 12-month-olds. Results 
were less clear in the 9-month-olds. However, using NOCAT as a covariate resulted in a similar effect in 
9-month-olds, suggesting that the Number of Completed Acquisition Trials was an important factor for 
the strength of the effect in this age group. The fact that we found an effect can be considered as evidence 
that 12-month-olds control sequential action. Performing two consecutive actions is sufficient to integrate 
them into a coherent representation. Twelve-month-olds apparently represent action sequences in a format 
that allows for interactions between the codes of their individual elements (which excludes fully symbolic 
formats). Moreover, our findings provide specific support for concurrent activation theories, as only these 











Figure 3. Mean reaction times (+SE) for 9-month-olds (N=14) and 12-month-olds (N = 16) in congruent and 



























Pupil dilation  
To accommodate for the variable RTs across age groups and conditions, we considered both 
stimulus-locked and response-locked Task-Evoked Pupillary Responses (TEPR’s). The stimulus-locked 
analysis for congruent and incongruent responses TERPs used a 500ms pre-effect baseline (Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). A repeated measures ANOVA on TERPs with congruency as within subjects 
factor revealed no a priori effects of congruency on baselines (-500 to 0ms), p’s > .7. Adults’ TEPRs start 
from 200 to 300ms after stimulus onset and peak  in the range of 500ms to 2000ms (Beatty, 1982; Beatty 
& Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). We therefore calculated the mean TERPs for congruent and incongruent 
responses as the mean percentage of change from baseline to 500-2000ms post effect onset. An ANOVA 
with MART as covariate revealed that, overall, participants exhibited larger relative pupil dilations during 
congruent responses, F(1,27)=4.12, p=.05, η2p=.13, independent of age group (p >.7). Since the time 
window was based on adult findings, which likely underestimate the pupillary reactions of the slower 
infants (Verschoor et al., 2013), we reran the analysis with a 1000-2500ms post effect onset time window. 
Again, pupil dilations were significantly larger in congruent trials, F(1,25)=5.03, p=.03, η2p=.16, 






Figure 4. Relative pupil sizes for congruent and incongruent responses to baseline, stimulus-locked. 
 
For the response-locked analysis, we calculated the percentage of dilation from a 700-ms time 
window starting at saccade onset, to the same 500ms pre-stimulus baseline. An ANOVA with MART as 
covariate yielded a tendency for larger relative dilation in congruent trials, F(1,27)=3.51, p=.07, η2p=.12, 
while the interaction with age group was not significant, p >.8 (see Figure 5). Adding NOCAT as 
additional covariate resulted in a significant effect (F(1,26)=5.48, p=.03, η2p=.17), again without an 




































































Figure 5. Relative pupil sizes for congruent and incongruent responses to baseline, response locked.   
 
Finding larger relative pupil dilations for congruent responses in both stimulus-locked and 
response-locked analyses corresponds nicely to the outcome of the RT analysis. Cueing the second 
component of an action sequence makes the execution of the first slower and more effortful. 
Gaze position 
In the test phase we primed the second element of the two-element sequences carried out in the 
acquisition phase by presenting the corresponding action effect. Activating the second element of the 
sequence might affect action planning directly. One of the second elements was an upward movement 
while the other was a downward movement. Priming these elements by their effects might induce a 
vertical bias in the direction of the cued element. Alternatively: the selection of the primary action results 













































analyzed the mean vertical deviation from the horizontal midline toward the primed action element as a 
function of congruency. To do this we collapsed all vertical deviations from horizontal midline toward the 
direction cued to one side and divided the data segments according to congruency from stimulus onset to 
650ms thereafter (corresponding to the mean RT plus mean random ITI) and compared these segments to 
a 150ms pre-effect baseline (the minimum fixation time before effect onset).  
There were no a priori effects of congruency on baselines, p> .5. An ANOVA with MART as 
covariate showed that during congruent responses gaze position deviated vertically significantly less 
toward the direction cued by the effect sound, F(1,27)=4.83, p=.04, η2p=.15 (effect size = 22 pixels; see 
Figure 6) than in incongruent responses, and this effect did not vary with age, p >.5. We additionally 
performed separate ANOVAs with MART as covariate testing congruent- and incongruent- responses 
against no deviation. The effect was significant for incongruent responses (F(1,27)=4.70, p=.04, η2p=.15) 






Figure 6. Vertical distance from midline toward cued direction of gaze position in pixels for congruent and incongruent 
responses. Time=0, is the moment the effect starts. 
 
Our gaze position findings show that priming the second action component results in activation of 
the vertical component only in incongruent trials. This might be due to competition between activated 
components in congruent trials, as concurrent models would hold: the selection of the primary action 
results in forward inhibition of the second. This finding provides further evidence for the concurrent 
model of sequential action control in infants and highlights its temporal dynamics. Moreover, the finding 

































































The aim of the current study was to examine (the development of) the cognitive substrate for 
sequential action control in 9- to 12-month-olds using a novel gaze-contingent paradigm. Relying on the 
idea that if two elementary actions are bound together in a sequence, priming the secondary action 
component would influence the availability of the primary component, we presented the infant 
participants with a two-step action sequence. While chaining and integrative models would lead one to 
expect facilitation in congruent responses, concurrent activation models would predict the opposite. Our 
major finding is that priming the second action inhibits the primary action, as indicated by latencies and 
pupil dilation. Secondly, we found an effect on gaze position indicating that action control inhibits the 
second component of an action sequence whilst preparing the first part of the sequence. Our findings on 
three different measures suggest an emerging ability for sequential action control in 9-month-olds that 
fully develops by the first birthday, and is best captured by concurrent activation models (Estes, 1972). 
From a developmental perspective our findings extend behavioral studies suggesting infants can 
control sequential action (e.g., Claxton et al., 2003; McCarty et al., 1999), and studies showing that this 
ability to be present only under ideal circumstances in 9-month-olds, or only a subset of subjects of this 
age group (Bauer, Wiebe, Waters & Bangston, 2001; Carver & Bauer, 1999, 2001; Elsner et al., 2007; 
Lukowski et al., 2005 Waters & Bangston, 2001). In addition, they are in accordance to studies 
suggesting that during the second half of the first year the ability to encode ordinal information comes 
online (Brannon, 2002; Picozzi et al., 2010; Suanda et al., 2008). The fact that evaluation of third-person 
sequential action is apparent significantly earlier in development, in 6- to 7-month-olds (Baillargeon et 
al., 1990; Biro et al., 2011; Csibra, 2008; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Verschoor & Biro, 2012), tentatively 
suggests either a different cognitive substrate or a dissociation between evaluation and production (e.g., 




Furthermore, our findings relate to infant studies (Claxton et al., 2003; McCarty et al., 1999; Cox 
& Smitsman, 2006) and cognitive theories (e.g. Botvinick & Plaut, 2004; Constantinidi et al., 2002; 
Cooper & Shallice, 2006; Estes, 1972; Norman & Shallice, 1986 Rumelhart & Norman, 1982) that 
implicate inhibition as an imperative faculty for controlling sequential action. Interestingly, inhibitory 
control begins to emerge toward the end of the first year and undergoes rapid development across the 
toddler period and into the preschool years, a pattern coinciding with age-related changes in frontal lobe 
maturation and connectivity (Diamond, 2002, Diamond et al., 2007, Luria, 1973; Wolfe & Bell, 2007). 
This onset around 1 year of age relates to the developmental timeline revealed by our results and supports 
our interpretation that inhibitory processes play an important role in the ontogenesis of sequential action 
control. 
Note that the development of inhibitory capacities has been linked to the development of time 
perception itself (Zélanti & Droit-Volet, 2011; Mäntylä, Carelli & Forman, 2007). Furthermore, in 
clinical (Barkley, 1997; Gerbing, Ahadi & Patton, 1987; Montare, 1977) and healthy populations (Foster 
et al., 2013) tests of inhibition show robust relationships to indices of timing (-deficiency). Thus the 
question arises whether the inhibitory mechanisms found are specific for action control or are general for 
representing temporal events (Fuster, 1993, 2002; Norman & Shallice, 1986). The literature reviewed 
here seems to point to the latter, suggesting temporal representations in the form of concurrent activation 
may be a precondition for sequential-action control. One might thus speculate that very early sequential-
action evaluation (e.g., Verschoor & Biro, 2012) depends on non-ordinal, or non-temporal 
representations. Interestingly, our paradigm offers a possibility to address these and related questions in 
future research. 
Concerning current theories on action control, our results seem to point to limitations in 




with regard to sequential action control, as this theory would predict activation of actions by their effects 
whereas we find inhibition of the primary action. Sidestepping the idea that inhibition of the primary 
action is not the same as inhibition of the sequence as a whole, Hull (1931) pointed out that binding of 
sequential action is possible by relating the sequences to internal or external context such as an 
overarching goal. An interesting question that such reasoning poses, is what kind of context and how such 
context may be incorporated in an overarching goal representation. Indeed action-effect learning can be 
context-specific (Kiesel & Hoffmann, 2004) which could accommodate such overarching ideomotor 
representations of action sequences. Thus we may not have succeeded in cueing the overarching goal 
because of insufficient context in the cue, and might have gotten stuck in the underlying concurrent level 
of representation. Indeed, Kiesel and Hoffmann (2004) have shown that the same actions can be accessed 
by different effect anticipations. They also claim that that response initiation has to wait for the 
anticipation of the effects that trigger the response (see also Kunde, 2003), suggesting it takes longer to 
initiate a response if it produces a long effect. Although this theory would also predict slower initiation 
for sequential actions, if one thinks of a sequence of (actions and) effects as a long effect, the theory 
cannot account for competitive processes our findings suggest. Thus we suggest ideomotor theory should 
be enhanced by incorporating overarching- and sequential- levels of goal representation. Such 
hierarchical structure might be conceived as either structural (Cooper & Shallice, 2006) or epiphenomenal 
(Botvinick & Plaut, 2004) to concurrent activation models. 
Nonetheless, our findings do suggest ideomotor processes play a role in sequential action since 
we inhibited the primary and secondary  action components by cueing the secondary action via its effect. 
Ideomotor processes have indeed been implicated in sequential action (Koch, Keller & Prinz, 2004). 
Ziessler (1994, 1998) and Elsner et al. (2007) found that action-effects play an important role in sequence 
learning and Stöcker & Hoffmann (2004) found that action effects facilitate chunking. Furthermore, the 




theory. Thus although the current findings extend cognitive theories of action control by suggesting that 
ideomotor theory needs elaborations to incorporate sequential action, they do not counter the ideomotor 
principle itself. 
Another theoretical implication of our results is that the repeated successiveness of actions in the 
acquisition phase sufficed to bind the actions into a sequence. This raises the question of what the exact 
criteria might be for such binding to occur. One could think of several dimensions for such criteria; our 
study suggests repetition, temporal closeness and spatial closeness might play a role. This is a particularly 
interesting question since its answer might provide clues as to how the cognitive system generates new 
action sequences, never performed before. However, more research is needed to answer such questions in 
more detail. For now, our results suggest that concerning infants’ own action control, sequential action 
can be picked up by exploration and does not necessarily depend on elaborate abstract or explicit 
strategies (Cleeremans & McClellend, 1991) that operate in terms of efficiency (e.g. Gergely & Csibra, 
2003) or causality (e.g., Woodward & Sommerville, 2000). 
Even though we consider the present findings as a first step towards the understanding of 
sequential-action control in infants, further research is needed to explore this model in greater detail. 
Although our paradigm produced continuous data which are temporally rich, they nevertheless should be 
considered as a snapshot of processes at work in sequential-action control. Earlier we hypothesized that 
cueing the secondary effect of the two-step sequence might have been too poor in contextual information 
to cue the overall sequence, thus resulting in local competition effects in an underlying concurrent level of 
representation. Alternatively, more dynamic explanations could be considered. For instance, it could be 
that the inhibition of the first sequence components was due to temporal differences in the process of 
activating the individual action components on the one hand and of the overarching goal representation on 




initiating simpler actions (Henry & Rogers, 1960; Rosenbaum, 1987). One could thus speculate that 
cueing the second action component activated the underlying representation quickly, but it took more 
time to activate the overarching goal representation. The eventual activation of this goal representation 
could have facilitated both components of the sequence (as proponents of integration theories might 
suggest), but that may have taken too long to be picked up by our measures. As a consequence, the 
inhibition that our findings point to may reflect an initial state of a dynamic action-planning process. 
Another possibility would be that cueing an action component that is not yet appropriate (as none of the 
secondary components was a valid action in the test phase) resulted in the inhibition of not only the first 
component but of the entire sequence, perhaps including the goal representation. We cannot exclude that 
the second component of each sequence was also inhibited—although the lack of gazing “away” from the 
direction cued by the second component suggests that it was not. The current experiment was not set up to 
distinguish between these more detailed scenarios. 
Other studies have shown end state comfort effects in infants (Claxton et al., 2003; McCarty et 
al., 1999; Cox & Smitsman, 2006) indicative of integrated representations of sequential action. In the 
current study we did not find evidence for this model. Nonetheless, we do not wish to claim that 
integrated sequential action control cannot occur in infancy. We would like to stress that the chaining, 
concurrent and integrated theories of sequential-action control are by no means mutually exclusive or 
complete. They posit useful approximations for understanding sequential actions, yet depending on exact 
circumstances relating to practice, content, time pressure and strategy, some models may be more adept 
than others at explaining specific empirical phenomenon. In our opinion a future all-encompassing theory 
of sequential action control will probably encompass elements of all three classes of theories. Indeed our 
results on gaze directions indirectly suggest an influence of the secondary action on the primary action 




diminish the importance of showing that concurrent processes are at work in infant sequential-action 
control. 
It remains essential to develop such a comprehensive theory of (the development of) sequential 
action representation, which specifically addresses the question of how novel components are integrated 
into a sequential plan, how the sequence is generated, whether this requires hierarchical representations 
and what types of information are incorporated in overarching goals. We are confident that the present 
paradigm can be helpful in answering some of these questions by introducing further modifications of the 
task (e.g., by cueing the first component and examining what effect this would have on the availability of 
the second). Since saccade-effect learning is now well established in adults (Huestegge & Kreutzfeldt, 
2012; Herwig & Horstmann, 2011) and infants (Verschoor et al., 2013) we are confident that the 
paradigm can help to increase our insight into general cognitive mechanisms underlying action planning 
since our synergy of methodology provides various measures (frequency-, RT-, pupillary- and gaze 
position measures) that can pick up different dynamic aspects of the planning process.  
In conclusion, the current study shows that sequential action can be picked up by exploration and 
does not depend on elaborate abstract strategies. Furthermore, the present findings demonstrate that 12-
month-olds are able to construct action plans comprising more than one element, and use inhibition 
mechanisms as suggested by concurrent activation models to put elements into the right temporal order. 
And lastly, we provide further evidence for the claim that the ability for sequential-action control 






















Summary and Epilogue 
The aim of the current thesis was to answer some of the questions which current developmental 
(neuro-) cognitive theories pose with regard to how infants learn to perceive, and perform goal-directed 
action. There is consensus among scholars that during the first year of life infants become sensitive to the 
goals of observed actions (e.g., Woodward, 1998), to the means by which they are achieved (e.g., Gergely 
et al. 1995) and use this information to predict future events and guide their own action (e.g., Elsner & 
Aschersleben, 2003). Nevertheless, the cognitive mechanisms that subserve these abilities are still under 
debate. Before discussing in more detail the (preliminary) answers the current empirical work offers, the 
main findings of the empirical chapters of the thesis will be summarized. Lastly, the implications for 
further research and my current opinion on what theoretical view best captures the current findings in the 
field will be presented. 
Summary 
Chapter 2 presents a study that investigated the relative importance of outcome-selection 
information vs. means-selection information.  Many studies that use Woodward’s (1998) VoE paradigm 
show that outcome-selection information (information presented by the choice an actor makes between 
potential outcomes) is important for infants’ goal perception. On the other hand, a significant number of 
studies in the tradition of Gergely et al. (1995) show that means-selection information (information 
presented by the efficiency of the action toward the outcome in regard of the situational constraints) is 
important for infants’ goal perception. Until now the relative importance of these two types of 
information has not been directly compared, partially due to the conceptually different paradigms used to 
investigate them. In this study these two types of paradigms were combined. It was found that when 
outcome selection information was presented, but the means were inefficient toward the goal, 7- and 9-




selection information displays primacy over outcome selection information not only for adults but also for 
infants. The early presence of this bias sheds light on the nature of the notion of goal in action 
understanding. Furthermore, the central claim of the “theory of rational action” - that infants only attribute 
a goal to an action if the action can be evaluated as an efficient action toward the end-state in the given 
situation - has so far only been supported by relatively indirect evidence. The experimental paradigm that 
had been used to investigate this theory tested infants’ predictions about the means, and not the goal, of 
the action. However, the finding that infants do not generate a specific expectation about the new means if 
the initial action is non-efficient only suggests, but does not prove, that infants do not in the meantime 
attribute a goal to the initial action. Infants may have given up on predicting the means, but could in 
principle have relied on the end-state of the action to infer it as the goal. The current paradigm enabled 
testing the expectations about the goal of the action by providing two possible end-states. The finding 
thus confirms that if the action, the end-state, and the situational constraints do not form a relation that 
satisfies the principle of efficient action, then infants do not commit themselves to a specific goal. In sum, 
this study showed that infants' early understanding of goal-directed actions is similar to that of adults as 
far as the relationship between means selection and outcome selection information is concerned. The 
early presence of the preferential bias for means selection information may suggests that this bias is not 
an acquired, but rather a core property of the cognitive mechanisms of goal attribution and thus it sheds 
light on the nature of the notion of goal. 
Chapter 3 utilizes a similar paradigm to chapter 2, integrating the Woodward- (1998) and Gergely 
et al.- (1995) type paradigms to further investigate how means-selection information relates to outcome-
selection information.  It is possible that infants appeal to one goal-like notion (e.g., 'preference') in 
situations that provide outcome selection information, and to another one (e.g., 'planning') when they 
receive evidence on means selection. Alternatively, a unitary concept of goal explains the results of both 




transfer of goal attribution from situations with one type of information to situations in which the other 
type of information is available.  Thus the central question in this chapter is if infants can transfer goal 
attribution from a situation in which only means information is presented toward one goal, to a situation 
in which there two possible outcomes. In other words, does observing an actor efficiently adjusting his 
action to situational constraints, lead infants to expect that the actor will continue to approach the same 
goal after another potential outcome is presented in the scene? Such transfer would indicate that both the 
Woodward- (1998) and Gergely et al.-(1995) type paradigms tap into the same unitary concept of goal 
that can rely on both outcome- and means- information. It was found that 12-month-olds who had 
attributed a goal based on the causal efficiency of a means-end action, generated expectations about the 
actor's action in another scenario in which the actor could choose between alternative outcomes. This 
finding thus suggests that, by 12 months, infants possess a unitary concept of goal. 
The fourth chapter explores the question how experience with a certain movement can influence 
goal attribution. More specifically, the hypothesis was investigated that, linking a novel first-person 
and/or third-person action to a salient action effect, is critical for infants to interpret a novel third-person 
action as goal-directed. The findings suggest that 12- but not 9-month-olds, provided they have 
previously associated the novel action with a salient visible outcome in another context, can assign a goal 
to the action even in the absence its outcome. On the other hand, the control condition suggests that prior 
experience with the action, but without the salient effect, does not lead to goal-directed interpretation of 
the novel action. The finding thus demonstrates the essential role action effects play in the developing 
ability of infants’ goal-directed understanding of novel actions. 
To further validate ideomotor theory as a cognitive developmental theory, chapter five replicates 
previous findings (Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006) that indicate that 4-year-old children can 




aim of the study, was to investigated whether action-effect associations are also acquired under explicit-
learning conditions, and whether familiar action-effect relations (such as between a trumpet and a trumpet 
sound) are learned the same way as novel, arbitrary relations are. Findings suggest that explicit learning 
produces the same bidirectional action-effect associations as implicit learning does, that non-arbitrary 
relations improve performance without affecting learning per se, and adults and young children show 
equivalent performance—apart from the common observation that children have greater difficulty to 
withstand stimulus-induced action tendencies. 
The next two chapters represent the first attempts to provide direct evidence for the spontaneous 
acquisition of bidirectional action-effect associations in infancy. In chapter six a highly simplified version 
of the Elsner and Hommel paradigm (2001) was applied. First evidence for the spontaneous acquisition of 
bidirectional action-effect associations in 9- 12- and 18-month-olds was found, suggesting that the 
mechanism underlying action-effect integration is in place at the latest around 9-months-old.  
Chapter seven is methodologically more advanced adaptation of the Elsner and Hommel 
paradigm (2001). The paradigm was made suitable for all age groups ranging from 7-month-old infants to 
adults, and employed a novel pupillometric and oculomotor paradigm to study developmental changes in 
the role of action-effects in the acquisition of voluntary action across the lifespan. The findings suggest 
that both 7- and 12-months olds (and adults) can use acquired action-effect bindings to predict action 
outcomes but only 12-months-olds (and adults) showed evidence for employing action-effects to select 
actions. This dissociation supports the idea that infants acquire action-effect knowledge before they have 
developed the cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform intentional 
actions.  
The last empirical chapter of the thesis used the newly developed methodology from chapter 




was to contrast chaining-, concurrent- and integrated models of sequential-action representation. Nine- 
and 12- month-olds were taught action sequences consisting of two elementary actions. Thereafter the 
secondary action was selectively activated to assess any interactions with the primary action. Results 






Chapter 2, 3 and 4 were concerned with the question how infants learn to perceive others’ actions. 
In general, the first three chapters of this thesis provide evidence that third-person action perception 
processing relies on several different sources of information. Chapter 2- and 3 show that the efficiency of 
an action is an important source of information for goal perception. Chapter 2 further suggests that it is 
more important than ends-selection information. Chapter 4 goes on to provide evidence for the notion that 
action-effect knowledge plays an important role in action perception.  
Taken together the first three studies show that during the first year of life infants acquire a 
unitary concept of goal. Chapter 2 shows that at least by 7-months of age previously obtained means-
selection information can transfer to predictions in situations involving two potential outcomes, and at 
least by 12-months of age, action-effect knowledge can transfer to predictions in situations involving two 
potential outcomes (Sommerville et al. (2005) provide evidence for similar transfer at 3.5-months of age). 
These transfers suggests that at the latest by age one, all three types of information feed into a unitary 
generalized concept of goal. Such a unitary concept of goal suggests a more sophisticated higher order 
interpretation of the current findings regarding infant goal attribution than just preference- efficiency- or 
action-effect detection. It suggests infants to recognize a "common denominator" in different aspects of 
human behavior, namely planning, action-effect relations and the expression of preference.  
Nevertheless, in the current thesis both types of transfer: (1) from means selection information to 
situations that involve ends-selection information, and (2) from action effect knowledge to situations that 
involve ends-selection information, have only been shown in one direction. In principle, to truly show 
that these types of information are processed in reference to a unitary goal concept, transfer should also be 
possible in the opposite direction. Showing transfer in the opposite direction of (1) should be impossible. 




an end is to a certain extent the same thing as an action effect. Additionally, transfer from means selection 
information to situations where action effects are presented (3) and its reverse, should in theory also be 
possible. How would one go about to test these hypothesis, or is there evidence corroborating these 
hypothesis?  
To test the first assumption (transfer in the opposite direction of (1)) one would need to design a 
new VoE paradigm. In the familiarization phase infants should see an actor repeatedly touching one of 
two toys. Where after, in the test phase infants should be shown the actor reaching efficiently or non-
efficiently for the same toy (the other toy is not presented in the test phase). If transfer has occurred 
infants should expect an efficient approach to the toy and therefore should look longer at an inefficient 
action. On the other hand, if no transfer occurred they should not have a specific expectation as to the 
efficiency of the action shown. As a control condition infants should be shown efficient and inefficient 
reaches toward the new toy (the old toy is not presented). Since no goal attribution took place for this toy 
infants should not differentiate between the two test events. Further research should investigate this 
hypothesis. 
The second proposed reversal of transfer (2) is already tested indirectly in 8-month-olds using 
EEG by Paulus et al. (2013). In their study they showed that the effects of actions that they had seen their 
parents do, elicited greater motor activation in infants than effects that were not associated with actions. 
This evidence indicates that infants can acquire action effect associations by observing others’ actions. 
The third type of transfer (3) (transfer from means selection information to situations where 
action effects are presented) is again testable. One would need to adapt the Gergely et al. (1995) paradigm 
in the following way. The familiarization should be conceptually the same as in the original paradigm; a 
small ball repeatedly approaches a big ball. In one group of infants the small ball adjusts its approach to 




group the ball approaches the big ball inefficiently, again starting from the middle. In the test phase the 
big ball is located on the opposite side as compared to the familiarization phase. The test phase should 
have two potential outcomes; one wherein the small ball approaches the big ball in a straight line and 
another wherein the small ball moves away from the big ball in a straight line. If transfer occurred, infants 
should expect the same outcome (or action effect) again (the big ball touching the small ball) even though 
it moves in the opposite direction as in the familiarization phase. Furthermore, this effect should only 
occur for the group of infants that were familiarized to the efficient approach. The opposite direction of 
the proposed transfer can also be tested. In the familiarization phase a small ball starting from the middle 
moves towards a big ball. In the test events the small ball moves toward the big ball which is now on the 
other side and adjusts its path to efficiently jump over an obstacle or the ball efficiently moves away from 
the bigger ball, efficiently jumping over an obstacle. If transfer took place, infants should look longer at 
the efficient jump away from the big ball.  
Providing additional evidence for the reverse transfer of (1) and (2), and providing evidence for 
(3) and its reverse, would further strengthen the notion of an overarching unified concept of goal. As 
mentioned earlier such a unified concept would indicate a rather advanced goal perception. Furthermore, 
the developmental pathway of the integration of these types of information into a unified concept is of 
great interest to elucidate the ontology of the concept of goal, and should be investigated further. 
The second part of the thesis was concerned with how actions are learned by experience. There is 
ample corroborating evidence suggesting (just as chapter 3 does) that infants use action-effect 
associations for third-person action perception (for a review, see: Hauf, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2003), 
imitation (for a review, see: Elsner 2007; Meltzoff, 2007) and exploration behavior (Elsner & 
Aschersleben, 2003). However, these studies do not provide direct evidence for the crucial bidirectional 




assume that learning new goals (learning new bidirectional action-effect associations) should be 
supported by the same mechanism as that found in adults (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Thus the first aim of 
the second section of the thesis was to generate direct evidence for bidirectional action-effect uptake. The 
secondary aim was discover the developmental pathway the uptake of bidirectional action-effect 
associations follows. 
After we succeeded in replicating the findings of Eenshuistra et al. (2004) and Kray et al. (2006) 
that indicate that 4-year-old children can form bidirectional action-effect associations similarly to adults, 
we went on to search for the same mechanism in infants. In chapter 6 and 7, we present first direct 
evidence for the uptake and use of bidirectional action-effect associations in infancy and therefore 
achieved our primary aim. 
Furthermore, combining the findings of chapter 6 and 7, our findings suggests a major change in 
action-effect learning from just action monitoring to action selection, just before the ninth month of age. 
In chapter 6 we found evidence indicating that learned action-effects influence action control starting at 9 
months of age and do so progressively more at 18 months of age. In chapter 7 we showed that although 
infants at 7 months of age do take up action-effect knowledge, they do not use it (under the conditions of 
the experiment) for action control. The dissociation we obtained in 7-month-olds suggests a 
developmental precedence of action monitoring over intentional action selection. Additionally we showed 
that 12-month-olds and adults showed employed action-effects to select actions in a similar fashion 
indicating that the same mechanism found in adults is already in place during infancy. Taken together the 
studies suggest a major change in action-effect learning from just action monitoring to action selection, 
just before the ninth month of age. 
In chapter 8 our findings demonstrate that young infants are able to construct action plans 




the right order. Even though we consider the findings as a first step towards the understanding of 
sequential-action representation in infants, the details of the suggested scenario are not entirely clear yet. 
We nonetheless present first evidence that infants are able to represent first-person sequential actions. 
Furthermore our finding is in agreement with the concurrent activation approach to sequential action 
(Estes, 1972) but not with integrative and chaining theories. It seems essential to develop a more 
comprehensive theory of (the development of) sequential action representation, which would need to 
address how novel components are integrated into a sequential plan, how the sequencing is generated, and 
whether this requires hierarchical representations. We are confident that the paradigm presented in 
chapter 8 can be helpful in answering some of these questions, especially by introducing further 
modifications of the task. 
Due to the setup of our particular paradigm in chapter 3, we could not differentiate whether the 
action-effect knowledge that enabled goal perception came from prior first-person experience or whether 
prior observance of others’ action effects was sufficient. Sommerville’s et al. (2008) findings seem to 
suggest that self-experience is primary to observed action-effect perception. However, taken together with 
the findings of Sommerville et al. (2005) who used a conceptually close paradigm to ours, and a 
significant number of studies that used other methods (a review, see: Hauf, 2007; Elsner 2007; Melzoff, 
2007), our finding suggests an important role for action-effect knowledge in third-person action 
perception. Furthermore, Paulus et al. (2012, 2013) showed that action-effects of observed actions elicit 
similar motor activity in the brain of 9-month-old infants as those of those of self-produced actions (in 8-
month-old infants). This finding suggests that infants represent first-person- and third-person- action-
effect knowledge in the same way. Thus these results are also compatible with theories, such as the 
Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), embodied cognition as a whole, and simulation theories 





If one takes into account the functional and representational equivalence of self-performed and 
perceived actions as suggested by Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), this pattern fits with 
data suggesting that at 6 months of age infants can understand goal directed action (e.g. Woodward, 
1998), or more accurately, experience violation-of-expectation to a change of goal, but are unable to 
perform true intentional action (distinguishing means from ends) until around 8 to 9 months of age 
(Goubet et al., 2006; Hauf, 2007; Piaget, 1936). Our findings also fit with results from studies on action 
perception, showing that infants at 9- but not 7-months of age can use observed action-effect relations to 
guide behavior (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008). Additionally, our data suggest that motor resonance when 
listening to previously self-produced sounds in 8-months-olds, as found by Paulus et al. (2012), might 
indeed reflect the existence of knowledge about action-effect relations; and yet, we do not necessarily 
expect this knowledge to result in overt behavior, at least not at 7-months of age. Similar evidence for 
action-knowledge activation during action observation has been obtained in infants as young as 6 months 
(Nyström, 2008). Some authors have argued that it is lacking representational equivalence between self-
produced actions and observed actions that prohibits infants younger than nine months from imitation 
(Hauf, 2007). Our data, together with those of Paulus et al. (2012, 2013), Verschoor et al. (2010), 
Nyström (2008), and Sommerville et al. (2005), suggest that it is not representational equivalence that is 
reached by 9 months of age, but the ability to successfully use bidirectional action-effect associations, 
learned either by observation or experience, for voluntary action.  
Indeed, action-effect associations could even be a basis for simulation itself. One of the main 
problems of simulation theories is the problem of how “supra modal codes”, as Meltzoff (2007) calls 
them, can emerge. Supra modal codes refer to action representations that unite first- and third-person into 
a common representational framework. Such representations allow infants to see the behaviors of others 
as commensurate with their own. Based on a ‘like me’ perception of others, infants could use these codes 




is with us from birth based on findings showing early imitation of facial gestures in newborn infants 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1997). However other theorists would predict the emergence of this 
supramodal space thru experience (e.g., Hommel, 2003). Hommel (2003) hypothesizes that action-effects 
themselves bridge the gap between first- and third person action representation (as chapter 3 suggests). 
This would work something like this: if an infant performs a certain action this produces perceivable 
effects, if another person produces similar perceivable effects these effect trigger the infant’s motor 
representation of their own action. This simple mechanism thus generates a certain perceptual equivalence 
in action representation of first- and third- person action (e.g., Paulus et al. 2012- 2013). Furthermore, 
unlike theories that propose that perception is translated automatically into supramodal codes, this theory 
can account for simulation of non-human actions. 
Lastly, a finding from chapter 2 requires further discussion, the finding that by 7-months of age 
infants will only attribute a goal to an action if it is efficient, regardless to whether outcome selection 
information could disambiguate the action. In the discussion of chapter 2 the early presence of the 
preferential bias for means selection information is taken to suggest that the principle of rational action is 
a “core property” of the cognitive mechanisms for goal attribution. Although, Csibra and Gergely (1998) 
state that the principle of rational action is the initial state of the infants’ naïve psychological theory, this 
“core property” does not necessarily have to be innate or come online via a process of maturation. It could 
also be learned. If one takes the perspective of embodied cognition and TEC seriously, one could go on to 
theorize in the following way. Infants, who have limited amounts of energy, are actors themselves. 
Therefore they should quickly learn, by evaluating action-effect contingencies, that acting efficiently 
toward a desired end state saves time and effort. If one further assumes that cognition emerges from 
sensory-motor processing, like embodied cognition does, one could assume that infants first internalize 





 By using innovative paradigms, the present thesis provides convincing evidence that action-effect 
learning, and sensorimotor processes in general play a crucial role in the development of action- 
perception and production in infancy. This finding was further generalized to sequential action. 
Furthermore the thesis suggests that means-selection-, ends-selection information, and action-effect 
knowledge together feed into a unitary concept of goal. Both these findings have the potential to generate 
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In dit proefschrift worden de resultaten van het onderzoek “Learning about goals: Development 
of action perception and action control” beschreven. De mens is gedwongen zich aan te passen aan zijn 
immer veranderende omstandigheden. Dit doet de mens door doelen na te streven. Gezien de constante 
veranderingen die onze omgeving ondergaat en de flexibiliteit waarmee de mens hierop kan reageren, is 
het zeer onwaarschijnlijk dat  zulke doelen aangeboren en onveranderlijk zijn. Aangezien de mens zonder 
het vermogen om doelen te stellen niet zou kunnen overleven, is de vraag hoe de mens doelen stelt en 
intentioneel handelt allerminst triviaal. 
Aangenomen dat doelen niet (allemaal) zijn aangeboren, rijst de vraag hoe de mens nieuwe 
doelgerichte handelingen kan leren. In principe is het antwoord op deze vraag op het eerste gezicht 
simpel: de mens leert doelgericht te handelen door te leren van wat anderen doen en door eigen ervaring. 
Echter als men wat kritischer naar dit antwoord kijkt komen nieuwe vragen op zoals “Hoe leren mensen 
van anderen?”. Om te leren van de doelgerichte handelingen van anderen moet de mens doelgerichte 
handeling en toevallige beweging kunnen onderscheiden. “Hoe neemt de mens een handeling van een 
ander als doelgericht waar?” is dus een logische vervolgvraag. Aangezien communicatie onmogelijk is 
zonder waarneming van andermans doelen, en de mens van nature sociaal is, is het vermogen om doelen 
te onder?”.  
Aangezien het vermogen doelgericht te handelen zich ontwikkelt gedurende de eerste paar 
levensjaren is het een logische stap om doelgericht handelen te onderzoeken bij zuigelingen. In deze 
dissertatie worden achtereenvolgens de volgende vragen onderzocht “ Hoe leren zuigelingen doelgerichte 
handelingen van anderen waar te nemen?” en “Hoe leren zuigelingen zelf doelgerichte handelingen uit te 






Doelgericht handelen leren door anderen te observeren 
Deze theorieën stellen verschillende soorten informatie voor als criterium voor zuigelingen om te 
beoordelen of een handeling doelgericht is. De zogenaamde “Teleological stance” theorie stelt dat de 
manier waarop een handeling wordt uitgevoerd ten opzichte van de omgeving een cruciale factor is om te 
bepalen of het gaat om  intentioneel handelen. Meer associatief georiënteerde theorieën voorspellen dat 
het herhaaldelijk dezelfde uitkomst kiezen uit verschillende mogelijkheden een cruciale factor is. In de 
hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 word onderzocht welke van deze twee soorten informatie belangrijker is voor het 
waarnemen van doelen op basis van geobserveerde handelingen, de manier waarop een handeling wordt 
uitgevoerd of welke uitkomst er wordt gekozen. De resultaten van deze onderzoeken suggereren dat de 
manier waarop de handeling wordt uitgevoerd (in dit geval dat de handeling wordt aangepast aan de 
omstandigheden) belangrijker is dan welke keuze er wordt gemaakt. Bovendien suggereren de resultaten 
dat zowel keuze van uitkomst, als manier van uitvoering dezelfde doelattributie beïnvloeden. Dit laat zien 
dat zuigelingen al vroeg in plaats van twee losstaande concurrerende concepten, een abstract concept van 
doelgerichtheid hebben waarin beide vormen van informatie een rol spelen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden twee andere theorieën tegen elkaar getoetst. De motor resonantie theorie 
beweert dat het cruciaal is om ervaring te hebben met een bepaalde handeling om deze bij anderen als 
doelgericht te kunnen waarnemen. Anderzijds benadrukt de Ideomotor theorie dat handelingen alleen als 
doelgericht worden beoordeeld als ze opvallende effecten teweeg brengen. Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat 
zuigelingen die zelf ervaring opdeden met een voor hen nieuwe handeling die opvallende effecten 




Terwijl zuigelingen die weliswaar dezelfde ervaring kregen maar dan zonder opvallend effect, dezelfde 
handeling niet als doelgericht waarnemen. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat ervaring met een bepaalde 
handeling op zich niet voldoende is om deze handeling, wanneer deze wordt uitgevoerd door iemand 
anders, te zien als doelgericht. Naast de ervaring met de handeling is het cruciaal om te hebben ervaren 
dat een dergelijke handeling opvallende effecten kan veroorzaken. 
Nieuwe doelen leren door ervaring 
Het tweede deel van de dissertatie behandelt het aanleren van nieuwe doelen door ervaring. De 
Ideomotor theorie behelst dat men eerst informatie moet vergaren over samenhangen tussen bewegingen 
en hun gevolgen om deze later intentioneel te kunnen toepassen. Hoe dit werkt illustreer ik aan de hand 
van een voorbeeld. Als een baby voor het eerst een rammelaar ziet weet hij/zij niet dat deze kan 
rammelen. De baby zal uit gezonde interesse de rammelaar gaan onderzoeken. De kans is groot dat op een 
gegeven moment de baby per toeval een beweging maakt (actie) die een rammel geluid tot gevolg heeft 
(effect). De Ideomotor theorie beweert dat actie en effect vanaf nu aan elkaar verbonden zijn via een 
verbinding die twee kanten opgaat. Dit betekent dat wanner de baby weer dezelfde beweging (met de 
rammelaar) maakt, hij/zij het rammel geluid verwacht. Andersom betekent het ook dat als de baby aan het 
rammelgeluid denkt hij/zij automatisch ook denkt aan de bijbehorende (rammel) actie. Door dit principe 
kunnen zuigelingen door middel van exploratie een arsenaal aan actie-effect verbindingen opdoen die 
later gebruikt kunnen worden om doelgerichte handelingen uit te voeren.  
Er is veel evidentie gevonden voor het ideomotor principe in volwassenen en er werd vaak zonder 
direct bewijs aangenomen dat het ook toepasbaar is op kinderen. De doelstelling van de volgende vier 
hoofdstukken is te bewijzen dat de Ideomotor theorie toepasbaar is op de ontwikkeling van doelgericht 
handelen. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt aangetoond dat actie-effect leren op een vergelijkbare manier werkt in 4 




ook toepasbaar is op zuigelingen van 12 maanden, maar nog niet op 9 maanden oude zuigelingen. 
Aangezien we hadden verwacht dat ook 9 maanden oude zuigelingen actie-effect leren zouden laten zien 
(omdat deze wel al doelgericht kunnen handelen) zijn we in hoofdstuk 7 op zoek gegaan naar een betere 
methode om actie-effect leren te meten bij zuigelingen. In dit hoofdstuk hebben we actie-effect leren 
onderzocht door middel van oogbewegingen en pupillometrie. Met deze methode waren we wel in staat 
om actie-effect leren aan te tonen bij 9 maanden oude zuigelingen. Bovendien konden we met deze 
methode een directe vergelijking maken tussen volwassenen en zuigelingen. In hoofdstuk 8 hebben we 
deze nieuwe methode verder ontwikkeld om hem ook toepasbaar te maken voor het vrijwel totaal 
onontgonnen onderzoek naar het aanleren van sequentiële acties. 
Samenvattend laat dit proefschrift zien dat zuigelingen al vroeg een abstract concept van 
doelgerichtheid ontwikkelen waarvoor ze gebruik maken van verschillende soorten informatie. Verder is 
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